Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23rd, 2023

[Marie-Josée Langlois]

As noted, all the steps would have to be followed regardless. Often, in terms of the information at hand, when we receive information, we have to continue and deepen that information to search for more in order to be able to assess. Timing will vary. The other aspect that is also one we consider in terms of the timelines to announcing sanctions is the importance of protecting information before the sanctions are announced to ensure there is no opportunity for the people or entities that will be designated to take action.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Am I right to assume that 40 days is not sufficient to list somebody when a committee is saying that person X should be listed?

[Marie-Josée Langlois]

Thank you very much.

As noted, it will depend a lot. It is difficult to do them in short timelines, but it will depend a lot on ongoing circumstances.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

I'm assuming that it's a rare minority of situations. Is it possible that in the vast majority it would be unreasonable? Is that correct?

[Marie-Josée Langlois]

Yes, and it is often very much related to the availability of credible, reliable, open-source information on a specific situation or on a specific person or entity as well.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Can you opine on the idea of having other international crimes, such as war crimes, ethnic cleansing, mass atrocities and mass killings, added to the notion, in addition to genocide, as it relates to the CRTC?

[Amy Awad]

Thank you for the question.

I think the same considerations would go into other types of crime. Those are also very serious international crimes. The question would be to ensure there was due process that was followed before an entity was identified so that the CRTC would have clear guidance in terms of when it was prohibited from issuing the licence.

I think the government would be open to looking at how the crimes are defined but also the process of how we get to that. As long as the process is addressed, I think the substance of the crime is something that could be further examined.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

You've said clearly that you want a robust process that has unified standards and is not arbitrary.

[Amy Awad]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Mr. Zuberi. You're out of time, I'm afraid.

We now go to Mr. Bergeron.

You have six minutes, sir.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to each of our witnesses for being here today and for your enlightening remarks on the bill we are reviewing.

I will ask you the question I wanted to ask Mr. Lawrence. We know full well that a certain number of countries around the world react fairly well and quickly to international pressure. However, we also know that a certain number of countries react fairly badly to international public pressure, and they will tend to close in on themselves like oysters rather than submit to the international pressure directed at them.

What do you think of the provision, which is a bit like a blanket provision, whereby the government would publish the names of prisoners of conscience, when we know full well that this might have an extremely positive outcome in some countries, but an extremely bad one in others?

[Heidi Hulan]

Thank you very much for the question.

As we said and as you heard in the last session, there are no international or domestic legal definitions for the terms in use here like “prisoners of conscience”. We use “human rights defenders”, which is a broader term that refers to people who individually, or with others, act to promote or protect human rights through peaceful means, but that is also not a legal definition.

This is a thorny area. Canada is very active in promoting the rights of human rights defenders around the world. As I said in my opening remarks, do no harm and the consent of the individual are key principles we use in taking that action. In all cases, the interest of the victim is the driving force behind the strategy we use in each consular case.

It is quite right to say that countries respond differently to pressure from outside. In some cases it can have a positive effect, and indeed we do frequently publicize names and cases, either ourselves, nationally or in concert with allies and partners. In other cases, particularly in countries with known practices of torture, publicizing a person's circumstances can lead to repercussions for the victim. Therefore, in this way, determining a strategy for how to engage on an individual case has to be determined on the basis of our understanding of local circumstances and contexts.

The most effective means that we can use is typically quiet diplomacy. Sometimes action in the public sphere can amplify this work and accelerate it, but I would conclude by saying that a requirement to publish the names of people on whose behalf Canada is engaging could impede our ability to assist them in their release. A lot of conversations require diplomacy in order to yield results in this area, and in certain cases publicizing those names could impede the development of the discussions that can be critical for results.

I'll leave it there.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

In a piece in the New York Times, republished in La Presse on March 16 last, it was reported that Orlan‑10 drones are playing an important role in Russia's artillery strategy, and we can imagine that they are also being used to drop cluster munitions.

In a National Post piece on December 15, an investigation revealed a logistics chain that goes around the world, including through Canada, and which ends at the production line of Orlan‑10 drones at the Special Technology Centre in Saint Petersburg, Russia.

According to the National Post, one of the major suppliers of Russia's drone program is an exporter based in Hong Kong, Asia Pacific Links, which, according to Russian customs and financial files, has provided millions of dollars' worth of parts, but never directly.

The owner of Asia Pacific Links is a man named Anton Trofimov, a Russian expat who holds a degree from a Chinese university and who also owns a company in Toronto. But according to our information, Mr. Trofimov is presently not the target of sanctions.

Since part of this bill deals with the sanctions regime—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Mr. Bergeron, you're over time. Can I ask that you wrap it up as fast as you can?

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Since part of this bill deals with sanctions, why is it that one oligarch might be on the sanctions list, but not another? Is it perhaps because one of those oligarchs owns a company in Canada?

[Heidi Hulan]

Very briefly, I can simply say that the decision to list someone and put them under sanctions is determined on the basis of what we believe to be the need and on what we can find in terms of evidence. As you know, all sanctions have to survive a judicial review if one is instigated, so a key driver for who is put on sanctions lists and who is not is the availability of evidence to substantiate the case.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We will now go to Ms. McPherson for six minutes.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you all for being here today. I know it's sometimes difficult, as you all have very busy jobs, so it's very kind of you to come and share your expertise with us.

This is a very complex bill because, of course, it touches on so many different areas.

Ms. Hulan, you won't be surprised that I'm going to ask you about the cluster munitions piece. I'm sure you've heard my thoughts on the TPNW, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the work that needs to be done in Ukraine on land mines.

With regard to cluster munitions, in your testimony you talked about the indirect financing of cluster munitions and not wanting to have people with pensions and whatnot be implicated. My question to you is this. Why would we want to allow anyone, including pensioners or others with pension funds, to invest in banned weapons? Many other countries have strong divestment policies, so I don't understand why that would be a rationale for why Canada allows that to happen.

[Heidi Hulan]

It is a question in our system of enforceability and questions around whether even financial institutions that hold mutual funds and other products can track all of the secondary and tertiary linkages between those investments and the source of revenue coming back. It is a pragmatic position that is designed to make the provisions enforceable.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

As I mentioned, many other countries do have strong legislation. We wouldn't even need to start from scratch. We could work with our allies.

As I mentioned earlier in today's meeting, 21 NATO countries have stronger legislation on cluster munitions. Why can Canada not follow the lead of those other countries? You say that it is too difficult, but it seems that other countries are able to enforce that. Other countries are able to have that legislation. I hate to think that Canada would be weak on that front.

[Heidi Hulan]

Yes, as would the government.

Let me just say that we collaborate frequently and consistently with our allies, including those to whom you are referring, and we have discussions with them about how they've placed provisions on indirect investments as well. To elaborate on this point, I'd like to turn to the director of the disarmament and non-proliferation division in our ministry, Angelica Liao-Moroz.

[Angelica Liao-Moroz, Executive Director, Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Space, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you very much for the question.

When Canada enacted our domestic legislation, the Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act, the clause related to prohibiting aiding and abetting, which I'm sure you're familiar with, was seen as covering the issue of investments. You rightly point out that different countries have different legislation in terms of how to implement that.

I won't comment specifically on the legislation of other countries, because I cannot speak to that with any degree of authority. What I would say in relation to indirect investments is that a really important element of it is intent and how you would determine or prove that the individual investor or entity has that intent.

As my colleague said, we know that the bill is well-intentioned. We just want to make sure that, at the end of the day, it is enforceable, and that we're not holding Canadians criminally liable, for example, pension fund holders who may unwittingly hold investments related to cluster munitions.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

I would argue that the intent of most pensioners is not to purchase cluster weapons. Therefore, it would be useful to have that in law so that they were not unintentionally doing that, as I've mentioned other countries have done.

Could you also explain this to me? When Canada, as a state party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, is legally obligated to ban cluster munitions and to discourage their use by anyone, Canadian Forces personnel are still permitted, during combined operations with states not party to the convention, to transport cluster monitions or to direct and authorize the use of cluster munitions. Does that not say that we don't believe in them, but we're going to give some exemptions to use them?

[Heidi Hulan]

Thank you for the question.

Under the treaty itself there is a carve-out in article 21 that takes into account the legitimate needs of armed forces to collaborate with one another—

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Is that on the legitimate use of cluster munitions?