Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 14th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 95 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders; therefore, members are attending in person in the room as well as remotely by using the Zoom application.

I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. You may speak in the official language of your choice.

Although this room is equipped with a powerful audio system, feedback events can occur. The most common cause of sound feedback is an earpiece worn too close to a microphone.

As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

With regard to a speaking list, the committee clerk is attempting to make sure that we comply with the members' requests.

In accordance with the committee's routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses, I am informing the committee that all witnesses appearing virtually have completed the required connection tests.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, November 8, 2023, the committee will resume its study of Canada's diplomatic capacity.

Now I'd like to welcome our witnesses.

We have with us today, in person, Professor Carvin from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. We also have here in person Professor Juneau, who is in public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa.

Joining us virtually was to be Ambassador Bonnafont. Unfortunately, from what I've been informed, he does not have the proper headset, and so the interpreters are unable to provide interpretive services. From what I am told, the interpreters have informed me that Ambassador Bonnafont does not have the appropriate headset, but we will endeavour—and this is up to the members—to try to schedule an alternative date on which we can benefit from the perspective of Ambassador Bonnafont.

We're also very pleased to have here with us today Ms. Farida Deif, Canada director of Human Rights Watch.

Each witness will be provided with five minutes.

Go ahead, MP Chatel.

[Sophie Chatel, Liberal, Pontiac, QC]

May I comment on Mr. Bonnafont's testimony?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Yes, of course.

[Sophie Chatel, Liberal, Pontiac, QC]

Great. First, I would like to know whether Mr. Bonnafont would be able to stay a little longer so that I can at least ask a few questions that I wanted to ask this excellent witness. I was very much looking forward to meeting him and asking him some very important questions for this study. If Mr. Bonnafont agrees, I would like to ask my questions so that he can answer them in writing, should he be unable to join us again.

Second, I would like us to ask the Board of Internal Economy to reassess the special situation of our committee, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, given that, by definition, we hear from witnesses from abroad. We don't always have the time to have the exact equipment that is required, according to the rules. The questions asked are very specific, after all.

Would it be possible to ask the board to submit a solution to situations like that? We are sometimes unable to put questions to witnesses in such circumstances. So I would ask the Board of Internal Economy to submit solutions to our committee.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, MP Chatel, for your intervention.

I completely agree with you, and I'm sure everyone else does as well. We were all looking very much forward to hearing from the ambassador, but unfortunately the interpreters have advised me that they are unable work; however, to work around that, we have sent messages to the ambassador. If he can confirm the make of his headphone and we receive that confirmation, then we will definitely have the benefit of hearing from him today.

As for the other question you've raised, perhaps we should talk about that during committee business, which is the last half hour of today's meeting.

Are you okay with that? Yes. That's excellent.

We will start off with our witnesses.

Please accept our apologies.

Professor Carvin, you have five minutes for your opening remarks. That is true for all three of the witnesses we are going to be hearing from today.

If I hold up this phone, that means you're very close to the time limit, and that applies not only to opening remarks but also to when members are asking you questions, because they're given specific time slots. If anyone does see this go up, please try to wrap it up in 10 to 20 seconds.

Professor Carvin, the floor is yours, and you have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Dr. Stephanie Carvin, Associate Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

I will advise the committee that I have provided, in true professorial fashion, longer comments, but in the interest of five minutes, I will be much more brief.

I suspect it's fairly well known that Lester B. Pearson once described foreign policy as “domestic policy with its hat on”, and Pierre Elliot Trudeau described it as “extension abroad of national policies”, yet it is seldom that we see our policy-makers treat foreign policy in this way.

Foreign affairs are often treated as an afterthought—a luxury rather than an instrument of state power that can further both our domestic and international interests abroad. Diplomacy is seen as a reward for friendship rather than as a tool that will ensure our interests and also reach across divides when difficult conversations need to take place.

It's understandable why this is the state of affairs. We live in a very safe neighbourhood compared to a lot of our friends and allies. We've had the blessing of not having to worry about our security.

I don't think I need to emphasize the point that these circumstances are rapidly changing. Daily headlines about war, foreign interference, espionage, cyber-attacks and the suffering of refugees and internally displaced persons in the context of an international order under stress are reminder enough.

The point is that we were once insulated from many of the world's most difficult challenges, but this is no longer the case. We no longer have the freedom to ignore the world outside our window. To address these problems, we need a foreign affairs department that can navigate these uncertain waters.

To this end, I wish to raise several points for the committee's consideration.

First, and I think most importantly, human resources issues at Global Affairs Canada, by all accounts, are in somewhat dire straits. The recruitment process is archaic, chaotic and not suited to the 21st century. To give just one example, it seems that a significant percentage of the workforce is made up of young master's students or young graduates on 90-day contracts. These temporary employees are constantly faced with the prospect of imminent unemployment and are constantly looking for the next opportunity.

To be frank, it is very odd when I attend a meeting at Global Affairs and I am confronted with students who are currently in my own class. This has happened multiple times.

This is not how you build a workforce, and therefore I'm strongly endorsing recommendations 9 through 13 on hiring and training of Global Affairs Canada's staff in the December 2023 Senate report, “More Than a Vocation”, which I suspect you're already familiar with.

Second, Canada's lack of a foreign policy is, frankly, bizarre, especially for a G7 country. When you ask about it, the result is often disappointing as well. We're told that creating a foreign policy is too hard, too challenging, that circumstances change too fast and that it's not a priority to signal to our allies what our intentions are because they can just pick up a phone and talk to us.

We have had a much-delayed Indo-Pacific policy, a defence policy that is yet to re-emerge and the downgrading of a promised Africa strategy to a framework last year.

It's clear that we are struggling to write foreign policy documents. I wonder if this is partially because we're simply out of practice in doing so. Other countries release documents on a fairly regular basis. I think there are a lot of advantages to having a foreign policy. It forces choices and it forces priorities. Yes, prioritization is difficult and it requires difficult discussions, or positions can change in light of new events, but the answer is updating that policy, not eschewing the exercise altogether.

I think it's also an important communications tool. This is always downgraded, especially by people who worked at the Department of Foreign Affairs. They don't see this as a communication tool.

I just travelled to Japan a week and a half ago. In preparation, I looked at their Diplomatic Bluebook. It's 400 pages. Do we need a 400-page book on foreign affairs? Absolutely not, but I think a clear strategic document that conveys our interests to not only our allies but also to Canadians is definitely within our interest. The other points I'd like raise today will kind of reflect and reinforce this point.

The third issue is Global Affairs' ability to give timely and useful advice to policy-makers at the centre of government. My colleague Thomas Juneau is going to speak about intelligence in Global Affairs, and I think this plays a part.

It's hard to coordinate these things, but anecdotally you hear tales of challenges in providing this advice. It's not only a Global Affairs problem, but better training needs to be given to Global Affairs staff to provide that timely advice that can really help influence a situation when it comes to timely decision-making in an evolving situation.

A fourth issue is mission creep. The Senate report I mentioned earlier, “More Than a Vocation”, suggests that GAC should be considered “a central agency with responsibility for coordinating Canada's approach to international policy files across the federal government.” It's recommendation 28.

I really disagree with this recommendation. I think this is a bad idea, and I'm concerned that in lieu of direction that would be provided by a foreign policy, GAC has a mission creep problem. It's true that every issue in government does have an international dimension and that GAC is the lead on foreign affairs, but it's impossible for GAC to have a lead in all of these areas.

I'm going to run out of time for my other points, so maybe you can ask me later, but you'll see them in my submission. I think we have to be aware that GAC needs to stick to its mandate.

One final thing would be Canada's ability to sustain its engagement. These are questions being asked by our allies. They see our Indo-Pacific policy and they're happy, but do we have what it takes to stay in that region and keep committing to those relationships that we're presently building?

Finally I will say that we need to improve our presence abroad. This matters to our allies. They care about us, and it's much easier to think about Canada if you can meet down the street and not three countries over. It's much easier that way.

Finally, I think that GAC has a communications problem. We need better transparency and better communications with Canadians, particularly if we're going to reinvest in this capacity. We have to explain to Canadians why it's in their interest to do so.

Thank you very much for this opportunity. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Professor Carvin.

We next go to Professor Juneau.

You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau, Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you very much. Thank you for the offer to speak today.

I will focus on three things today. One is that the foreign ministry we need for tomorrow is one that should work seamlessly with intelligence. Two is that we do not have that at this point, and three is what we can do to get to that point.

First, very quickly, the foreign ministry for tomorrow is one that should be able to work seamlessly with the intelligence community. This is necessary to deal with a lot of the international threats that we face today. Think about foreign electoral interference, transnational repression, economic espionage, transnational terrorism, the security implications of climate change and so on. Concretely, this means that Global Affairs Canada has to work closely with CSIS, CSE, DND, Canadian Forces intelligence command and others in the security and intelligence community and beyond Ottawa to deal with these and other threats.

The second point I'd make is that the foreign ministry we need for tomorrow, one that can work seamlessly with the intelligence community, is not what we have right now. To be more specific, I would emphasize that the situation today is much better than it was 10 or 15 years ago. Intelligence works with the policy community much better. This is something that Professor Carvin and I have argued in some of our research, but we still have a long way to go.

Too often, our diplomatic and intelligence worlds speak different languages and fail to work with each other in a coherent way. That means sharing information in a timely way. It means coordinating policies and operations. Some of the blame has to go to the intelligence community for this. It remains too insular and too disconnected from the needs of policy. Some of the blame also has to go to the diplomatic side, where culturally the bureaucracy remains too neglectful of all things intelligence, again despite recent progress.

One way to illustrate this is that our diplomatic service has low intelligence literacy. This means that even though some individual diplomats have a solid experience of how intelligence can help them in their work, collectively the overall understanding of intelligence and an understanding of how to integrate it into their work remains below the level of the capabilities of diplomatic services of some of our key allies.

I would note, by the way, that the reverse is true and also problematic. Our intelligence community has low policy literacy, but that's not our focus here today.

This has consequences. We saw the tip of the iceberg of these problems emerge in debates about foreign interference in recent months and information not flowing efficiently. Different parts of the government fail to understand each other, and so on. What this means concretely is that the ceiling for success in our ability to counter foreign interference or other threats that we face will remain lower than it could be as long as we don't improve the relationship between the diplomatic and intelligence arms of national power.

Three, what can we do to better integrate our diplomatic and intelligence functions?

One—and this is a bit in line with what Professor Carvin says—we need a comprehensive review of our national security architecture, which is outdated. This can include reforming our intelligence priorities process, which is sclerotic; improving information-sharing mechanisms and reviewing and adjusting governance structures, including those that should allow for better coordination and information sharing with other levels of government, with the private sector and with civil society; tackling a major human resource crisis, as Professor Carvin discussed; dealing with the epidemic of the over-classification that I've discussed in other committees recently, which remains a major obstacle to making better use of intelligence, including in Global Affairs; and reviewing training programs.

Point two is more transparency and engagement, as Professor Carvin mentioned, with the public, with civil society and with the private sector. This is essential to bring in new ideas to reinforce a stronger challenge function, which is lacking in the department, and reinforcing accountability mechanisms by better shining a light on weaknesses.

The third point concerns secondments and exchanges. We need our diplomats to spend more time working outside Global Affairs in the intelligence community—and elsewhere, for that matter. This is the best way to build a mutual understanding and to deepen institutional linkages.

Four, in an ideal world, we should have a foreign human intelligence agency, which we don't have. Realistically, that is unlikely to happen at least for the foreseeable future. Until we have one, we should use existing structures and existing authorities and improve them to collect and then use more and better foreign intelligence through CSIS, CSE, CFINTCOM and so on. This is something that both of us have written together about in recent times.

In a world of growing uncertainty in terms of our relations with the U.S., we should push to further Canadianize our collection and our analysis of foreign intelligence and work through a lens of more properly Canadian interests.

Five, building on this, we should continue our ongoing efforts to develop our intelligence diplomacy capacity—which GAC and CSIS should do in tandem, although it's not always easy—diversify our foreign intelligence relations, and better leverage these partnerships.

Last, and I'll finish on this, is that to do this, we need sustained leadership at the political level and at the bureaucratic level—which currently is lacking—to really invest the time necessary to push these administrative reforms.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Professor Juneau.

We next go to Ms. Farida Deif from Human Rights Watch.

Welcome back, Ms. Deif. You have five minutes.

[Farida Deif, Canada Director, Human Rights Watch]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and honourable members, for inviting me to discuss Canada's diplomatic capacity in these very turbulent and unpredictable times. This study could not be timelier.

It will not come as a surprise that I will focus on human rights, which I believe should constitute the moral backbone of Canadian diplomacy. As the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights has said, human rights are the antidote to the prevailing politics of distraction, deception, indifference and repression.

It's clear that the deeply troubling state of affairs we're witnessing globally is fuelled by impunity for human rights violations by the uneven application of international law and the perception that some governments can commit grave crimes and get away with it.

With that said, I will focus today on Canada's efforts to advance justice and accountability for serious international crimes and the increasingly glaring double standards that erode Canada's credibility and have profound repercussions for Canadians and people around the world.

As you know, Canada was instrumental in the creation of the current international framework for the prevention of mass atrocities. It has also been a leading voice for international accountability, playing a central role in establishing the ICC and more recently supporting efforts to address grave crimes in Syria, Myanmar and Ukraine.

The Canadian government's position vis-à-vis the current crisis in Gaza departs significantly from Canada's storied legacy of action. Since the beginning of this conflict, this government has avoided condemning any specific war crimes in Gaza. Instead it repeats broad and general guidance for all parties to abide by international law, while Russia's indiscriminate air strikes on hospitals and schools in Ukraine were rightly condemned. Israel has repeatedly carried out similar attacks without much in the way of condemnation from Ottawa.

The international community rightly condemned President Bashar al-Assad's denial of food and water to civilians in Aleppo, but Canada failed to condemn Israel's use of starvation as a method of warfare in Gaza.

Similarly, Canada has been a global leader in banning explosive weapons like land mines and cluster munitions and in endorsing a new political declaration on explosive weapons, but the government directly undermined these efforts by remaining silent on Israel's recent use of white phosphorus in populated areas in Gaza and in Lebanon.

The government's problematic response to the ICJ's recent ruling on Israel further undermines its stated commitment to a global rules-based order, highlighting its double standards when it comes to Israel. This may also signal that Israel does not need to comply with the order and sends a dangerous message to other states that are before international bodies.

When Canadian diplomacy deviates from international law, it has harmful consequences for Canada far beyond Gaza. Statements by Canadian officials on atrocities anywhere in the world will ring hollow, making it harder to hold perpetrators accountable and deter future international crimes. Pressure by Canada on warring parties to abide by the laws of war and other conflicts will no doubt also carry less weight.

These dangerous double standards unfortunately extend to consular affairs. I have appeared before this committee to highlight the utterly dire situation facing Canadian men, women and children who have been arbitrarily detained in northeast Syria for suspected ISIS ties. We have, at Human Rights Watch, along with a range of UN experts, including the UN Secretary-General, repeatedly called on Canada to repatriate citizens for rehabilitation, reintegration and prosecution as warranted. While some of these Canadian women and children have been repatriated following a court case, many remain unlawfully detained, in addition to all Canadian men. To date, none of the Canadians who have been detained for close to seven years have received any consular assistance. In this way, Canada is flouting not only its international legal obligations but its own guidelines to intervene when citizens abroad face serious abuses, including risks to life, torture and inhumane and degrading treatment.

In January 2021, Global Affairs adopted a consular policy framework specific to this group of citizens that makes it near impossible for them to return home. Among the eligibility criteria for repatriation is a change in medical condition, but the government knows full well that there's little to no chance of these detainees accessing medical care without Canada's assistance.

I'd like to remind you, finally, that in June 2021, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development made concrete recommendations on the provision of consular assistance to this very group of Canadian detainees. This has unfortunately fallen on deaf ears. Global Affairs has provided no consular assistance to the detainees and has done little to nothing to support their relatives here in Canada, some of whom are just pleading for proof of life for their loved ones.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Ms. Deif.

We will now turn to the members for questions.

As I understand it, MP Chong is up first. You have six minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing.

I noted that in the 2023 article that you both published in an international journal, you said that:

Countries are increasingly invited to international coalitions because they are willing and able to bring something to the table, not because of who they are or what they represent. In an era of resurgent great power competition, this material factor is likely to dominate the creation of international coalitions going forward.

You also added that, “the twenty-first century will be more like a potluck than a party: one must bring something to be invited.”

In that context and in the context of your opening remarks, perhaps you could tell us what capabilities Canada presently has to bring to the potluck and what capabilities Canada lacks.

[Dr. Stephanie Carvin]

Sir, nothing makes an academic happier than when you cite their article. I'm going to thank you from the bottom of my heart for doing this.

I think there are actually quite a few capabilities, and then there are ones we have to make decisions about.

Canada has very good capability in the Arctic, for example. We have good intelligence in the Arctic. This is increasingly being considered—it's not an endorsement of mine—a zone of potential conflict in the future. It's something that our European allies are particularly worried about and that will certainly be a focus of NATO going forward. This is an area where we definitely have a lot of capacity.

Similarly, I've been told that we have very good capacity on Russia. Obviously, this is very much in the news and very much at the presence of our allies as well.

These are niche capabilities.

We also have in our own community our tech sector, which is fantastic. We are absolutely leaders with AI. We have innovation in multiple areas that will be of interest. We've noticed this with a number of attempts to actually steal this information and get access to our intellectual property. I think these are areas we could leverage, but we have to make decisions.

Professor Juneau and I have engaged with our allies. They often say to us that when Canada goes to meetings, it doesn't say anything. It doesn't give its opinion. Sometimes it brings talking points. We have all of these things that we could bring to the potluck, but we're just not making our decisions.

Some of our closest allies have told us that they are waiting for us to tell them what we can bring. It's not that they're asking for things and we're saying no; it's that they're saying, “Okay, what are you going to bring?”, and we seem to be in a huddle formation without being able to provide an answer.

I'm waiting for Global Affairs and the Department of National Defence and all of these things to tell us and our allies what they can bring.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

Thank you.

I agree with this. I would just add a few points.

That article was written in reference to AUKUS specifically, but it's a point that we do think is applicable far beyond that. More and more ad hoc coalitions will be built on the basis of what we can bring to the table as opposed to others thinking we're nice. From a Canadian perspective, that's a problem.

I would also add to what Professor Carvin mentioned and say that the lack of a Canadian ability in many cases—not systematically—to bring something to the table and contribute concretely is causing growing frustration with our allies.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

When you say a lack of capability to bring something to the table, are you referencing our lack of defence and security capabilities, our intelligence capability...?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

It's all of them, yes.

That's a problem. Canada very rarely operates alone. We operate with allies. Our first and most important foreign policy interest is to be, and be perceived by our allies as, a reliable ally. When that frustration mounts, it's a vital national interest that is being threatened for us.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I know that yesterday in the Financial Times, a NATO official said that two-thirds of NATO members are going to meet their 2% commitment this year. Canada is decidedly not in that two-thirds. That was in the context of increasing alarm about a potential outcome in the U.S. election later on this year.

These things are very timely right now. Would you not agree?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

To the list of niche capabilities that Professor Carvin mentioned, I would add CSE, our signals intelligence national cryptological agency, which is a very well-respected agency abroad. It is very good and it is respected by our allies.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

You didn't use the term “machinery of government”; you used the term “governance” in your opening remarks about rearranging things within the Government of Canada and how its central agencies and departments interact and how its intelligence community works. You mentioned the four parts of the intelligence community and the Canadian government.

What specific machinery of government changes would you recommend?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

That's a very good question.

First of all, I would mention that Professor Carvin and I wrote a book together on intelligence analysis and policy-making that focuses specifically on these angles, and we do have a full chapter that makes some recommendations.

I think the first recommendation has to be a comprehensive review. That's not a concrete recommendation, but we need to have a serious and systematic effort to look at everything we're doing.

In terms of foreign policy and national security policy generally, but including the machinery dimension, a lot of our structures are dated, and they reflect yesterday's—

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

This defence review has been going on now for some time. Why does it always take so long in Canada, and it doesn't take nearly this long in other G7 countries?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Answer very briefly, please, because we're out of time.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

I would say that it's political direction and the lack of a perceived pressing need to do it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We next go to MP Chatel. You have six minutes.

[Sophie Chatel, Liberal, Pontiac, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I know Mr. Bonnafont doesn't have the right headset. However, I will ask him a few questions; perhaps some of the witnesses will be able to answer my questions afterwards.

Mr. Bonnafont, I know that you won't be able to answer the committee verbally today, but I will read you my questions anyway because I would very much like to learn more about your experience. You can then send your answers in writing to the committee.

Mr. Bonnafont, you've been a career diplomat since 1986. You served in New Delhi, Kuwait, New York. You were the spokesperson for the presidency of the republic before becoming ambassador to India and Spain. You are the director for North Africa and the Middle East and an adviser to the Prime Minister.

However, you did something that piqued the interest of this committee. In March 2023, you led a foreign services review, which resulted in a 298-page report.

I would like to ask you the following questions.

First, can you give us an overview of this foreign services review and its objectives, especially when it comes to adapting and updating diplomatic work and capabilities?

Second, in what ways did the report seek to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of France's diplomatic efforts in addressing complex global issues and crises? One of the factors I'm particularly interested in is how the climate crisis we're experiencing is going to affect geopolitics and the refugees commonly referred to as “climate refugees”. So climate change has many impacts in that area.

I see that you are taking notes, but we will send you all these questions in writing.

Third, given your participation in the foreign services review in France, what lessons do you think Canada could learn from this experience as it considers the future of its own diplomatic capabilities and services?

Fourth, as part of that review, can you point to any key lessons learned or best practices identified that could be useful for other countries, including Canada, of course, in shaping the future of diplomacy?

Finally, fifth, given the dynamic nature of international relations, how do you see the role of diplomatic services evolving in response to emerging global challenges and opportunities?

Those are my questions for you, Mr. Bonnafont.

Again, welcome to the committee, although we're unfortunately having technical issues with the headset standards.

I will now turn to Ms. Carvin and Mr. Juneau.

You have seen my interest in climate change and geopolitical change.

I invite you to answer my questions, as well.