Mr. Chair, I'll start by replying to that at a high level and then I'll turn to my colleague Mr. Hamilton to see if he wants to add.
It's an excellent question. We're in close touch with the like-minded, but we also speak to think tanks, including in Beijing, to understand China's motivations. I spoke earlier to the [Technical difficulty—Editor] higher-level motivations that China has been quite clear about. It sees reunification with Taiwan as an essential part of achieving its goals of meeting its centennial of the revolution in 2049 as a rejuvenated great power.
The ways in which it would hope to achieve those objectives, from a rhetorical point of view, have been quite consistent. If you look at it since 1979, when the party shifted from talking about the liberation of Taiwan in a more aggressive sense to talking about peaceful reunification, the rhetorical frame has been largely consistent, including under Xi Jinping in his speeches, most recently last year.
What is changing, apart from the rhetoric, is that we see incredible investment in its military capacity to keep options open, you might say, to take advantage of a changing geopolitical environment and of China's growing economic might, which has made an asymmetry both economically but militarily possible in 2022 in a way that it wasn't in 1979.
As China has grown and become more powerful, not surprisingly that potential option for its goal of reunification has been heavily invested in. As I said earlier, we continue to monitor and be concerned about other approaches, not just military. We encourage both sides to buy the time to maintain stability and dialogue for the possibility of a peaceful resolution of their outstanding issues.