Chair, I am going to come back in on this, just because I think some of the arguments are discordant with the reality.
There is nothing not respectful to the Standing Orders about passing legislation that creates a parliamentary trigger. It doesn't attempt to nullify the Standing Orders or deny the authority of the Standing Orders. It creates additional reporting obligations for the minister, and there are all kinds of places where statute creates additional reporting obligations for the minister that go beyond what is required in the Standing Orders. In particular, this measure seeks to apply in cases where the Standing Orders would not apply, such as during a prorogation.
We welcome upcoming discussion and study on sanctions, but surely it should be apparent on faith that having greater accountability to Parliament in the process of responding to recommendations around sanctions, and doing what other countries have done in having a parliamentary trigger, is part of how we ensure effective accountability to Parliament for sanctions.
For members who believe that the sanctions regime is not operating in an optimal fashion right now, one simple way we can address that is by requiring stronger reporting to Parliament around sanctions. This doesn't preclude any of that subsequent work, but studies are times when committees can explore issues and make recommendations to governments. It is when we review legislation that we exercise the hard power of a committee.
We could make a real difference here by adding reporting requirements that would, I think, push the government to do more in terms of sanctions. They would push not just “the” government but any government to do more in terms of sanctions. These trigger mechanisms would provide greater accountability to Parliament when a future government is in place.
This is the goal of this legislation, fundamentally: to strengthen the democratic architecture around human rights issues and give Parliament more tools to be informed of and respond to government decisions around sanctions and other human rights issues. I think if this government amendment is passed, some of the folks who are members of the government today may in the future say that they wish they had this tool available in order to hold future governments to account and to encourage the use of sanctions.
We could have a long discussion about SEMA versus Magnitsky sanctions, and I suspect we'll have some of that discussion in the upcoming study, but to have this parliamentary trigger mechanism gives the government wide discretion to continue to choose whether they want to use SEMA or Magnitsky, or not use anything, in a particular case.
Again, that accountability reporting measure will be strengthened by this, and that's again why it's important. It would be disappointing to see this part of the bill gutted, and I think many of the people who follow these issues and engage on sanctions issues will be disappointed if that's the result.
I'll leave it there.