Foreign Affairs Committee on June 15th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I'm afraid you're considerably out of time, Mr. Astapenka, but you can elaborate on that point once you're asked a follow-up question.

[Vladzimir Astapenka]

Yes.

These operations would have been organized all over the world.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you. We appreciate that.

We now go Mr. Champoux.

You have five minutes.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I too want to thank the witnesses, Ms. Braw and Mr. Astapenka, for being with us today. I hope they can hear the English interpretation properly. My questions will be in French, of course.

Ms. Braw, you've explained in the past that, in order to seize assets, rather than freeze them, a link to crime must have been established. You suggested that seizing Russian assets without evidence of criminality would have the effect, as clarified earlier, of depriving western companies and individuals abroad of the legal protection that western governments have painstakingly pushed other governments to adopt in recent years.

The question is how to structure asset seizure and confiscation authorities in a way that can address these concerns.

[Elisabeth Braw]

That is a central question of how we can help rebuild Ukraine and establish some sort of functioning order at the same time.

With regard to Russian state and private assets that have been frozen by the west, freezing assets is easy. It's part of the sanctions program. Assets being frozen doesn't have to imply criminality, whereas seizing assets can only be done when the authorities have established reasonable evidence of criminality. That is the challenge.

If we, western countries that are now in the position of freezing Russian assets, say that we have the assets, that we'll just seize them and use them for the reconstruction of Ukraine, that puts our companies operating globally in immense peril. Then other countries can say, “Well, if you don't respect the rule of law, then we won't respect the rule of law. If you do something that we don't like, we'll freeze your companies' assets and immediately seize them, and there will be nothing you can do.” The globalized economy is built on the rule of law. Even though other countries don't particularly excel in their adherence to the rule of law, we have to do so. It is the one big advantage that we have, and it's one of the big advantages that make our countries attractive for businesses to operate in.

Because so much Russian behaviour—when it comes to finances, business operations and so forth—involves criminal aspects, there is an opportunity there for western authorities to investigate many more Russian activities so that they can then seize the relevant frozen Russian assets. The Italian Guardia di Finanza is doing great work in that area. I think it's something that holds potential for other countries, as well.

We won't be able to seize enormous amounts of Russian assets by conducting criminal investigations, but we will be able to seize more than we have seized so far, while still adhering to the rule of law.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Astapenka, earlier you talked about the lack of coordination, which can, from your point of view, indeed be a problem. You are, I think, quite well placed to observe the current consequences of sanctions by Canada, but also by other countries, in the context of the war in Ukraine. Do you feel that the lack of coordination between the various nations, and perhaps a few other blunders due to that lack, mean that sanctions are not very effective, if at all in some cases?

[Vladzimir Astapenka]

Definitely. As you mentioned, there are different decisions on Russia and Belarus, for example. Some countries take additional measures on Russia. Some countries would take one or two additional measures on Belarus. Generally, this regime is not coordinated.

As you may know, Russia and Belarus are in a common economic area or a customs union, which means there is a free circulation of products between these countries. There are no customs checks between Belarus and Russia. When you try to prohibit the delivery of something to Russia and not to Belarus, it means that you leave an open hole. Any product could enter Belarus and then end up in Russia.

That's what we are tracing. That's what we're observing for the moment. This is something that requires a much higher degree of coordination among those who impose sanctions.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Astapenka.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We now go to MP McPherson.

You have five minutes.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much to our witnesses for being with us today. This is very important information for us to be gathering.

My first question is going to be for Mr. Astapenka.

You were just speaking to my colleague about the sanctions between Belarus and Russia and how there's a gap there. You spoke a little bit about the fact that Russia and Belarus are coordinated, but the sanction regime is not coordinated. Can you tell us what it would look like if those loopholes were closed? What loopholes are we looking at? Who should be on this list? What should the sanctions against the Belarusian government look like to be more effective in stopping products from getting to Russia?

[Vladzimir Astapenka]

It's a technical question that will be difficult for me to answer in much detail.

Generally, these are products of dual use. The European Union and the United States prohibited many products of dual use being supplied to Russia after the beginning of this war, and these decisions were not taken in respect of Belarus. We have information about microchips, some electronic devices, some radio devices or spare parts to produce military equipment being supplied to Belarus in order to finally end up in Russia. This is the main area of preoccupation.

For your information—it's public knowledge—the European Union has already prepared another round of sanctions especially devoted to this coordination practice. Unfortunately, they have been considering this since January but the decision has not been made yet.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Hopefully, all countries will come together on those sanctions so that they are more effective. I think what we've heard very clearly from witnesses, like yourself, is that when the sanctions are comprehensive and when they are collective, it works much better.

Ms. Braw, thank you very much for sharing all of your expertise with us. Certainly, I have learned a lot from some of the information you've brought forward, including the idea that countries are weighing the cost-benefit analysis and then finding that it is still worthwhile because the sanctions are not costing enough for these countries.

How do we make them cost the most? What examples can we take from other countries, countries that are actually doing very well in making those sanctions cost the most? Maybe that's looking at grey-zone warfare or some of those other things that you can maybe speak to, please.

[Elisabeth Braw]

One reason the Russian government hasn't considered our western sanctions to be a particularly costly measure against it is that they were predictable. The Russian side could pretty easily figure out what the west would sanction once Russia invaded, and even before Russia invaded.

I think one of the key elements of effective deterrence is the element of surprise. Thomas Schelling won the Nobel Prize in economics for his work on deterrence theory. I'm not pretending to be the first to discuss the element of surprise, but that is a key part.

In the west, we like to do things in an orderly fashion, and obviously when many countries have to agree on something, you can't be particularly impulsive or innovative, but if the side to be sanctioned has no idea and cannot predict what it is that we'll sanction or indeed whom we will sanction, then that fear itself serves as a deterrent. That involves not just economic sanctions, but individual sanctions.

It should involve individual sanctions not just against the decision-makers themselves, but against their families. That's an area where we in the west have been reluctant to go because we don't want to punish children for the sins of their fathers, but I think we do have to think along those lines, not just when the war we were trying to prevent is already well under way, but as a deterrent.

What would have happened, for example, if in the lead-up to the war, when we were trying to prevent Russia from invading, we had sanctioned Putin's mistress and her two children straightaway? What if we had sanctioned the children of various leading Russian officials who live in the U.K., in Canada, or in the United States and have a good life there? Yes, it's not their fault that Russia was planning to invade Ukraine, but they are enjoying the benefit of our hospitality. I think all of us who are parents, and indeed everyone, know that a parent's love for their children is stronger than their love for themselves. If Russia or other decision-makers have to worry that if they do something of which the west disapproves their children might lose their right to live and work and enjoy life in the west, I think that would be a powerful way of using sanctions.

Not all the children—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I'm afraid you're out of time, Ms. Braw. We're going to have to move to the next member for their question.

We now go to Mr. Genuis.

You have three minutes.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

I want to thank both of the witnesses for being here. I think it's very valuable that we delve more into the Belarusian situation.

In particular, I want to thank you, Mr. Astapenka, for your testimony and also for your personal work and sacrifice. I read a little bit about your background and see that you've been personally targeted as well. I want to salute your courage and share that I had an opportunity here in Ottawa to meet with Ms. Tsikhanouskaya, and I greatly admire her incredible leadership and courage.

The main focus today is sanctions, but I'd like to give you an opportunity to share a little bit about what you think Canada can do to positively support the Belarusian people and the Belarusian opposition. In addition to applying tough and consistent sanctions to the existing regime, how can we support you in your movement for freedom and justice?

[Vladzimir Astapenka]

Thank you so much for your words and for your question.

I'll try to be brief. We have different strategies, and, as I have already stated, the sanctions already applied have not changed the course of Lukashenko. Now it looks like he is going to stay there as long as he can, because it is important for him not to leave somewhere.

Politically, I would answer your question very briefly. Since Lukashenko has no legitimacy, there should be someone who should have the legitimacy to represent the people of Belarus. We believe that, for the moment, it's Tsikhanouskaya, who stood for the elections, who basically won the elections as we believe, and who created the United Transitional Cabinet.

It's a big challenge and a question for the international community how to deal with this cabinet, how to recognize it and how to acknowledge its existence. We are really open to any co-operation that we may have with different countries. If Canada would be the leading country in this respect, we would be very happy to co-operate.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Fundamentally, you're looking for other countries to recognize that the person who won the election is the legitimate president, and all the things that would logically flow from that.

[Vladzimir Astapenka]

As you may know, for the moment, it stops at the point that the elections were not recognized as legal, binding and obligatory. There are no official results of this election that are recognized. It's a question of the recognition of Tsikhanouskaya.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Exactly. I agree with your assessment about who clearly had the support of the people and who got the most votes.

If you have a moment, could you just comment on recent U.K. sanctions and how Canada could strengthen its sanctions to line up with the strengthening of sanctions in the U.K.?

[Vladzimir Astapenka]

In short, this is exactly what we expected because these are the sanctions to harmonize and to coordinate the regime with the Russian sanctions. We expect that the European Union could do the same and Canada and the U.S.A. would support this development.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We now go to MP Bendayan.

You have three minutes.

[Rachel Bendayan, Liberal, Outremont, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witnesses who are here for their testimony.

Obviously, the political situation in Belarus is of concern to our government and to Canadians. In addition to the problems that we see with the last election, of course, there is also the issue of Putin seeing Belarus as a borderland or perhaps even as a buffer against NATO. Certainly Putin has made no secret of Russia's intent to further integrate Belarus into its sphere of influence and possibly even integrate Belarus holus-bolus into Russia itself.

I wonder if you might expand upon the role that you see Canada and other NATO allies playing in order to further advance democracy in Belarus in view of the Belarusian people asking for free and fair elections.

[Vladzimir Astapenka]

Thank you so much.

It's not a sanctions policy; it was a strike, but I really appreciate the ability to speak on this subject.

We believe that Lukashenko turned the country into a concentration camp. In one of the reports of the human rights organizations, it was called “an open-air prison”. It's really rather difficult for the people living inside Belarus now to manifest something different or something that Lukashenko doesn't like. On top of that, Putin came to Belarus with the troops, the tanks, the rockets and the aircraft and launched the war of aggression against Ukraine. We believe that under these circumstances, Belarus could and maybe should be considered an occupied territory, when the people cannot really decide their destiny.

Of course, I should mention—I should have mentioned this earlier—the recent development of deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, which Lukashenko claims is done by his initiative, but it is done by Putin. They promised that the nuclear weapons would be delivered on July 8. That will be a very dangerous factor for regional security, at least, and of course, it undermines the non-proliferation treaty and all the obligations in this sphere.

We believe that such a development could be the cause of a real, strong response from the collective west, and that, maybe, specially designed sanctions should be planned if such a development occurs.

[Rachel Bendayan, Liberal, Outremont, QC]

If there is any time remaining, I would give it over to my colleague, Mr. Zuberi.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

No, there are seven seconds remaining. He is going in third.

We will go to Mr. Champoux now for three minutes.