Evidence of meeting #3 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.)

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

Members speaking

Before the committee

Laporte  Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
Curran  Deputy Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence
Lessard  Executive Director, Europe Bilateral and European Union Institutions Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

I call this meeting to order. Welcome to meeting number three of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

Before we continue, I would like to ask all in-person participants to consult the guidelines written on the cards on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio and feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of all participants, including our wonderful interpreters. You will also notice a QR code on the card, which links to a short awareness video.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of witnesses and members. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic, and please mute yourself when you are not speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

This is a reminder that all comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can, and we appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

Pursuant to Standing Order 106(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, September 23, 2025, the committee is meeting on the study of Russian incursions into Polish and Romanian airspace.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses. From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have Eric Laporte, executive director, regional security and defence relations division, and Stéphane Lessard, executive director, Europe bilateral and European Union institutions division. From the Department of National Defence, we have Ty Curran, deputy director general, international security policy.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions.

I now invite Mr. Laporte to make an opening statement for up to five minutes.

Eric Laporte Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for the invitation to appear today to brief you on recent Russian airspace violations over NATO territory. It's a pleasure to do so alongside my colleagues Stéphane Lessard, executive director, northern and central Europe relations division at Global Affairs Canada, and Mr. Ty Curran, deputy director general for international security policy at the Department of National Defence.

Mr. Curran and I had the honour of briefing your colleagues at the Standing Committee on National Defence last week, and we look forward to your questions.

Before starting, I would like to provide some context to the recent events and speak to Canada's contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and support to Ukraine.

Since September 10, we have seen an increase in airspace violations over NATO allied territory on the part of Russia. This has included multiple drones overflying Poland and Romania, as well as an airspace incursion by three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets over Estonia. We have also seen unauthorized incursions into airspace over the Copenhagen and Oslo airports by drones.

While it wasn't immediately clear who was behind the flyover of Denmark's Copenhagen airport, the Danish prime minister said that Russian involvement could not be ruled out. There were some further disruptions in Denmark overnight, and there has been no attribution yet except for the Danish defence minister saying that it was a “professional actor”.

Airspace violations on the part of Russia are not a new phenomenon. They have been a regular occurrence since Russia began its illegal invasion of Ukraine but accelerated in intensity and scope in 2025, including the use of drones and fighter jets.

In response to the most recent incursions, NATO and the affected allies showed determination and resolve and demonstrated unparalleled allied interoperability. The recent interception of Russian drones over Poland by allied aircraft, for example, included a coordinated response involving Dutch and Polish fighter jets, a NATO early warning aircraft, an Italian air-to-air refueller and German ground-based interceptors. Similar allied coordination happens in most instances.

Both Poland and Estonia invoked article 4 of the Washington treaty following the incidents. For the benefit of the committee, I would like to specify that article 4 of the Washington treaty states that allies “will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” This is intended as a strong political signal to adversaries that a particular ally or allies feel threatened and may request assistance from other allies. This is not the same as article 5, the collective defence clause of the treaty, where an attack on one ally is considered an attack against all.

Following the September 23 article 4 consultations this week, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement this week condemning Russia's reckless actions, which are escalatory, risk miscalculation and endanger lives. A North Atlantic Council statement means that it was agreed by all 32 allies to send such a message.

In the statement, allies reaffirmed their unshakeable shared commitment to defending allied territory, and they confirmed that General Grynkewich, NATO's supreme allied commander, or SACEUR, has the tools and authorities he needs to ensure NATO's defence. Eastern Sentry, which was launched following the incursion into Polish airspace, adds further strength and flexibility to NATO's posture along the eastern flank.

Deliberate or not, Russia's recent reckless actions are part of a dangerous pattern of cyber and hybrid activities by Russia to test and probe allied responses. I can show sabotage, disturbances to GPS, weaponization of migrants, sabotage of critical underwater infrastructure and disinformation campaigns across Europe as examples.

With all of this going on, you might ask this: How is Canada protecting its allies?

NATO remains a cornerstone of Canada's defence. We are contributing substantially to the alliance's core tasks and missions, including along the eastern flank. Canada's troop contributions to NATO's multinational brigade in Latvia, which we lead, has more than doubled in size since Russia's invasion of Ukraine and is growing stronger. This is a tangible demonstration of Canada's commitment to Baltic security, one which Prime Minister Carney renewed for another three years just recently.

Canada is also the third-largest contributor to NATO's mission providing security assistance and training to Ukraine, also known as NSATU.

Under our G7 presidency and in consultation with our partners, Canada is continuing to pressure Russia to end its war in Ukraine.

Last summer, at the G7 summit in Kananaskis, Prime Minister Carney announced the largest round of trade and maritime sanctions imposed by Canada since the invasion of Ukraine.

In Charlevoix, in March 2025, the G7 foreign ministers also adopted the G7 Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, a Canadian initiative that reaffirms the G7's steadfast commitment to helping maintain a free, open and secure maritime domain based on respect for the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity and ensures environmental sustainability.

As part of this initiative, Canada established a shadow fleet task force with participating G7 members, in partnership with the eight Nordic and Baltic countries.

Canada is continuing to work with its close partners to coordinate additional measures against the Russian regime in order to increase the economic cost of Russia's war of aggression.

Recently, on September 22, 2025, Minister Anand met with her G7 counterparts on the sidelines of the high‑level week of the United Nations General Assembly.

In a joint statement by the G7 this week, foreign ministers expressed concern about Russia's recent violations of the airspace of Estonia, Poland and Romania. These were unacceptable violations that threaten international security.

The ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work together to achieve lasting peace and build a strong, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine by continuing to coordinate their efforts with the United States to provide Ukraine with robust and credible security guarantees.

The ministers also discussed the need to impose new economic sanctions against Russia, including taking measures against third countries that facilitate its activities.

In conclusion, I can say that NATO's response to Russia's actions remains strong.

NATO has taken vigorous measures to strengthen our deterrence and defence posture in response to Russia's persistent attempts to test the alliance's defences.

Canada remains committed to contributing to the security of its allies, particularly on NATO's eastern flank, and to supporting Ukraine—whose security contributes to our own—in its right to defend itself against Russia's ongoing aggression.

We'll keep working with our allies to rebuild Ukraine and strengthen its long‑term resilience.

We're ready to answer your questions.

Thank you.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you very much for your remarks.

I now open the floor for questions.

We begin with Mr. Chong. You have six minutes.

3:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First, I'd like to clarify with our witnesses exactly what incursions have happened over the last month. As I understand it, there were Russian drones that went into Polish and Romanian airspace. You also enumerated that Russian jets went into Estonian airspace, and it appears that there were Russian drones over Copenhagen and Oslo airports. Have there not also been incursions into Lithuanian and Latvian airspace as well?

3:40 p.m.

Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Eric Laporte

Maybe I can start, and then my colleague, Mr. Curran, might have some additional details to provide.

We have seen, over the course of the year, an increase in Russian airspace violation. It has increased since 2022, but certainly markedly in 2025. Since September 10, we have been tracking Polish, Romanian and Estonian incursions with fighter jets. In Denmark we have seen, and Norway also, this with drones. Again, those have not been specifically attributed to Russian activities, though the authorities in Denmark have noted that those were conducted by a very capable actor. I'm not aware of Lithuanian...or other drones, but it is quite possible.

3:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON

It was referred to by Secretary General Mark Rutte in his press conference of September 12, 2025, when he noted that there were airspace violations that occurred also in Latvia and Lithuania. That's why I ask.

What air assets do we have in eastern Europe? I think we have some CF-18s and some Griffon helicopters as well. Is that correct? What, exactly, do we have in terms of air assets?

Ty Curran Deputy Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence

In Latvia, we currently have four Griffon helicopters that are deployed there. We previously had Chinook helicopters as well. We have transport planes that are in Prestwick, in the UK, but we do not have fighter assets that are in Europe in a deployed fashion other than, periodically, for exercises. Those are the deployed assets right now.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON

NATO announced Operation Eastern Sentry, which is predominantly an air operation. Is Canada involved with Operation Eastern Sentry? If so, how exactly and with what assets?

3:45 p.m.

Deputy Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence

Ty Curran

Thank you for the question, Mr. Chair.

We're absolutely working with our NATO allies in Eastern Sentry. We have not provided forces to date, although we are looking at what could be provided.

I would just add that our contribution to NATO includes also the work we do in terms of deterrence with Latvia as well as the work we do here at home with NORAD.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON

I note that the Russian drones and fighter jets that have violated NATO airspace in some cases flew many kilometres into NATO airspace and for durations of nearly an hour. At what point do we shoot these things down?

3:45 p.m.

Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Eric Laporte

Maybe I can start.

We saw on September 10 that NATO did shoot down a number of Russian drones at that time. Again, as I mentioned earlier, airspace encroachments by Russian fighter jets or drones is not a new phenomenon. I think every time they cross, a decision needs to be taken in real time by commanders on the ground and by authorities. There are also issues of wanting to ensure the safety of personnel on the ground. If you shoot something down, where is it going to land? Does it pose a threat to the civilian population, etc.?

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON

Has NATO's stance with respect to these incursions changed since the initial wave? Is kinetic action going to be a lot quicker in the future than what we saw in the last month?

3:45 p.m.

Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Eric Laporte

We saw on September 12, in response to the Polish air incursion, the setting up of Eastern Sentry, as my colleague mentioned. That's a new activity for NATO. It is looking to gather some additional capabilities and forces, including fighter aircraft, early warning systems and jamming capabilities. It will be mixing traditional capabilities and novel technologies, so this is ramping up.

There is also a cost curve involved in shooting down drones, for example. Some of these are not very expensive to produce. Russia can mass-produce these. Using high-end fighter aircraft and high-end missiles to shoot those down at a cost of hundreds of thousands is—

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON

I have one last question before my time is up.

Russia started these incursions a month ago and then followed up with a number of subsequent incursions. It seems to me that our deterrence is not sufficient. Are there discussions going on about increasing deterrence?

3:45 p.m.

Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Eric Laporte

Again, I would want to point out that Russian drone incursions are not a new phenomenon. They have been doing it since 2022, essentially, but the pace and scope have increased recently. Since that has happened, NATO has invoked, twice, two article 4 consultations amongst allies and as a message has launched Eastern Sentry. I would assume that there will be a greater response in the future.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON

Thank you.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you.

Mrs. Fortier, you have the floor for six minutes.

Mona Fortier Liberal Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the witnesses for joining us to share their knowledge on the topic that the committee is studying today.

You can imagine that Canadians, including me, are watching the current events with a certain level of trepidation. We know that the war in Ukraine is generating pressure. However, I can now see that we're venturing into territory that I find very worrying.

Today, I think that we really need an update on Canada's efforts. We want to look at how we'll proceed with our allies. We also want to know how Canada will promote certain initiatives or diplomatic measures to strengthen its posture.

Can you elaborate on our diplomatic measures or initiatives to strengthen NATO's collective defence posture against these recent incursions?

3:45 p.m.

Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Eric Laporte

I already referred to a few diplomatic initiatives. For example, as chair of the G7, Minister Anand brought together her counterparts for a meeting in New York this week. Obviously, she discussed the situation in Ukraine, but she also spoke about Russian incursions. The seven members of the G7, including Japan, issued a joint statement condemning Russia's actions.

In addition, in response to the incidents in Poland, Global Affairs Canada summoned the Russian ambassador to Ottawa on September 10. It was a high‑level summons to condemn these actions. The goal was also to remind Russia that Canada is closely monitoring the situation and that, if it continues, there could be repercussions at home and within NATO.

As always, we're continuing to look at the possibility of imposing further sanctions, for example.

These are examples of diplomatic initiatives. My counterpart, Mr. Curran, may want to add something.

3:50 p.m.

Deputy Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence

Ty Curran

I would add that this is why we invested in the Canadian Armed Forces to increase our anti‑aircraft capacity against drones and our deterrent effect against our adversaries.

Mona Fortier Liberal Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON

Specifically, has the government taken any bilateral measures with Poland, Romania, Lithuania or Estonia?

3:50 p.m.

Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Eric Laporte

Of course. In any case, we've had conversations with our allies, both within NATO and bilaterally. The minister spoke with some of her counterparts in the affected allied countries to reaffirm Canada's support and remind them of our presence in Europe, including Eastern Europe, where we're providing ground support.

My colleague, Mr. Lessard, may have something to add.

Stéphane Lessard Executive Director, Europe Bilateral and European Union Institutions Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

I can confirm that Minister Anand has held discussions with her counterparts, in particular with the Polish deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Mr. Sikorski. They held talks yesterday and today in New York, where she conveyed Canada's solidarity and steadfast commitment to the security of Poland and all countries on the eastern flank.

Mona Fortier Liberal Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON

How effectively do you think that NATO has responded to these incursions? How do you measure the effectiveness of the actions taken? Should anything else be done now, given the current pressure?

3:50 p.m.

Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Eric Laporte

Thank you for the question.

This is something to consider, of course. NATO's response to this situation is ongoing. For example, the Eastern Sentry military operation has been launched. However, it will take time to implement all the planned resources. We'll see how Russia reacts.

Since 2022, and even since 2014, the Russians have been continuously testing the waters to gauge how NATO allies will respond. In the Baltic Sea, there have been frequent cases of sabotage involving critical infrastructure. This led NATO to launch the Baltic Sentry military operation in 2023 to increase surveillance measures. Since then, these cases of sabotage have gone down. The results weren't instantaneous. However, we hope that this will send a message to the Russians.