Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 14th, 2022

[Weldon Epp]

Mr. Chair, I'd be happy to take that question in the first instance and turn to my colleague, our head of mission in Taipei, to elaborate.

Canada has repeatedly stated, both through the Prime Minister's own statements and those of various other ministers, and also through our positions taken at relevant international organizations, that the Canadian position is that we welcome the participation of Taiwan in the international community and in organizations where the context permits and the interest of the international community in having the participation of Taiwan's 24 million people at the table merits it. That has included, but not been limited to, pressing for Taiwan's observer status, which it at one point enjoyed at the World Health Assembly with respect to the work of the WHO. It has also included our efforts to ensure that when it comes to aviation and aviation security and safety, Taiwan's participation at ICAO is facilitated. Canada will continue to push for those.

There are other fora in which Taiwan has a seat or plays a meaningful role, including in various fisheries organizations. As the committee will be aware, Canada works with Chinese Taipei in the context of the WTO and APEC. Where possible, our policy has always been to be pragmatic and look at ways in which we can increase the effectiveness of those organizations, not least over one of the more dynamic and important economies in the Asia-Pacific region. We do this together with partners who share that view and share the view that, particularly given its democratic government and governance and its dynamic economy, Taiwan brings a lot to many tables. We do that through coordination with like-minded [Technical difficulty—Editor ] and through conversations with the secretariats of the organizations mentioned.

I'd like to turn to Mr. Reeves to speak about some of the ways we do this, not least through other bodies, like something called the GCTF.

[Jordan Reeves, Executive Director, Canadian Trade Office in Taipei, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

The GCTF is a good example. This is a platform called the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, based in Taiwan. There are a couple of other partners; the U.S. and Japan are the principal partners, and Australia has just joined. This is a platform that Taiwan uses to promote essentially good governance throughout the region and beyond.

For the very first time this past year, Canada co-organized one of the sessions and joined with the other partners. This one was on women's political participation, so we had the Honourable Rona Ambrose on as one of the speakers on that panel, as well as Carole James, the former deputy premier of British Columbia. That is a great example of where we can be working with Taiwan alongside other like-minded partners in the region.

As Mr. Epp has so eloquently explained, yes, Canada has been quite consistent in calling for an inclusive approach, a non-politicized approach, to international organizations, especially when it comes to dealing with issues around the environment, aviation safety, which was mentioned, and certainly health—the latest pandemic. These are issues that do not respect political boundaries.

On ICAO, I'll say one other—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

I apologize. We'll have to leave it there. There will be an opportunity to follow up in successive rounds, but thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Ms. Bendayan.

Mr. Bergeron, you have six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for taking the time to shed light on the current situation and relations between Canada and Taiwan.

Special thanks to Mr. Reeves for joining us at this late hour. I am closely following the Beijing winter Olympics, so I understand that the time change really takes its toll over time, as the Olympics progress. In any case, thank you for joining us.

I must admit that I was also surprised by the answers that witnesses gave to questions from the honourable member Michael Chong on the Taiwan Strait and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans‑Pacific Partnership. That said, I certainly will not criticize them because our desire is to have open and frank discussions, rather than hearing rehashed official lines. Therefore, I thank them very much for that.

The President of Taiwan has established a working group under the National Security Council to closely monitor the evolving situation between Russia and Ukraine, and to determine its potential impact on Taiwan.

We addressed this issue last week in a meeting on the situation between Russian and Ukraine. Professor Anessa Kimball, from Université Laval, told us that most of the west's attention was focused on Ukraine and that very little attention was being given to Taiwan. Furthermore, quite surprisingly, at a town hall on October 21, President Biden was asked directly whether the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a possible attack by the PRC. He responded that the United States was committed to doing so. However, we know that the United States has already said that it would not intervene if Ukraine were invaded.

Was Professor Kimball misinformed when she told us that the west is more concerned about the situation in Ukraine?

My second question is somewhat tied to President Biden's response. If Taiwan were invaded, would Canada be willing to take military action?

[Weldon Epp]

As we know, and as the member mentioned, colleagues from Global Affairs Canada were before the committee recently to speak about the situation in Ukraine. I know that the comparison with Taiwan came up in that context. It's very much a discussion point. I would say that this committee and Global Affairs—the government—are very alive to that issue.

We continue to watch closely, not least because whether you're sitting in Moscow, Beijing or Taipei—or Ottawa, for that matter—there is a risk that developments in Ukraine present a sort of unwelcome natural experiment, if you would, that will allow various parties to watch closely and see the effectiveness of different diplomatic tools to respond to a very alarming situation.

Notwithstanding that, I would say Canada remains very concerned separately with developments in the Taiwan Strait. We mentioned off the top, in the opening statement, the increasing operational pace of very unwelcome and destabilizing incursions from the PLA Air Force. Those are also, unfortunately, opportunities to test potential options for the future.

The Canadian government is monitoring all those developments very closely. These are quite unique and separate, but of course there are some cross-pollinations in terms of how international diplomacy and various means of responding to coercion, be it outright or through other means, are most effectively done.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Epp.

Even though everyone can agree that they are two completely different issues, thank you for recognizing that they are most certainly directly linked. I think that the joint statement issued by President Putin and President Xi Jinping a few days ago, which Michael Chong referred to, is a testament to the closer ties between Russia and China, including on the issue of Taiwan. There is therefore certainly a link to be drawn between the two.

Since you do not want to weigh in on the link that could possibly be established between them, let's talk more specifically about the situation in Taiwan.

If the People's Republic of China were to invade the island, what would be the Canadian government's reaction, given Canada's adherence to the one China policy?

[Weldon Epp]

Mr. Chair, I'd like to speak to that. I have very limited time, but I won't speak to the hypothetical various future scenarios.

China, in its own words, has never ruled out, never precluded, using force to reunify with Taiwan, and Canada is deeply concerned by recent activities. I'll just speak to the facts as we see them rather than to some hypothetical future.

There are increasing activities by the PLA Air Force, and not just overt activity by the military but also what we would call “below threshold” activities, which include things like cyber-attacks, interference and united front tactics. We're alive to all of those. We will continue to monitor those together with partners, and continue to encourage both sides to step back from provocative actions, particularly the Chinese side, which has changed the dynamic recently, in the last year. We will also continue to seek dialogue and a space to maintain stability and resolve the outstanding historical differences through peaceful dialogue.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you, Mr. Epp.

Thank you very much, Mr. Bergeron.

The final six-minute intervention in the opening round goes to Ms. McPherson.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to thank the witnesses for coming and sharing their expertise with us today. Happy Valentine's Day to all of the witnesses and to the members of the committee.

I'd like to follow up a bit on some of the questions that Monsieur Bergeron has asked, because of course we're all very preoccupied with what is happening in Ukraine and the potential for an invasion by Russia. It's interesting to get your perspectives on that.

Does the Canadian government believe that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would make Chinese aggression toward Taiwan more likely? Could you give me a bit of clarity on why or why not that is the case?

[Weldon Epp]

We need to be frank here. Whether it's think tanks, academics or governments, we are all monitoring developments in Ukraine, not least for the question you're raising.

It's very dynamic, of course, and I'm not going to speak to how the government would respond or what we assess to be the likelihood of that impact at this time. Given the open line we're using for this call, let's stick to what we know about with respect to China.

We know China has been quite explicit in identifying its own strategic goals. In the words of Xi Jinping, they include national rejuvenation by 2049. He's made an implicit link, but we all understand that rejuvenation would definitely include reunification with Taiwan.

There is increasing concern that China may be putting a timeline on those goals to achieve its general rejuvenation and its goal of becoming a great power globally but also the predominant regional power by 2049. It's been investing heavily in its military, and we see activities within the region that are increasingly alarming, not just in the Taiwan Strait, but—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

I'm sorry to interrupt you. We have bells that are currently ringing. I've hit the pause button on this intervention. We need unanimous consent by the committee in this case to continue to work. Customarily, if the committee grants it, it's usually for no more than 15 minutes, and I think it's a 30-minute bell.

Do we have unanimous consent to continue for up to an additional 15 minutes? Is that enough time for colleagues to cast their votes? Is there any opposition?

Hearing none, we will continue for 15 minutes.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair. Can I seek consent to extend for another 10 minutes, beyond the proposed 15? We can vote by app, so I don't think we need more—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Sure, if colleagues feel that's okay.

Do you want to put a particular time on it?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

We've agreed to 15. I would say extend it by another 10, on top of that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Is it 25 minutes?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Is there any opposition from colleagues?

You seem to have agreement, Mr. Genuis.

Thanks very much.

I will pass the floor back to Mr. Epp, with my apologies.

[Weldon Epp]

Mr. Chair, perhaps I'll pause there and turn it back to you.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you. I'll step in.

I understand that we are asking you questions on hypotheticals and that is always a bit of a challenge, but knowing the situation we find ourselves in, this is something the committee is deeply concerned about.

When we look at what's happening in Ukraine and the potential for Russian aggression there, my other concern and the other thing I'd like more information about is how what happened in Hong Kong over the last several years has impacted what's happening in Taiwan. Knowing that Taiwan has been governed in a progressive, democratic way, I'd love to get some context on, first of all, the human rights protections—the human rights that are happening in Taiwan and the reality around things like LGBT+ rights, indigenous rights and women's rights—and how you see them interacting with what happened in Hong Kong in 2019 and later.

[Weldon Epp]

Mr. Chair, let me make a quick response to that, and then I'd like to turn it over to the executive director of our CTO team in Taipei to speak to the latter part of the question.

Obviously Canada, with others, has spoken out, is on the record and has taken policy decisions to respond to the deterioration of rights and freedoms under the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong. Those developments came quickly, not least opportunistically, because of conditions provided by COVID, and Canada and others have looked at that with concern.

Taiwan is a very different situation in the sense that the processes and tools used to shift those goalposts in Hong Kong were effectively through legislative means and law enforcement. Obviously Taiwan, de facto, is administered by a different government, a democratically elected one and, as you point out, one that has been a bastion of human rights and progressive policies within the region.

With that, I'd like to turn it over to Jordan Reeves.

[Jordan Reeves]

I could comment a bit further, perhaps, that what we saw happening in Hong Kong had a profound impact on Taiwan and Taiwanese politics, for sure. In Taiwan, basically the Hong Kong reality of what happened with the national security law...essentially told most Taiwanese that “one country, two systems” was clearly out; it was no longer an option for the majority of Taiwanese.

We saw this correspond with an increase in the number of people in Taiwan who also identified themselves as Taiwanese, as opposed to being both Taiwanese and Chinese, or only Chinese. In terms of the latest numbers we have for the end of last year, 62.3% of the Taiwanese population now identify as being purely Taiwanese. Many of these tend to be the younger Taiwanese, and they tend to be strong supporters of the current administration, the DPP. To generalize, to simplify a little, it is considered to be the pro-independence party in Taiwan.

This had a profound impact on the local politics. In 2018, after local elections, there were many who saw that there was an opportunity for the opposition, the KMT, which had usually been taking a stance that is a bit closer to China, to make a comeback. However, as a result of the Hong Kong situation in that context, the politics shifted in Taiwan and President Tsai was re-elected. We see some of the impacts of that within the region. That would probably be the largest impact that the situation in Hong Kong had on Taiwan, as the Taiwanese watched what happened there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you, Mr. Reeves.

Thank you very much, Ms. McPherson. There will be an opportunity to follow up in subsequent rounds.

We will now go into our second round of questions.

Leading us off will be Mr. Genuis, with a five-minute round.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Order Paper question 41, which was mine, was with respect to AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific strategy. I had asked about whether Canada was interested in becoming part of AUKUS and about Canadian views of an engagement with AUKUS. The response, understandably, noted the role of nuclear submarines as part of AUKUS. It says, quote, “Canada has not and does not seek to be directly involved in the nuclear-powered submarine aspects of this trilateral arrangement”.

That's fair enough, but it seems to leave a lot unsaid. Is Canada interested in being involved in aspects of this agreement not related to nuclear-powered submarines?

[Weldon Epp]

Mr. Chair, with your permission, I'll turn to my colleague Kevin Hamilton to respond to that.

[Kevin Hamilton]

The member is quite correct that there are other aspects of the AUKUS agreement beyond the centrepiece, which was the Australian acquisition of nuclear submarines. There are such aspects as advancing applied research and innovation, emerging technologies, artificial intelligence and quantum computing. These are areas and aspects that we deal with already with the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia in the context of the Five Eyes arrangement.

The question of whether Canada would need to be part of AUKUS to continue with those very important aspects of our relationship is somewhat moot. We have that relationship already. Leaving aside the nuclear submarine aspect, which, as the member correctly notes, we're not particularly interested in right now, we feel that we have that relationship and that it is strong.