Evidence of meeting #5 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was russia.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Marcus Kolga  Director, DisinfoWatch
Ihor Michalchyshyn  Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer, Ukrainian Canadian Congress
William Browder  CEO, Hermitage Capital Management; Head, Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign
Clerk of the Committee  Ms. Erica Pereira
Kimball  Associate Professor of Political Science, Directorate, Centre for International Security, École supérieur d’études internationales, Université Laval, As an Individual
Fen Osler Hampson  Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual
Olga Oliker  Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

5:30 p.m.

NDP

Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB

There is potential there.

I've been trying to get my head around this. I asked people in our previous panel about the idea of imposing sanctions, putting in defensive weapons and all the things.... Would that escalate instead of de-escalate the situation versus waiting too long, until a potential further incursion into Ukraine? How do we find that balance in making sure we still are giving as much room as we possibly can for diplomacy, for de-escalation and for a peaceful resolution?

I've said it in the House of Commons. The people who will suffer if there is war are the Ukrainian people. It is the women and children in Ukraine.

How do we find that balance, Dr. Oliker?

5:30 p.m.

Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

Olga Oliker

Defensive weapons are not going to escalate the situation, particularly if they are in fact things that help more Ukrainians survive. Why would that escalate the situation?

5:30 p.m.

NDP

Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB

Wouldn't it be seen by Russia as being a provocation?

5:30 p.m.

Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

Olga Oliker

They'll make noise and they'll complain, but no, I don't think that makes the situation worse. Moreover, the Russians are still going to win the war, and they know it.

I think a challenge with the weapons provisions is that afterwards, if we do get a deal, we have a much more heavily armed Ukraine. We'll have to see what that means. Let's burn that bridge when we get there.

In terms of sanctions and buildups, sanctions work best as a deterrent instrument when you don't have to impose them. If you start imposing them, you're imposing them as a punishment instrument. That tends to work great at sending signals that you're unhappy, but as we've seen over the last eight years with Russia, it works less well in actually changing behaviour. There is very little reason to think that punishing them now with more incremental sanctions is going to change their behaviour.

The one thing that is different from that is sanctions that are actually meant to stop a particular thing that you don't want to happen. These are sanctions that physically change the equation, like anti-corruption measures in one's own country. Those can be useful because they have an effect.

The buildup is continuing. That's going on even now, with new forces being sent to Europe and around Europe. I think that is a taste of things to come.

5:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Thank you, Ms. McPherson.

Colleagues, we are at just after 5:30. I'm mindful of a potential interest to extend for no more than 15 minutes, but I'd like to do that by consensus because I realize that some members may have to travel. It's Thursday evening.

I'm also very mindful that at least one of our witnesses is in the Brussels time zone. If everybody is okay to go to 5:45 EST, we could get in the first four segments of round two.

Is there any opposition to that? I'd like to do this by consensus.

Seeing none, I will give the floor to Mr. Chong for five minutes.

5:30 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

I'd like to explore the architecture and tools available to uphold the rules-based international order to contain threats coming from wayward states, so I'd like to ask Professor Hampson about the idea of an international anti-corruption court.

I believe last fall you penned an op-ed suggesting that Canada should take the lead in the establishment of such a court. I have two questions I would like you to answer. First, what role does corruption play in Russia's foreign policy? Second, what role could an international anti-corruption court play in countering Russia's threats?

5:30 p.m.

Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual

Dr. Fen Osler Hampson

First of all, what role does corruption play? Corruption props up the regime and its leaders through their various offshore accounts and monies that they've hidden in various bank accounts in different parts of the world and different assets.

To come back to the issue of sanctions, we should put them on notice that we have tools. If FARA were to be passed—that's the frozen assets repurposing act—we could use it against them to confiscate those assets. That would be sending a much stronger threat than just freezing. It's called freeze and seize, and I would say that you tell them, “You cross that line, it's going hit you in the pocketbook.”

When it comes to the international anti-corruption court, it's putting foreign leaders on notice, if they're prosecuted before the court, that if they step outside of their country, they will be brought before the court and tried.

It's often said that such an instrument might be opposed, for example, by Canadian companies, Mr. Chong, but in fact, I think you'd find, if you started canvassing them, that they would see this as a great way to level the playing field when they do business abroad, because it's going to put foreign leaders on notice that they can't play these kinds of games.

Again, without getting into too many of the details, they're two potential instruments to use against corrupt regimes like the leadership of Russia. It's going to take a long time to establish an international anti-corruption court, but we can do FARA right now if there's political will to do it, and I would suggest that there are strong reasons to do it. Other countries might well follow our lead if we were to pass such legislation sooner rather than later.

5:35 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

It was stated by our previous panel today that President Putin is worth $200 billion. Do you think that's an accurate assessment?

5:35 p.m.

Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual

Dr. Fen Osler Hampson

Yes, and it may be a rather conservative assessment, to be quite honest, because we don't really know how much he has stashed away. He's worth a lot, and it obviously matters a lot to him. We should put him and his henchmen on notice that we're not only going to freeze, but we're going to seize.

5:35 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Bill Browder on the previous panel suggested that the government consider the following course of action: Identify the 50 oligarchs who hold President Putin's $200 billion in wealth, sanction an initial five right off the bat and impose a deadline for Russian troops to pull back from the Ukraine border. Then, if that deadline is not met, sanction an additional five oligarchs and hold the sanction of 40 oligarchs in reserve if Russia were to further invade Ukraine. What do you think of that strategy?

5:35 p.m.

Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual

Dr. Fen Osler Hampson

I think it's potentially a useful one, but you have to be careful about making threats that you're not prepared to carry through on, and as you noted, we as a country have not been particularly active on the Magnitsky front.

5:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

Thank you very much, Professor Hampson.

The next round goes to Mr. Sarai and Dr. Fry, who will split the time of five minutes.

5:35 p.m.

Liberal

Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC

Thank you to all the witnesses. This has been actually a very informative panel. Since I'm a little short on time, I'm going to try to be quick.

Dr. Oliker, what's the level of Ukraine's preparedness on their own? Do they stand a chance, or is it a really overwhelming situation for them?

5:35 p.m.

Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

Olga Oliker

They will lose a war against Russia. They are better prepared than they were in 2014, but so is Russia, and Russia just has more.

5:35 p.m.

Liberal

Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC

You think that without NATO, the Americans and others, they will not stand a fighting chance.

5:35 p.m.

Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

Olga Oliker

They will lose a war, and no amount of supplies that we can give them in the short term is going to change that.

5:35 p.m.

Liberal

Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC

What's your assessment of the EU's commitment? What are the chances that they will be stronger in their support of Ukraine?

5:40 p.m.

Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

Olga Oliker

If Russia escalates and mounts an attack in any form, the EU will impose sanctions. I don't have any doubts that they will take steps. I have no doubt that Nord Stream won't be turned on. I also think the Russians expect all of that.

5:40 p.m.

Liberal

Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC

They don't expect any military intervention from NATO or others. They're expecting sanctions. Is that your assessment of the situation?

5:40 p.m.

Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

Olga Oliker

They're expecting exactly what we told them, sanctions and a big buildup in other countries in Europe.

5:40 p.m.

Liberal

Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC

Thank you, Dr. Oliker.

My next question is for Professor Kimball. What do you think the European Union and NATO—it's a similar question—will end up doing if Russia actually invades? Do you have the same assessment as Dr. Oliker?

5:40 p.m.

Associate Professor of Political Science, Directorate, Centre for International Security, École supérieur d’études internationales, Université Laval, As an Individual

Anessa Kimball

Well, of course the European Union doesn't have very many other choices, aside from putting sanctions up as its first response.

Now, NATO could do one of several things. There are a lot of risks in the sense that already NATO has deployed troops forward, close to the border, and of course there's a risk that if Russia gets into Ukraine, it might start to get greedy, and that greediness could obviously go to places like Georgia, where it also has other instabilities, or Kazakhstan. That would be another risk.

One issue is that they have prospectively concentrated a lot of their military forces in the west, and, in the way that they used Sochi to move down into Crimea after the Olympics, as a springboard, they might decide to pivot and go somewhere else. Their goal, more or less, is to keep the irritation high and to keep NATO in a situation where it prefers not to respond with violence because it doesn't want to look like it's escalating. This gives Russia a large amount of room to manoeuvre, particularly because it can use civilians. It doesn't necessarily need to have soldiers who are identified as soldiers doing the activities. That's something, of course, that NATO and other states are not doing, because they have to wear the identification, so that's another thing that benefits Russia.

5:40 p.m.

Liberal

Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC

Over to you, Dr. Fry.

5:40 p.m.

Liberal

Hedy Fry Liberal Vancouver Centre, BC

Thanks very much, Randeep, for sharing your time. It's very generous of you, as I know you to be.

I just want to say that I've listened to all the questions over the last while since we've been doing this whole thing. I am very involved at the OSCE parliamentary assembly level, and I just want to ask about Minsk at the OSCE table. Minsk has not worked really well since 2014. It's been kind of toothless as far as I'm concerned.

Are we going to depend on Minsk, and if we decide to impose sanctions, is Germany going to join? Germany has shown a bit of ambivalence, and I am hoping they're going to join with us, but what about the OSCE nations other than the European Union?

That's for Ms. Oliker and Professor Kimball.

5:40 p.m.

Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

Olga Oliker

The Minsk deals are the deals that are in place, and a lot of the sanctions already on Russia are tied to their implementation. Getting rid of Minsk opens a pretty big can of worms. Figuring out a way to implement it and find a middle ground is the better path.

I am very confident that if Russia attacks Ukraine, Germany will implement a sanctions regime. I don't have any doubts about that.