Foreign Affairs Committee on March 12th, 2026

[Kristin Halvorsen]

No, we have not. What we've seen consistently over the last three years is that people have been coming back in growing numbers. Three years ago, if we interviewed 10 people, seven would have been leaving the country and three would have been coming back. Now that ratio is almost inverted, and that trend has remained since January 3.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON]

More specifically, what are the reasons for coming back? Can you explain to the committee what the economic reasons are? Are those who are coming back doing so because they want to be part of Venezuela's next steps? Please share if you've heard anything about that.

[Kristin Halvorsen]

What we hear from people is that the main reason is family reunification. There is then the issue of people having been abroad for a long time. They may have tried to integrate into their host country and have not been very successful at that. Now they see hope for economic recovery in Venezuela and think they will be better off in Venezuela. As always, there are a number of complex reasons that compel people to move.

It's also interesting to us that people coming back increasingly refer to wanting to stay. They now wish to remain in Venezuela. That is also an upward trend that we've been measuring over the last years. Now, up to 85% are expressing that they want to remain in Venezuela if basic conditions are met. That's very interesting for us, and it means that we need to really tailor responses both to people who for different reasons want to remain in their host countries and to people who now wish to return.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON]

The answer you just gave gives an introduction to my next question. With the current situation unfolding, what can Canada do to continue to support the UNHCR's efforts and/or Canada's humanitarian assistance to the Venezuelan people?

[Kristin Halvorsen]

There will still be a need for different kinds of interventions in the host countries. There will need to be support for people to be able to naturalize, if that's an opportunity, and to at least have ID documents in order, and there will probably also be a need for some work in terms of labour inclusion. Those things are very much the same for Venezuela, to be honest. We see that when people come back, they might come with children who were born abroad, so they will probably need access to late birth registration or other ID documents. All of that can be done by helping us support these responses, and it would be very welcome.

Also, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, there is a consistent need for psychosocial support, which the communities themselves identify. This is also something that would be very much needed to ensure that those who come back can reintegrate in the best manner possible.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON]

How are you working with neighbouring governments or organizations? What are you doing with them? How is it coordinated?

[Kristin Halvorsen]

UNHCR, of course, has offices here in Venezuela, but also in Colombia and in Brazil, which are the immediate neighbouring countries. We also have a response across the region. That means it's mainly the representation in that country that will speak to the government. We do coordinate with our colleagues. We have discussions with them to identify trends and movement.

That said, of course, in a situation where people might want to come back to Venezuela, we would engage in tripartite agreements where the host country, the country of origin and UNHCR work together to ensure that these returns can take place in a voluntary, informed and safe manner. That would be a way.

Finally, for the overall coordination in the region, all these governments are working together through the R4V platform.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We will go next to MP Brunelle-Duceppe.

You have six minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here for this important study.

Ms. Dickinson, I'd like to know your organization's analysis of the military operation that resulted in Maduro's removal from power.

[Elizabeth Dickinson]

Our organization mostly focuses on internal conflict and armed group dynamics. We don't have any particular analysis of the actual operation that took place.

I don't know if there's a particular focus that you have in mind in terms of its impact on the ground or the international law perspective.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Forgive me if I wasn't clear enough, but my question was about domestic repercussions. I'm interested in the consequences on the ground, in terms of domestic policy, of course, but also in terms of the current security situation in Venezuela.

[Elizabeth Dickinson]

In terms of the internal situation, it was an interesting operation. Essentially what happened was that the figurehead of the regime—which we can think about as an ecosystem with various centres of power—was removed, but the ecosystem of power that is divided among different individuals within the government remains intact and largely unchanged.

One interesting thing we have seen is the cohesiveness, particularly of the security sector, to stay on board, even as some very significant economic reforms have been made. We would salute, certainly, the release of political prisoners and the creation of a reconciliation committee.

I think there are positive steps. Of course, we need to see more, and we would all love for that to be faster, but I think the attentiveness to the security situation is vital.

Outside of Caracas, the security situation remains extremely volatile. As I mentioned, armed and criminal groups—for example, the ELN— are clinging hard to their economic interests throughout the country, particularly in the mining sector, but also in trafficking. Addressing those security concerns is probably a very long-term situation, because the security arrangement that has been in place for years now has been for Caracas to essentially outsource controlling governments of certain areas of the country, particularly in rural areas, to non-state actors. Those groups exercise control, they impose rules on the community and they run the economy. They are essentially those who are governing. Rolling back that scenario, I think, will take some time.

In the meantime, we also need to be attentive about the potential for criminal organizations to try to take advantage of the situation and the changes in Caracas by, for example, expanding their control or moving into new illicit economies.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

You talked about the potential for greater radicalization of these groups, such as Ejército de Liberación Nacional.

I'm curious about the areas currently controlled by the government and where it's currently extracting minerals, such as gold, rare earths or rare minerals. What market do these products end up in? Do they end up in western markets, for example, or is it more limited to Venezuela's closest neighbours?

[Elizabeth Dickinson]

Absolutely. Let me start with the part about the trafficking of these illicit minerals. There are several ways in which these armed groups work in collaboration, really, and in complicity with the Venezuelan security forces. First, these minerals are essentially sold to the state mining company. From there, they are exported to the countries that Venezuela exports the largest amount of gold to. Previously, this included China, but it's also countries in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The other way these minerals are essentially extracted and moved back into the legal supply chain is through the border with Colombia. This is one of the many reasons that for groups such as ELN, control of this border area is fundamental. For example, in the case of coltan and other critical minerals, these minerals are moved across the border from the Amazonas state into Vichada in Colombia, where they are essentially registered as if they were extracted in Colombia, and then they're exported through a legal process to China, in many cases, but to other buyers as well.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Okay.

Just to clarify, then, there aren't necessarily any private Canadian or American companies in that supply chain.

[Elizabeth Dickinson]

As of now, no, we are not aware of any. However, because of the expressions of interest from the United States, we now have companies raising their voices and raising their hands, saying they might be interested in coming back in. That's particularly the case with companies that had their assets expropriated when the minerals sector, like the oil sector, was nationalized some years ago.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Ms. Dickinson.

Ms. Halvorsen, you said that many of the 7.9 million refugees are returning. As another witness said, this is almost an unprecedented refugee crisis, one of the most serious on the planet in a long time.

You're telling us that these people are returning to the country, to Venezuela. Are the majority of refugees returning from a particular country, or are they coming back from several countries?

[Kristin Halvorsen]

In summary, people are returning from several countries. Of course, the last country they return from tends to be Colombia, having a joint border, but we have the registration of people coming back from Chile, Peru and Ecuador. Also, as policies changed in the United States, people who had gone up through the Darién jungle and reached Mexico decided to come back after those changes.

We have return movements from the whole region.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

Next we have questions from MP Ziad Aboultaif.

You have five minutes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thanks, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses.

Dr. Johnston, you mentioned that United States policy, when it comes to Venezuelan oil, is based on the long-term reserve rather than current supply. Is that true?

[Robert Johnston]

They have made public statements suggesting that it could have both short-term value and longer-term value, but I think in the current moment, when U.S. oil production is at record highs and they're still seeing a lot of investment in shale oil in Texas in particular, the immediate need for that oil is less. Of course, things keep changing, and we have the crisis in Iran, but the Venezuelan oil production increase will not be enough to displace the 15 million or 20 million barrels a day of supply being disrupted in Iran.

Ultimately, this is more about a medium-term and long-term option value for the U.S.—and, of course, about keeping the resource out of the hands of the Russians and the Chinese.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thanks for the clarification.

What is the capacity of oil production in Venezuela at the moment?

[Robert Johnston]

It's been fluctuating up to about one million barrels a day. That's mostly through projects that have been producing so-called extra-heavy oil, where they've had to import condensate and light oil from other countries to try to blend and sell into the market. Until they get their big upgraders fixed to produce more synthetic crude oil, that will be a big limit on how much more they can produce beyond the level of one million barrels a day. The next level of growth will take a lot more investment and a lot more time.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

It would be nice to know what equipment is used by the oil industry in Venezuela. Is it American equipment? Is it European equipment? Do we know?

[Robert Johnston]

The five major Venezuelan Orinoco heavy oil projects back in the 1990s were all U.S. and European companies. They used U.S., Canadian and European technology.

The process of upgrading extra-heavy, almost solid oil into lighter oil was all built by the super-majors, mostly from the U.S. Some of those companies, like Repsol from Spain, seem willing to go back. Others, like Exxon, have said they're not going to go back. It's still too risky.