Thank you very much. It's obviously a great joy to be here. I have to say that security here, I'll tell you, is much tighter than at the British House of Commons.
I've published both on long energy transitions and, in the past, on war. I'm happy to talk about either.
In terms of long energy transitions, a key point is that the global energy mix is changing. That is a long and very destabilizing process. That is the way it is.
Now, there are a couple of points that are quite salient. Actual estimates of oil and gas reserves vary hugely. Industry estimations tend to be very optimistic. That's a very simple point. The other thing is that, increasingly, oil and gas in the world are unconventional sources. The key thing about that is there has been tremendous expansion of it that was predicated on cheap money. As we know from the U.S. case, now that money is more expensive, unconventional oil and gas is not growing as fast as it was.
I'm going to tell you a quick story before I move on to the subject of war. My mother-in-law from England came to visit us a couple of weeks ago, and she was describing how growing up in rural England in the 1940s and early 1950s they had no electricity and no running water and still largely had horses in the fields. That was true for the rest of the world. The world has changed tremendously in a generation, and for some people in cities maybe two or three generations. Those sorts of big changes, history alerts us, come at costs, and we're only becoming aware of those costs these days.
I'll turn to the subject of war.
Commentators love quoting Clausewitz, and Clausewitz has wonderful one-liners, like “fog of war” and “War is...a continuation of politics”. Clausewitz said lots of uncomfortable things, which people like to gloss over. The first thing is that war is a very unpleasant business. Clausewitz was writing in the early 19th century, when there was a general view that you did not involve civilians in war, to a large extent. That was done by professionals. Nowadays, that seems acceptable.
The other point, as Clausewitz argued, is that defensive is much stronger than offensive. That favoured the Ukrainians in the opening stage of the war. Regrettably, it obviously favours the Russian side these days. There's a further point that is really worth considering. The recent case of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh alerts us to the fact that, for countries that are reliant on great power help from the outside, if that great power help is speedily removed, the consequences can be very unpredictable, and we all know the potential radical change of U.S. support after the next election. That sounds very pessimistic.
People love to use the analogy of the Finnish Winter War to describe Ukraine. There are key differences. The Finns were very successful in keeping their casualties down; that's the first point. The second thing is that perhaps the bargaining position of Ukraine over the last few weeks has diminished. In my previous deposition, I made the point that maybe it's a stalemate, and obviously since then a lot of commentators have talked about a stalemate. People in the U.S. military are talking about how a stalemate would be a good outcome, so there's a certain degree of unpredictability.
Optimism.... Under very bleak circumstances, Finland, in 1945, managed to secure peace with Russia. It was a very bitter pill but, nonetheless, it did preserve national independence.
These are very challenging times. Where does this leave Canada? A question is, “What happened to Armenia's other allies when Russia pulled the plug on it?” It's a very good question.
I think I've used about four minutes, Mr. Chair, and I won't exhaust your patience any further.