A strategy is critical. As I mentioned earlier, we've had five different foreign ministers in the past seven years I've been in this role. That's significant transition. Having an overarching, multi-year strategy would mean that there would be some continuity on key human rights files. We wouldn't be reinventing the wheel with every transition. It's certainly critical to have a human rights strategy for that reason. It's also in order to create a sort of yardstick or benchmark to assess the minister's actions and activities with respect to human rights. That, I think, will be very critical.
I would just make a final point, if I have the time.
I know there's been a conversation around “prisoners of conscience” and the framing of the language around the human rights reporting. I agree with Alex Neve in terms of the language being about prisoners who are being detained in violation of international law. I think that's a much broader definition, which would also capture the two Michaels who were detained in China, for example. It would capture Canadian Iranian dual nationals and others who are detained on trumped up espionage, terrorism or treason charges who are not necessarily prisoners of conscience—they may just be ordinary engineers, doctors, etc.—but are dual nationals and are then detained. I think a larger, over-encompassing definition would be much more effective.