Evidence of meeting #22 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was threats.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Assistant Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
That is correct. We're still working closely.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON
Understood. Thank you very much for that clarification.
The CSIS director, Daniel Rogers, has said, “Non-Arctic states, including the People's Republic of China, seek to gain a strategic and economic foothold in the region.”
I think we have a pretty good idea of what the economic foothold is that they seek to gain, but could you talk about what kind of strategic foothold they seek to gain? In other words, could you be a little more pedestrian about what a strategic foothold is? What are we talking about here in terms of a strategic foothold? Are we talking infrastructure, or clandestine agents or proxy agents surveilling the Arctic region? What do we mean when we say they are seeking to gain a strategic foothold?
Assistant Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
It would cover all of the things you just mentioned. Economically speaking, it's investments in critical minerals, predatory market investments and attempts at supply chain control, which also gives them access to the area and access to infrastructure. A foothold in the region is really it.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON
Okay.
Could you talk about the kinds of critical infrastructure they're seeking to gain a foothold in? What kinds of infrastructure are we talking about here? There's clearly not a lot of infrastructure up in that region. Is it cyber-infrastructure, energy, diesel-fired electrical plants or runways? What infrastructure are we talking about that they're seeking to gain control of?
Assistant Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
From a CSIS perspective, the concern would be all of the above. As you mentioned, there's a lack of infrastructure in the Arctic, and there's a lack of redundancy for some of the infrastructure that exists. It's rather sparse.
The concern from a CSIS perspective is dependencies, control and access to that infrastructure.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
Thank you very much.
We go next to Steven Guilbeault for five minutes.
Liberal
Steven Guilbeault Liberal Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC
I think a lot of questions have been asked, but I'd like to ask a few more.
Mr. Lynd, you cited the investment act as one of the tools you're working with.
I understand that it's tricky for someone in your role to make suggestions about the government. However, we're not the government. We are elected officials, we are the legislative branch. If you had a few recommendations to make to improve some of these tools, such as the investment act, where should we look to make improvements? I'm trying not to put you on the spot. I don't want to get you in trouble either.
Assistant Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
It's a good question.
I am not an expert on the Investment Canada Act, so I wouldn't be the best person to respond to that. I am sure that there would be people who be able to identify, based on some of the observations we have, where the gaps could be and make recommendations.
Unfortunately, I'm not in an informed position to do so.
Liberal
Steven Guilbeault Liberal Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC
My colleague tells me that the committee should hold more meetings on this issue.
A number of us have asked questions about partnerships with indigenous communities and governments. Are there ways to strengthen ties and work with them to better protect them against all manner of threats? We're talking about cyber-threats, digital threats, but regardless of their nature, would you have any recommendations to help us to better protect these entities?
Director General, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
One thing we tell the government about the Arctic and the north is a truth that everyone knows: Infrastructure gaps pose an indirect risk to national security. If the communities are vulnerable, if the infrastructure is not advanced enough, those communities may want to accept investments from abroad, which would make them even more vulnerable.
We often tell the government that gaps in critical infrastructure and infrastructure in general pose an indirect risk to national security.
Liberal
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
Thank you very much.
We go next to Monsieur Brunelle-Duceppe.
You have two and a half minutes.
Bloc
Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Lynd, considering that threats in the Arctic and actions by hostile actors are growing in number, I want to pick up on the questions Ms. Fortier asked earlier about your presence.
You say that you don't necessarily have a permanent presence. Is that due to a lack of funding, resources, or training? If none of those are lacking, couldn't you use more training, more resources, more money?
Assistant Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Like all government departments, we've had to allocate our resources across the country in a way that maximizes impact. It is a resource issue at the current time.
What we have done is increase our travel from our offices that are not in the Arctic by sending employees much more regularly and frequently into the Arctic—as often as possible. It's not just to the territorial capitals but also into the smaller cities as well. It is related to the allocation of our resources to be able to have a maximum effect across the country.
Bloc
Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
I don't want to show off my superpower here, but we are talking about strengthening relationships with communities.
Here's an idea that might blossom and make you wonder if it might be precisely within those communities that one could find resources who would necessarily become permanent and would help you not only be more present on the territory, but that presence could also be people who know the territory perfectly well?
Assistant Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I completely agree. Ideally, we would have offices in the Arctic, in the territorial capitals. The way the service is structured now, we have offices across the country in the provincial capitals. They're everywhere except in P.E.I. Ideally, we would have similar office structures up in the Arctic as well.
Bloc
Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
This would fill two gaps, namely the permanent presence of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on site, as well as the relationship with the communities, if people from those communities have permanent jobs with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. That's my understanding.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
Thank you very much.
Next, we go to MP Michael Chong for five minutes, please.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Obviously, Canada has had, for decades, intelligence sharing and collaboration as a member of the Five Eyes network, two members of which are clearly Arctic states. Recently, other Arctic states have obviously been threatened by the increased level of activity of states like the PRC and the Russian Federation in that sphere.
I note that the Government of Canada has signalled that it is going to be establishing foreign and security partnerships with other Arctic states that are not members of the Five Eyes network, such as Finland, for example. Can you tell us whether there's anything flowing from these recently announced security partnerships that involves CSIS, and whether or not CSIS is now more actively collaborating and sharing intelligence with states like Finland, Norway, Sweden and the other Arctic states that are not members of the Five Eyes network?
Assistant Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
The answer is yes. Without getting into specific countries and organizations, I can tell you that CSIS is amplifying its partnerships and relationships with other countries, particularly when it comes to the Arctic. We're enhancing our information sharing, our approach to jointly ensuring the mutual security of Arctic issues. Yes, CSIS has been engaged and has progressed some work in relation to those international commitments that you mentioned.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON
In other words, this flows from the security partnerships that the government has announced in the last year or two.
Assistant Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Those partnerships always existed, and we were always sharing with our partners. However, we have looked for ways to continue to enhance and strategically progress some of those partnerships.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON
In other words, you have looked for ways to intensify the collaboration and information sharing. I understand. Thank you. I appreciate that clarification.
I have a question regarding dual-use type activities, such as research, in Canada's Arctic by malevolent state actors. Can you talk to us a bit about the kinds, the nature and the form of these dual-use activities by malevolent state actors in the Arctic region?