Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on Magnitsky sanctions.
Human Rights First is an independent, non-profit advocacy organization dedicated to promoting and protecting human rights and urging the U.S. to take a leading role in this effort, both at home and around the world.
For the past six years, Human Rights First has built a global coalition of 300 civil society groups to advocate for the use of targeted human rights and anti-corruption sanctions, both in the U.S. and in other jurisdictions with Magnitsky-style sanctions programs. We're proud to have the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, which testified last week before this body, leading the coalition's work in Canada, as well as partners in the U.K. and the EU.
From the first U.S. global Magnitsky sanctions in 2017, civil society has been integral to their effectiveness. By our estimate, one-third of all U.S. global Magnitsky sanctions have had a basis in recommendations from civil society.
Today, I'd like to highlight three ways civil society provides critical contributions to governments implementing targeted human rights and anti-corruption sanctions, which Human Rights First would encourage the Government of Canada to build on.
First, civil society groups are a key source of information that governments need to impose sanctions. Civil society has unparalleled evidence of abuses and insight into who bears responsibility based on years of research, monitoring, interviews with victims and on-site documentation. These are sources government officials often don't have.
We've worked with civil society groups to bring more than 160 well-documented files to the U.S. government, recommending specific perpetrators for Magnitsky sanctions. This pipeline is reflected in about one-third of U.S. global Magnitsky cases, including ones the U.S. government cites as among the most impactful sanctions. This speaks to the quality of evidence and analysis civil society provides and the fact that sanctions in the name of human rights and anti-corruption are more credible when they reflect the priorities of independent human rights and anti-corruption groups.
As more jurisdictions have adopted Magnitsky sanctions, we've encouraged other governments to take a similar approach to engaging civil society. As one example of how this can work, we helped coordinate the submission of detailed sanctions recommendations for the arbitrary detention of Russian opposition leader Vladimir Kara-Murza in multiple jurisdictions. We are pleased that Canada was the first to announce sanctions in Vladimir's case in November, followed by the U.S., the U.K. and the EU. These all followed submissions from civil society. We'd encourage the Canadian government to build on this positive engagement with civil society.
Second, civil society plays a vital role in understanding the impact of sanctions and their enforcement. In the wake of U.S. sanctions against Bangladesh's Rapid Action Battalion for human rights abuses in 2021, civil society groups tracked the abrupt halt in extrajudicial killings by the unit, as well as the eventual resumption of those abuses. They highlighted how the sanctions cut through government efforts to suppress speech and sparked unprecedented calls for accountability. They documented threats from law enforcement pressuring families of victims to recant reports of disappeared loved ones and increased surveillance and harassment of human rights groups. This information is critical for governments as they monitor sanctions enforcement, consider additional measures and address calls for the lifting of sanctions.
Finally, civil society groups identify gaps in the implementation of sanctions programs and urge governments towards more equitable use of these tools. In November, we released a joint report with our partners, “Multilateral Magnitsky Sanctions at Five Years”, analyzing how the U.S., Canada, the U.K. and the EU have used their Magnitsky sanctions. We found key gaps across the four jurisdictions. These included significant shortcomings in how Canada uses sanctions for human rights abuses and corruption under the JVCFOA and SEMA, such as missing opportunities to multilateralize and strengthen the impact of the sanctions, rarely imposing sanctions for corruption, excluding close partners and allies from sanctions even when merited, and failing to provide accountability for marginalized victims of human rights abuses.
On this last point, we found that in five years Canada had never imposed Magnitsky sanctions for human rights abuses against LGBTQ+ or indigenous persons. In its public announcements, only 7% of its Magnitsky cases mentioned female victims and just 1% mentioned children. If these sanctions are tools for accountability, we found they're overlooking most of the world's victims.
Canadian officials have thoughtfully engaged with these findings and we understand Global Affairs plans to take them into account in the future. We're eager to build on this engagement, to share the perspectives of those fighting human rights abuses and corruption in their countries and around the world and to strengthen the use of Magnitsky sanctions to hold perpetrators accountable.
On behalf of Human Rights First, thank you and I look forward to your questions today.