Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 29th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Welcome back, everyone.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, November 8, 2023, the committee will now commence its study of Canada's diplomatic capacity, otherwise known as the future of diplomacy study.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and our esteemed witnesses.

Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name.

If you are participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic, and please mute your microphone when you are not speaking. If you are in the room, on the other hand, your mic will be controlled by the proceedings and verification officer.

You may speak in the official language of your choice. Interpretation services are available. You have the choice, at the bottom of your screen, of floor, English or French. If interpretation is lost, please inform me immediately.

In accordance with the committee’s routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses, I have been informed by the clerk that the two witnesses who are joining us virtually have completed the required connection tests in advance of our meeting.

Now I'd like to welcome our esteemed guests.

First we have, here in person, Professor Mark Kersten, who is with the University of the Fraser Valley and the Wayamo Foundation.

We're very pleased to have two additional witnesses, who are joining us virtually. We have Professor Chapnick, a professor of defence studies at the Canadian Forces College. We also have Professor Welsh, a professor of global governance and security at McGill University.

Each of our witnesses will be provided with five minutes for opening remarks. Then we will go to the members for any questions they may have.

Professor Kersten, since you're here in person, you have the floor. You have five minutes.

[Dr. Mark Kersten, Assistant Professor, University of the Fraser Valley, and the Wayamo Foundation, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to speak to Canada's commitment to a rules-based system in relation to the very currency of diplomacy: international law. In particular, I will focus on Canada's approach to prosecuting international crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression.

Canada has done a great deal to support accountability efforts in recent years. Since 2022, Canada has consistently supported the prosecution of international crimes in Ukraine. Along with the Netherlands, Canada has taken Syria to the International Court of Justice over torture. However, many question why there are so many inconsistencies in Canada's support for international law and accountability efforts.

I would like to explore two questions that I believe are instructive in relation to Canada's position on prosecuting international crimes and standing in the world.

First, what would Canada do if a mid-level Russian or Syrian war criminal or a member of the Wagner Group entered Canada? As a signatory of the Geneva Conventions, Canada is obligated to investigate war crimes and prosecute them in its own courts.

Canada's diplomatic partners would expect it to prosecute and not become a safe haven for war criminals, yet all too often, Canada does nothing or attempts to deport alleged war criminals instead of prosecuting them. If Canada does deport those alleged war criminals, it seeks zero guarantees that they will be held accountable in the country to which they are deported.

In 2016, the Department of Justice released a report which stated that over 200 perpetrators of international crimes reside in Canada. Canada has not prosecuted any of them. Canada has the laws to do it and it has the resources to do it, but it won't do it. Unlike its allies, since the early 2010s, Canada has abandoned the use of universal jurisdiction.

My second question is, what would Canada do if the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for senior Hamas leaders and those responsible for atrocities committed on October 7? There is a real prospect that this will happen in the coming weeks and months. What would Canada say to the Israeli families who have asked the International Criminal Court to investigate Hamas's crimes? What would it say to Palestinians?

Right now, the only answer that is consistent with Canadian policy would be that Canada would oppose ICC warrants for Hamas leaders because Canada believes that Palestine is not a state and therefore the ICC plays no role in Israel or Palestine. Indeed, Canada has opposed every single independent and impartial international effort to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed in Israel and Palestine—every single one.

The question arises, what are the rules when Canada supports victims and survivors in some places some of the times, but not in other places at other times? Those who look to Canada—victims of atrocities, diplomats, staff in international organizations, others that I engage with on an almost day-to-day basis—want leadership, and not just on a rules-based system. They want a consistent rules-based system. They still expect Canada to lead, but they wonder why in so many cases it's unwilling and unable to do so.

It's not too late. I believe Canada can lead, and I'd like to offer a few recommendations.

One, establish a diplomatic post for an ambassador for international justice to help coordinate accountability efforts here and abroad.

Two, invest in holding atrocity perpetrators living in our midst, in our communities here, to account in our courts under universal jurisdiction or work with the deportation destination countries to ensure they are held to account there.

Three, support the ICC in all situations under its jurisdiction. To do so, Canada does not need to recognize that Palestine is a state. Belgium and Switzerland, two close allies of ours, have recognized that the ICC has a role to play, and neither currently recognizes Palestine as a state.

Four, study the possible creation of an additional hybrid court for Israel and Palestine staffed by international prosecutors and judges, with some Israeli and Palestinian staff as well.

Five, lead international efforts to trace and, where possible, seize assets of perpetrators of international crimes: transnational organized crimes like human trafficking and money laundering and large-scale corruption. These crimes are linked and they should be investigated and prosecuted as such.

Finally, support efforts to amend the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court so that the court can prosecute the crime of aggression, including a situation dear to our hearts in Ukraine.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your comments and questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Professor Kersten.

We now go to Professor Chapnick.

Professor Chapnick, you have five minutes. The floor is yours.

[Dr. Adam Chapnick, Professor, Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for the invitation to be here.

I thank you also for your service to Canadians, all of you who stand for election. It is a noble act, and I salute your courage. I salute your resilience in these times, and I salute your commitment to our country.

You've asked me to speak about Canada's diplomatic capacity: Do we as a country have the personnel and supports in place to promote and defend our national interests at home and around the world?

The objective answer to part of this question can be found in the statistics that folks from Global Affairs Canada can provide the committee. I will leave that to them. I will instead reflect on two more subjective capacity issues that I hope you will take into consideration during your deliberations. One is national ambition on the world stage, and the other is the value of diplomatic agility.

The very question of whether Global Affairs Canada has the capacity to, and I quote the committee, “demonstrate leadership within key multilateral organizations” suggests a level of foreign policy ambition that is not necessarily derived from the national interest.

Canada makes up just under one-half of 1% of the world's population, and we rely on international trade to grow our economy. We do not have the capacity, be that in terms of population, in terms of independent economic power or in terms of military might, to impose our will on others, and efforts to do so often risk undermining the relationships we must cultivate in order to maximize our security and prosperity.

We must defend and seek to preserve as much of the current international order as we can while keeping in mind that foreign policy is not an exercise in making Canadians feel good about themselves. Rather than leading internationally, it is often, although not always, in our interest to allow others the spotlight instead.

Such a pragmatic approach to defending the national interest requires seasoned, well-educated, multilingual diplomats willing to do the grunt work that keeps the global order functioning. We must take on positions in international organizations that no one else wants. We must participate actively in the meetings that no one enjoys. We must pay our dues on time and in full, no matter who else does. We must ensure that states friendly to us remain committed to multilateral solutions to global problems. For this, I am confident that the capacity exists. I worry more that it is sometimes diverted to unnecessary efforts to lead.

Similarly, I am less concerned with Canada's capacity to, and I quote the committee again, “plan ahead for future geopolitical shifts, crises, and opportunities” than I am with the ability of our foreign service officials to pivot in response to global disruptions outside of our control. No amount of planning will prevent more powerful external forces from shaping and reshaping the international environment in which we must operate. Better, then, that we privilege adaptability, flexibility and relationship building, and that we do so modestly and with humility.

In sum, let us focus on the capacity to do the little things right, rather than trying too hard to be great.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Professor Chapnick.

We now go to Professor Welsh.

Professor Welsh, you have five minutes.

[Dr. Jennifer Welsh, Director, Centre for International Peace and Security Studies, McGill University, As an individual]

Good afternoon.

Thank you for the invitation to come and discuss with the committee the current state of Canada's diplomatic capacity and its future in an increasingly unstable world.

I'd like to begin by agreeing with the opening paragraph of the “Future of Diplomacy” initiative report that suggests Canada must invest more in its diplomatic service and activities given our current global context and that we cannot continue to rest on our laurels.

Canadians are living in an international system that is less hospitable to our interests and values than perhaps at any time since the end of the Second World War. We do need to be more strategic about our global engagement and seek to enhance our influence, especially through diplomacy.

This influence is not just about guns and bombs but a deep and granular understanding of the forces at work. This requires a presence around the world. I give an example to the committee that prior to its invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, Russia significantly increased its presence on the ground in Latin America, especially in Mexico, in recognition of the importance of political narratives and winning allies. Effective diplomacy is critical to understanding how narratives that challenge our interests and values take hold and how they can be countered.

The UN Secretary-General's recent “A New Agenda for Peace” that was released over the summer not only paints a grim picture of the intersecting challenges facing our world, but also positions the UN system in a very different way from the recent past. It is much more backstage in a supportive role, ready to step in when and if national governments themselves can find common ground. Only diplomacy can achieve that common ground.

When I look at the priorities outlined so far by GAC and its various initiatives, I have a number of observations I could share with you today, but I'll limit myself here to three by way of conclusion.

Yes, we need to increase our presence with key countries, but this goes beyond the G20. We also need to be much more engaged in the Americas, where Canada's footprint has been far too light given its strategic importance not just to us but to the United States, and in Africa and Central Asia. However, we also need to be much more innovative with our liberal democratic allies.

Yes, we need to be more present at top multilateral tables. I note the worrying fact that while we are a major contributor to the UN system, our diplomatic presence is among the lowest in the G7. We also need to expand diplomacy beyond traditional multilateral institutions, which may not be the forum in which key advances are made. I can give an example of postpandemic diplomacy in the Q and A if this is of interest of the committee.

Second, and the previous speaker alluded to this, Canada's diplomatic capacity needs to include a much more robust and cutting-edge system for foresight and scenario planning, an exercise that needs to be clear-eyed about how threats to states and the individuals within them could unfold, and how they intersect. It has become clear to many of us in the research and academic community that GAC has lost that policy planning edge and needs to develop much better long-term assessment of trends and their potential impacts. It could also look to other countries whose governments are key funders of research. I point here to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in the U.K.

Third and finally, there's a sustained discussion of the need for GAC and Canadian diplomats to engage more strategically in communication. Yes, I'd agree. However, this must extend beyond public relations to real substance. Above all, if GAC and the federal government wishes to sustain support from Canadians for a new foreign policy direction, it must speak honestly, openly and often about the dramatic changes in the international environment and particularly the threats facing our prosperity, security and political values. This is something I fail to see. Linked to this, I would recommend taking great care with the recommendation for Canada's diplomacy to be open and connected.

In many ways this is true but with respect to the particular comments on diaspora communities, I think both our political leaders and civil service have operated with an outdated approach. Canada's core challenge going forward will be to ensure that our diversity still enables us to have a coherent national interest that we can define and promote, which may be at odds with what some diaspora communities might wish.

As a final point, the future of diplomacy initiative calls for a whole-of-government approach to tackling crises and pursuing Canadian interests. It suggests that GAC should lead it. However, with the deepest of respect, I would question whether other federal government actors still look to GAC to chart the overarching direction for Canada's foreign and global engagement, given that Canada has not updated its foreign policy strategy in almost two decades.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Professor Welsh.

We will now go to the members for questions. Each member will have six minutes for the first round.

We start off with Mr. Aboultaif.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Welcome again, Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Professor Chapnick and Ms. Welsh.

Knowing the new dynamic that's presented itself on the world stage for at least the last decade or two, Canada seems to not be as active as it can be or to meet the expectations of Canada's role on the world stage.

In the minds of Canadians, rather than the rest of the international community, it can be surprising. I think there's a bigger expectation of our role, what we can do or that we can play a bigger role, but we somehow haven't been able to translate this into a policy and a role—and maybe the personality, too—to be able to be as effective as expected.

If we were to do an overview or comparison between the past and the present, where do you see Canada's international role now, and Canada's diplomacy?

I'd like the three of you to weigh in on this, and I'll start with Professor Chapnick.

[Dr. Adam Chapnick]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chair, I think that if we want to compare historically, we have to take some context into consideration. Historically, when Canada's reputation was at its best, the world was infinitely smaller. As a result, it was a lot easier to stand out, particularly in the 1940s and 1950s when our reputation was at its peak. Europe was rebuilding; Germany was a defeated country, and we had a Cold War beginning. Coming out of the Second World War, Canada was one of the four most powerful countries in the world for a very brief period.

We parlayed that into influence, I would suggest, through humility. Canada did not look for opportunities to lead. We merely accepted them when they came. Our leaders did not speak to Canadians about how important we were. We allowed our actions to do the talking and took credit when credit came. It didn't actually come that often, until the mid-1950s, which was a testimony to the work we'd done up to that point that had not necessarily been recognized until then. As I suggested in my opening comments, that was the grunt work—keeping a fledgling international economic and political and security system moving by participating actively and not seeking credit for everything that we did.

Is it harder today? Absolutely. Is Canada's reputation different today? Well, we're competing with 192 other UN members as opposed to 50 at the beginning, so that's not unexpected.

I think the biggest difference is that successive governments of every political stripe set up expectations amongst the Canadian public that are not necessarily realistic and don't necessarily reflect the good work that our diplomats do behind the scenes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you.

Dr. Kersten.

[Dr. Mark Kersten]

Thank you very much for the question.

Of course, I agree that Canada can't do everything, but where it sees opportunities to foster accountability and to work with its diplomatic partners to achieve a degree of justice and accountability, I think it should take it.

I strongly believe that our ability to do so credibly is enhanced if we do so at home. As I mentioned, if we hold the alleged perpetrators of international crimes who reside in our communities and in Canada to account here in our court system—as we're able to do—our credibility abroad will increase. People will see that we are willing to walk the walk and not just talk the talk.

Again, I want to reiterate that Canada has done some good things. It is helping in the push for the creation of an international anti-corruption court. It has submitted documentation filings at the International Court of Justice in support of a genocide case in relation to the Rohingya in Myanmar.

Again, I would say, take those opportunities where they arise. Just as importantly, when Canada feels it cannot do so, at least don't stand in the way of justice and accountability.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Madam Welsh.

[Dr. Jennifer Welsh]

Thank you very much.

I would like to echo the theme of Professor Chapnick.

It is critical, in the current environment that Canada is in, and that Canadians are living in, that we don't make our foreign policy just an extension of domestic politics. The situation is far too serious for that. Our search to have a headline or to show that we are leading can really divert us from thinking about where our capacity can really have an impact.

Many times, we will have an impact, and it will not be visible. I'll give you the example of the NATO meeting last summer where there was a very difficult issue on the table, which was Ukraine's membership in NATO. It was clear that Ukraine was not going to get the answer it wanted. Canada and its allies were at a very difficult meeting, and our civil servants and others worked very hard to come up with language around security guarantees for Ukraine, which was maybe not the best answer in terms of Kyiv, but it was a very important contribution.

I very much—

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

I'm sorry. I want to ask you a question. You've mentioned something about—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I'm afraid, Mr. Aboultaif, that you're out of time. It's 12 seconds past six minutes.

We will now go to MP Damoff.

You have six minutes.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, witnesses, for being here today, and for your testimony and expertise.

In 2022, Minister Joly committed to transforming Global Affairs Canada to better serve Canadians amidst increasing global uncertainty. We're certainly seeing that around the world. There are increasing security crises and complex challenges we need to overcome.

I want to start by thanking all those who work in Global Affairs Canada. Their dedication and commitment is really impressive, and I think all Canadians owe them a debt of gratitude.

I want to focus on consular services because none of you touched on that. It's not just cases like the two Michaels, which are so public. We've recently seen hundreds of Canadians being evacuated from Israel and Gaza, but there are also less well-known cases that never make it into the newspapers.

I'm wondering, Ms. Welsh, if you could start, and then others may want to jump in. Where do you see us in terms of consular services, and how can we improve what we're doing there?

[Dr. Jennifer Welsh]

Thank you very much.

I want to be completely open and say that this is not a part of Global Affairs I know as well. I think you are absolutely right to begin by applauding those on the ground.

What I will say in response is that there was a tendency, in the 1990s and 2000s, to think of crises as things that happen periodically. We'll have a crisis, and then we'll be able to go back to normal. I think recent history is showing us that we are now in a situation of permanent turbulence, so there needs to be a capacity in Global Affairs....

I found it very interesting that, in the report, they talk about a standing geopolitical crisis task force within Global Affairs that could bring people together, from across not only government but also local staff, in particular crisis situations, quickly and efficiently, to address those situations you speak of where our staff will be required on the ground to protect Canadians. I think this is the way we need to be able to reimagine those capacities.

Our presence is so important here in order to foresee some of those crises that may develop. We need to remember that a diplomatic presence is not only for crisis response but also for prevention so when that crisis comes, you have the knowledge to be able to protect Canadians in a much more effective way.

I hope those comments are partly helpful with the concern you have.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Mr. Chapnick, do you have anything to add to that ?

[Dr. Adam Chapnick]

I must say that Professor Welsh knows more about this than I do. If she says she doesn't know a lot, that means you'll know how much I know.

However, I think I can draw a parallel with the situation of consular affairs today to the situation the Canadian Armed Forces face with domestic deployments. What I mean by that is there was a time when the Canadian Armed Forces were called to do a domestic deployment once in a blue moon and, when they were, they figured things out. They went and they did what they had to do, which meant that their processes weren't formalized. There was a lot of ad hockery, and you hoped you wouldn't have to do it very often.

Similarly, the consular service wasn't being called on nearly as often as it is being called on now and is likely to be called on now, which means that it is probably time for a more sophisticated formalized approach to something that is much less of a one-off in emergencies and is going to be a regular part of doing business.

I think we are in a situation similar to the situation that the Canadian Armed Forces are facing, in that one of these duties that wasn't the highlight of what you do is coming to dominate more than it used to.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Mr. Kersten, you said you wanted to add to that as well.

[Dr. Mark Kersten]

Sure, and I, along with other Canadians, have watched the remarkable work done in Ukraine to bring Canadians home, and for others as well, in Afghanistan after the pullout and in Sudan. I think that's remarkable and incredible work.

The only thing that I think I would add to that, not being an expert on consular services, is that sometimes there's a tendency to suggest that once that is done, we can then turn the page and look onwards. I think we really have to remember that people are also left behind in those crises.

I agree that we are in a moment, a time or a period of almost perpetual crises, but there's a tendency sometimes to jump from one crisis to another and forget the preceding ones. The people who suffer in those preceding ones continue to suffer and we can—and I believe should—do more for them.

Thank you.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

I only have 20 seconds left, Chair, so I'll give it back to you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you. I appreciate that.

We now go to MP Bergeron for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us and informing our thinking on the future of Canadian diplomacy.

There's no question that Canada has lost a lot of influence over the last few decades. We saw that with its two unsuccessful attempts to get elected to the UN Security Council, first under Stephen Harper's government and then under the current Prime Minister.

I hear Professor Welsh's recommendation to refocus our efforts on certain parts of the world. I also hear the message that we need to build on our strengths. Canada isn't a great military power—far from it—and it's no longer a power of great political influence. It's also not an economic powerhouse. However, it manages to distinguish itself in certain areas.

In 2022, Daniel Livermore, who spent three decades as a public servant in international relations, was concerned that Global Affairs Canada appeared to be ignoring international cultural affairs. In fact, in the minister's plan for the future of diplomacy, the cultural aspect is mentioned only once in 40 pages. Let me just quote that one time: The department should continue to maximize the use of “soft power” and public diplomacy abroad, including through support for science diplomacy, sport diplomacy, academic diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy.

At one time, Canada invested a lot of money in cultural diplomacy. That's no longer the case. And yet, culturally speaking, Canada and Quebec probably shine far beyond their demographic and economic weight, among other things, internationally.

Dr. Welsh and Mr. Chapnick, why do you think Canada has moved away from cultural diplomacy a little bit in recent years, and what importance should Canada place on that to regain some international influence?

[Dr. Jennifer Welsh]

Thank you very much.

I'm happy to begin the discussion. I have two sets of comments in reply.

The first is that I think there's a dangerous tendency to believe that the current environment we are in favours hard power almost exclusively as opposed to soft power, and I don't completely agree with that. I do think that the soft power resources, particularly of liberal democracies, are going to remain incredibly important, because we have a number of countries in the world today that are incredibly worried about an international system that becomes divided between great powers and in which they will be forced to choose a side.

Therefore, we need to understand in very granular ways how and why they take the positions they do on certain issues like the Ukraine invasion, in which the ambivalence of many countries in the global south was in many respects a surprise to diplomats and others in the western world, when I think a deeper understanding, through the exercise of soft power and closer relations, may have provided information that would have helped. I think culture also can help in countering narratives. It can be a very attractive way of creating closer relationships.

I would say in conclusion that I've been sitting for the last year on a panel by the Council of Canadian Academies on Canada's scientific and innovation partnerships. One of the messages is that it's precisely in an era of geopolitical competition where relationships among scientists—and I include here not just hard sciences, but social sciences—are absolutely critical. U.S. and Chinese scientists are still engaging with one another today, and that is precisely the kind of co-operation and engagement we need to sustain.