Mr. Chair, I want to be clear. Canada does have a policy, hypothetical or not, and we've been consistent.
As we have for 50 years under our one China policy, in calling on both sides to seek to resolve outstanding differences through dialogue and peaceful means with regard to potential future actions taken by one side or the other, we need to respond to events as they evolve and not preclude the possibility for positive outcomes.
What I said in my earlier comments was that we are deeply concerned with actions being taken by the Chinese side, which are adding both pressure and tension to the region and potentially being seen as a dress rehearsal for future actions.
The Chinese government, as I said, has never ruled out reunification by force, but it is also active in other means of putting pressure on Taiwan. We're alive to all of those, including economic coercion and reducing Taiwan's international space. That also includes the kind of activity we've seen recently with respect to Lithuania and the EU. That's why the government is seeking to join consultations on the EU's action against China and the WTO with respect to Lithuania. Canada will continue to stand up and oppose economic coercion as well as more overt military coercion and threats.
Last, I would say that as you've seen in the last year—and my colleague Mr. Hamilton can speak to this further—given the rising tensions not just in the Taiwan Strait but across the region, in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, you will see an uptick in the operational frequency of deploying Royal Canadian Navy assets in that region, working with our partners to undertake new, interoperable exercises. All of those are part of our preparations and contributions to stability today and in the future in that region.