Evidence of meeting #5 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 44th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was russia.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
Mr. Chair, I'm so sorry to interrupt. I know this is very important, but I wonder if it would be possible for me to move a motion before the panel begins, so I don't have to interrupt them towards the end of the meeting?
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Ms. McPherson, we have very little time as it is. This is a compressed panel. We've agreed to take the panel on this afternoon and listen to their testimony.
Is it a point of order you're raising?
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
It is the motion that I've brought forward that I would like to read into the record, so I can ask for unanimous consent on it.
It will take only a moment to read it into the record, if that's okay.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
From our exchange earlier with the clerk, I believe the motion is already formally moved. Therefore, procedurally, reading it into the record would not have an additional effect.
You're welcome to use your allocated time to read the motion into the record, if that's procedurally correct, but I believe you could speak to it at the next meeting, because it's already been submitted.
I'd like to ask the clerk to verify. I'm mindful of the clock, Ms. McPherson. We have invited this panel and we want to move forward.
Madam Clerk, what's the procedural status of Ms. McPherson's motion, if it's the same motion we're even talking about? I want to make sure it is. It may be a new motion, in which case—
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
It's the motion to invite the Ambassador of the United States to come to the committee.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Madam Clerk, can we circle back and get the procedural effect of reading that into the record? Does that add anything at this point?
The Clerk of the Committee Ms. Erica Pereira
Notice has been given to members of Parliament. At this point, it has not been read into the record. All that would do is make the motion available to be seen publicly, but it would not be able to be debated.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Ms. McPherson is procedurally free to do so in her allocated time, I would assume.
I'm getting a nod.
Ms. McPherson, I would invite you to use your allocated speaking time if you wish to put that statement on the record.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Briefly, to go back to the process, I will let witnesses know that simultaneous interpretation is available at the bottom of your screen by clicking the globe icon. You have the floor feed, French or English audio.
Each of you will have five minutes to make opening statements. I'll be very strict on time, especially given that we are under compressed time frames this afternoon.
What I will do once you are approaching 30 seconds in your opening remarks is hold up this yellow card as a cue. That will also serve as a guide in subsequent questions and answers with members of the committee. Keep an eye out. It's a very manual way, but it seems to work at some level. Be conscious of the fact that time is allocated very tightly.
I would like to introduce our witnesses and then turn it over to our first speaker. We have Anessa Kimball, who is an associate professor of political science and director at the Centre for International Security, École supérieure d'études internationales, Université Laval. We have Fen Osler Hampson, chancellor's professor at Carleton University and president of the World Refugee & Migration Council. We have Dr. Olga Oliker, program director, Europe and Central Asia, of the International Crisis Group.
Professor Kimball, I will give you the floor for your opening remarks, for five minutes. Please go ahead.
Anessa Kimball Associate Professor of Political Science, Directorate, Centre for International Security, École supérieure d’études internationales, Université Laval, As an Individual
Thank you for the privilege to share reflections on the situation at the Russia-Ukraine border. These remarks examine the role of international organizations, the nature of stakeholder commitments and whether institutions can return regional peace and stability. Then I'll close with some recommendations.
On international organizations, it's fair to say that Russia with China will prevent action from the United Nations Security Council, and there would be a probable veto of the use of any sort of peacekeeping forces on the border area. The European Union right now appears to be working through Macron as its legitimate speaker, but it is struggling to maintain a common position. You've just heard testimony about the pipeline politics, more or less. This essentially divides the U.S. from Germany and France, and is also creating internal frictions.
When it comes to NATO, Russia does not want it to be formally involved in what it sees classically as an internal historical issue. Of course, though the U.S. would prefer NATO's involvement for strategic reasons, Russia has called for a shift to the OSCE.
In terms of stakeholder commitments, there are both risks and externalities but also opportunities. When it comes to sunk costs, Canada has its training mission in the Ukraine, and Royal Canadian Air Force personnel based in Romania. Allied troops are in the east, serving as a trip wire and a risk for accidents, hybrid wars, including cyber-attacks, information wars and so on.
The institution and other actors, such as NATO, have tied hands by giving an open-door policy to Ukraine. Right now we have a migration and human rights crisis. While we're trying to prevent porous borders, territorial integrity is symbolically and functionally key, given multiple risks working at the same time.
At the same time, NATO has committed to not repositioning assets of mobile land-based strategic defence. Patriot and THADD systems are absent, despite Russia's placing Iskander missiles in the area. Their use by Russia would be a public gamble to up the ante and escalate. Russia prefers modifications without violence. For it, the threat of future strategic uncertainty being perceived today as prohibitively costly can force actors to negotiate.
We talked a bit about targeted sanctions. I see these mostly as a short-term punishment that Russia can mitigate by adjusting market size or price rather easily. Again, spring is arriving in Europe in the next few months, so its energy leverage will be reduced.
What we have seen is that Russia has hardened the Ukrainian border, with parts of at least 11 of its 13 armies deployed. Shifting so many forces far to the west means it is comfortable with this much exposure to China in the east.
How is this possible? Russia and China have a functional non-aggression act, which is permitting them to split western partner attention between securing the eastern border of NATO, which Canada, the U.S. and partners have highly invested in both defensively, economically and politically, and attempting to deter Chinese irregular territorial expansion in Southeast Asia.
Naval and air dominance are at risk in Southeast Asia. What we see now are large joint military and naval operations between the Chinese and Russians, indicating growing functioning defence and security co-operation. Together, these countries are hedging against the U.S. and the democratic order. They have resolved multiple territorial disputes over the last 20 years and deepened technical co-operation, creating what they themselves have called a “strategic alliance partnership”, risking bilateral strategic vulnerability to each other to counter the U.S. and the west.
Russia benefits from Chinese economic investments and intellectual and human capital, while both advance their defence and security industrial sectors jointly. Importantly, they disagreed on aspects of the belt and road initiative, but it was a key security and economic integrator for both countries that resulted in regional and global defence security implications, and it was accomplished using informal means of co-operation.
Right now, they have a short-term resolution to their joint commitment problem. The commitment is to not fight each other and to refrain from being involved in each other's respective regional issues while focusing on the independent but linked economic development and national security agendas. Russia sees China as helping prevent its decline by not meddling in Europe, while China appreciates Russia's tacit non-intervention in the Far East, both benefiting from a shared blindness to human rights abuses of ethnic and religious minorities.
What could the OSCE do? It is the only institution right now that Russia is a member of. It can do conflict prevention, border crisis management, post-conflict rehab, as well as confidence and security building, but it's more of an exchange. It doesn't really have any meat.
If we accept that Russia is an entrenched revisionist power facing a comparative decline and Ukraine is its chess piece on the board, the Minsk agreements are insufficient. Russia is excluded entirely from Minsk II.
The structure and process could be rebooted, but that requires redemarcation of non-militarized zones. Parties must commit to stabilizing Ukraine's borders. While they offer direction, they're not implementable. They require clarifications on obligations, as well as both increased commitments to monitoring by third parties and implementation by all parties.
Canada could leverage bilateral agreements and informal agreements with Ukraine and regional partners, and could collaborate on regional security, international stability, civil-military relations, democratic stability, human rights monitoring, and increasing education in exchanges like Global Affairs' own emerging leaders in the Americas program and other military training programs.
Also, Poland and Turkey are increasingly key in the NATO/Russia-European relationship in the near to mid term, and Canada should care about that.
In closing, the decision of the U.S. to send troops to Denmark will not reduce Russia's perception of encirclement in the region. The Danes historically refuse to host any NATO assets, recalling that among the original partners, Copenhagen was closest to Moscow. This is a shift from their seven-decades-old position and a signal of contemporary insecurities. I can discuss the Americas in questions.
Thank you for your time, honourable members
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Professor Kimball, thank you very much for your opening remarks.
I will now turn the floor over to Professor Hampson for five minutes.
Dr. Fen Osler Hampson Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual
Thank you very much.
I'd like to pose four questions to your committee.
Is Canada doing enough to deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine? What do we do if deterrence fails? What additional measures should be taken to strengthen Ukraine's resilience to reduce the risks of state and societal collapse as the crisis evolves? Finally, what should Canada's role be in strengthening arms control and in terms of confidence-building measures to de-escalate the crisis and reduce the risks of military confrontation?
We're currently in the preattack phase. Is there more that Canada can do to help Ukraine? Some argue that we should provide small arms and anti-tank weapons, which are sitting in warehouses and were originally destined for Kurdish forces in Iraq. Maybe.
Cybersecurity assistance, in co-operation with Estonia and the European Union, is an option, but time is running out.
As noted by your previous panel, we should also be ready for cyber-attacks and social media disinformation campaigns that will be directed at us.
What should we be planning for now if deterrence fails and there is some form of Russian incursion? NATO allies on the front lines will be asking for a lot more direct military support and assistance, especially the Baltic states. Are we ready for that?
Europe, NATO and Canada should be ready to handle a major refugee crisis, which in the worst-case scenario could mean five million or more forcibly displaced persons.
How will NATO respond to Russian attacks against Ukraine’s civilian populations, which could kill tens of thousands of people? In previous crises—Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya—NATO used its military assets to impose no-fly zones. That's not really an option here.
When it comes to economic sanctions, there are financial sanctions against Russian banks and financial institutions, high-tech export bans and comprehensive trade and investment sanctions, but I would draw your committee's attention to FARA, the frozen assets repurposing act legislation, which is currently before the Senate of Canada. It is a form of “Magnitsky plus”. Don't just freeze, but seize Putin's and his henchmen's monies and foreign holdings, and repurpose them to help his victims. Maybe that's an option that should be considered if he attacks Ukraine.
Energy prices have skyrocketed. A Russian invasion of Ukraine will almost certainly lead to a further spike in prices, not just because of the cancellation of the Nord Stream 2, but because major Russian gas exports to Europe currently transit through Ukraine.
Canadian consumers will be affected at a time when central Canada is also vulnerable to supply disruptions if Line 5 is shut down by the governor of the state of Michigan. It's a perfect storm scenario.
A Russian attack will be extremely damaging to Ukraine’s economy. There's likely to be a run on the hryvnya and a balance of payments and fiscal crisis. Ukraine is also going to lose major sources of revenue from the transit fees it gets from transporting Russian gas to Europe. Its health care and social service systems could also be overwhelmed.
If they're not already doing so, the IMF, EU, World Bank and other international institutions will need to develop contingency plans to help Ukraine deal with a severe economic crisis. What's Canada going to contribute in this scenario, beyond what we're already doing? What contingency plans are in place for a major humanitarian emergency?
If Russia stands down, there's probably going to be a discussion about a new security architecture. There will have to be a major commitment to new arms control and confidence-building measures.
Efforts to reinvigorate the NATO-Russia Council as a key forum for consultation and co-operation should be looked at. Canada played a key role in its origins and development.
Many arms control and confidence-building measures for Europe have gone into the paper shredder. Open Skies and the INF Treaty will need to be resuscitated, along with other confidence and security-building measures that would disallow military exercises near another country’s borders.
Historically, as you all know, Canada has played a critical role in building Europe’s arms control and confidence-building architecture. We will need to step up to the plate again.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Thank you very much, Professor Hampson. Thank you for being spot on with respect to timing.
I'd now like to turn the floor over to you, Dr. Oliker, with special thanks from the committee. You're connecting from Brussels, and we know it's late evening your time. This is much appreciated.
Please go ahead with your opening remarks. You have five minutes.
Olga Oliker Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group
Thank you to the committee for having me, and thank you to the chair, vice-chairs and honourable members for being here.
As I think you heard quite clearly in the last session, escalated war is and remains very possible. There is a huge troop buildup and wide flexibility for Moscow in choosing what sort of operation it could pursue. This has been supplemented by substantial naval presence in the Black and Azov sea areas, though we have heard reports in the last hour that at least the missile exercise in the Sea of Azov has been cancelled. That does not change the fact, even without the missile exercise, that Russia pretty much has Ukraine surrounded.
If escalated war happens, Russia will win. They have more people and more weapons. They are more capable and have more ability to send more stuff in. No amount of lethal or non-lethal aid that Ukraine's friends can send is going to change that equation. There are weapons that can make it possible for Ukraine to inflict more damage. There are systems and tools that could help more Ukrainians survive. Those are the options, but they're not going to deliver victory. Once war begins, supply from abroad is going to become difficult if Russia continues to block access via water and flying becomes unsafe.
There are two ways to prevent war that could actually work and are pretty likely to work. One is to give the Russians what they want. The other is for NATO member states, including Canada and the United States, to pledge to fight for Ukraine. Neither of those is going to happen. With regard to the former, it's because what they want, with regard to Ukraine and with regard to European security more broadly, is not acceptable to NATO or to Ukraine. For the latter, it's because while the threat of a larger war with more participants and a real risk of escalation, including to nuclear use, could well deter Moscow, those risks are also so high that NATO member states don't want to take them.
We've had these last three months of diplomacy in an effort to find a formula that creates enough incentives for Moscow to back down without undermining western Ukrainian security or sovereignty. These aren't all carrots, of course. I think we've talked about this. You have this paired offer of talks about the fundamentals of European security, which Professor Hampson just talked about, with the threat of substantial sanctions and troop buildups in Europe, which have already begun. It's the right approach, but it might not work, in which case Ukraine will suffer first and most, but all of the rest of us, as Professor Hampson just said, will be suffering too.
I want to talk briefly about why Russia is doing this, despite the fact that they say they are not and that the buildup is western hype. The diplomacy, which is focused on European security, underlines the reality that the challenge in Ukraine is part of the broader European security challenge of incompatible views of security on the part of Russia on the one hand and western states on the other. For Russia, 30 years of NATO enlargement and engagement near its borders are an effort, and often a successful one, to limit Moscow's capabilities and influence, and to coerce it. Moscow has never seen NATO or the EU as independent actors. It views both as subsidiaries of the United States.
Ukraine has long been a red line for Moscow in this context. While the 2014 war was spurred at the start by EU association, not NATO enlargement—and indeed NATO enlargement to the Ukraine has not been and remains not in the cards in the foreseeable future—Russia has since grown even more concerned by Ukraine's growing ties with the alliance, which ironically, of course, were driven largely by the war.
Russia had hoped that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, elected in 2019 on a peace platform, would implement the Minsk agreements—the ceasefire deals signed in 2014 and 2015 to end the worst of the fighting—the way Russia wants them implemented, such that it could cement its influence in Ukraine's east and give that east veto over foreign policy steps. That has not happened. Instead, Zelenskyy is pretty much in the same place as his predecessor was, with fighting at a simmer and negotiations at a standstill.
COVID has now led to an almost complete halt of human and commercial traffic between government-controlled territories and those that are not. Russia may well have been thinking that force, or its threat, could force Zelenskyy to back down, or that he could be forced from office and replaced by somebody more palatable, although the election of somebody friendly to Russia seems unlikely without a full occupation.
In principle, a real deal on European security, and indeed on Ukraine, is in everyone's interests. It's a good thing even without the current escalation. Limits on deployments, activities and exercises and perhaps, yes, even some affirmation of the reality that Ukraine is not joining NATO in the foreseeable future could very well make everybody better off. The efforts by NATO and Russia to deter one another over the last eight years have led to increasing rates of incidents as forces exercise and operate in close proximity.
A deal to end the war in Ukraine would save lives and livelihoods, but Russia may be waiting to see what it can get. It might get greedy, particularly if it believes that sanctions can be weathered, Ukraine won't put up much of a fight, and western buildups and sanctions will happen anyway. If it does agree to negotiate, it's vital that these negotiations continue, or more crises will recur.
If we instead have more war, we are going to see more of these buildups in activities. We're going to see increasing tension and more crises, with each one more likely to lead to the escalation we all fear. We should be prepared for this potential future as well.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Dr. Oliker, thank you very much for your testimony.
The remaining time will allow us to go through four allocations of six-minute interventions by members.
The first goes to Mr. Aboultaif.
You have the floor for six minutes. Please go ahead.
Conservative
Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB
Thanks to the panellists. I think we had three wonderful testimonies this afternoon.
The situation out there is obviously very complicated and one of probably the toughest.... It's a perfect storm on its own, where so many factors can play.
At the edge of it is security, whether it's energy or territorial security. It seems like this situation escalated so quickly at the establishment of the second line of Nord Stream, which is Nord Stream 2. For some reason it's just become an issue at all levels. Now the Russians want security and to protect borders. They don't want Ukraine to join NATO. Furthermore, they want to divide the western world and NATO by talking to the Americans and not talking to the French, or talking to the French alone.
With this grim situation we're facing, the question is on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. If that stops, it is not good for Russia, Germany or Ukraine.
I would love to see other statistics on that from Dr. Hampson or Dr. Oliker. Would you both be able to give us some feedback on that?
Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group
I don't have statistics at my fingertips. I could probably find some and provide them.
Here are a couple of things about Nord Stream 2. It doesn't exist yet, which means Russia is doing a fine job of supplying energy to Europe without it. It's part of Russia's plan for long-term energy supply to Europe. That's why it's important, but not starting it doesn't actually change anything. It preserves the status quo.
The other thing that's really important to remember is that when Nord Stream 2 was first thought up, the idea was that it was a way to avoid transit through Ukraine, so that German energy supplies would be protected from fights between Russia and Ukraine. The fact is, at this point most of Germany's energy from Russia does not transit through Ukraine. Over the time that Nord Stream 2 was in the works, lots of other routes have developed. For Germany, at least, that's not an issue. It's more of an issue for some other countries.
It's really become much more of a political issue than not. That isn't to say it's meaningless for Russia; it's quite important for Russia and Germany. There are sunk costs. People have put a lot of money into this pipeline. For Russia, it is a big part of their model for how to supply Europe, but it has also become, I would say, more politically important than it is economically important.
Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual
Russia currently provides Germany with about 40% of its hydrocarbon energy sources—oil and gas. The Nord Stream pipeline was originally intended to provide something like 55 billion cubic metres of gas to Germany. If you're an energy expert, you'll know what that means. I wouldn't consider myself an energy expert, so I can't tell you what that means, but it sounds like an awful lot of gas.
The pipeline can always be turned on in the future. You can suspend exports and say you're not going to take them. That's always an option, if things change. That does give you, I think, important leverage vis-à-vis Putin's regime. It does mean that in the short term, he won't get paid for anything.
Conservative
Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB
President Biden and the American administration have been looking for other sources of energy to basically replace...if anything happened with the pipeline or the gas supply from Russia.
How much do you think this is going to change the strategy of Vladimir Putin? He seems to be playing all of his cards at the same time, without any indication of which one will come first. We're going to keep in mind for sure that the war is not to anybody's benefit, now or in the future.
Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual
Right now the Biden administration is looking for LNG contracts in the Middle East, which is the nearest source of supply, but I can bet you that those countries are also coming under pressure from Russia not to enter into potential contracts, so there's going to be a lot of pressure put on the Saudis and others not to play ball.
I think we can all agree that they will get some gas, but it's going to be a lot more expensive, and a lot more expensive for everybody.
Conservative
Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB
Do you believe it's too late, or it's running a bit late, to try to find energy source replacement at this stage?
Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual
No, I do not, but I don't think it's going to be part of the bargaining equation with Putin if he is planning to go in at the end of February.