What a love-in this is. This isn't how it normally is, unfortunately, but maybe we're headed there with your positive influence.
On the issue of the parliamentary trigger that was also raised, it seems to me that one of the important things about this legislation is that government responses can take a long time, 120 days maximum, and that may not be adequate in responding to emergent situations. It does give committees flexibility around creating a timeline for a response, but it also requires a response even in the event of prorogation or dissolution. There is no mechanism by which governments can avoid providing this response. If a committee says this is an urgent international issue and that a response is required, that is important as a way of saying that we need a response from the government. It also prescribes that the response has to be a response.
Sometimes we get, in committee responses, official government responses provided through the standing order process, something like, “The government takes note of the committee's recommendation.” What I wouldn't want to see is, if the committee says, “We think this person needs to be sanctioned and the government needs to consider sanctioning the person”, the government waits 119 days and then says, “We take note of that recommendation,” or it gets lost in prorogation or dissolution. This is why, from my perspective, the parliamentary triggers that we've seen in other countries for Magnitsky sanctions and in this legislation are important.
Could you maybe comment further on it? Some people are going to say that there's already a mechanism for asking for a government response, so why did you add this additional mechanism as it relates to sanctioning entities and individuals?