Foreign Affairs Committee on Sept. 25th, 2025

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you.

Next, we have MP Aboultaif for five minutes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses for appearing before the committee today. It's not unprecedented actually, what we've seen, what Russia is doing in multiple attempts against multiple NATO members.

It's funny because from the Baltics all the way to interior Europe to Romania and Poland, it seems like a type of bullying tactic in one aspect of it. Obviously, it's not unplanned. It is well planned. Maybe it's one of those campaigns to try to confuse us and to keep us busy wondering, around the 30-plus members of NATO, what we do with Russia and with Putin and his power? Unfortunately, it's an empire that survives on wars and conflicts. It's becoming our problem in the western world, in NATO and obviously across the board.

Such an attempt could trigger article 5 if the Russians were too stupid and hit a target in any of these countries. We would then be facing article 5. From your knowledge, and I'm going to ask you as an expert, within the NATO constitution and what constitutes NATO members to act upon such a threat, what could trigger article 5 in this case?

We know article 4 is applied because the members that were attacked, or subject to an attack, have to consult the rest of the member allies. What could trigger article 5? Shouldn't article 5 not at least be an option in front of Russia? Unfortunately, such a thing could also trigger a third world war of some kind. This is a very tricky situation. In terms of NATO, how do you see this playing out between article 4 and article 5?

[Eric Laporte]

It's a very good question. It's worth remembering that in all of its history, NATO only invoked article 5 once and that was following the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Article 4 has been invoked nine times so far, five times by Turkey following events around its borders, a number of times by European allies following the invasion in 2022, and then of course we have Poland and Estonia this week.

You asked the question, what are the triggers? The beauty of article 5 is that it's pretty clear in one way, in the treaty, that it's an armed attack against an ally. At the same time, it's also a little bit fuzzy in that it's an armed attack against an ally, but that's not defined.

There are advantages of having it that way to ensure that our adversaries don't know exactly where the threshold is.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Between article 4 and article 5, there's a huge space. What we don't know, we don't know, but what in terms of what we do know do you believe the NATO response was sufficient to deter and what could also be done to make sure we escalate without a huge escalation, without going to war?

[Eric Laporte]

Do I know if it's sufficient to deter? I don't. It's speculative.

That said, the messaging the alliance put out is fairly clear that collective defence is strong and that we stand by and are committed to it, so Russia should be taking heed of that.

[Ty Curran]

Mr. Chair, if I could just add—

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

I would love to hear you. Go on.

[Ty Curran]

Obviously, it's hard for us to speculate on Russian intentions in this space. What I would say is that regardless of those intentions, we've seen reinforcement of the eastern flank with Eastern Sentry, similar to what we saw after the invasion in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022 with a reinforcement of NATO forces, including Canada, on the eastern flank. We've also seen Sweden and Finland join the alliance, making the alliance stronger.

As these activities happen, we also adapt. As my colleague said, it's a sort of cat and mouse game, but I do think that NATO is stronger today than it was in 2022. I expect it provides a very strong deterrent effect, as part of that thinking, which of course is still speculative.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much, Mr. Aboultaif.

We now to MP Anita Vandenbeld.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here to answer these questions on these vitally important topics.

I'm hoping that you can put this a bit into context because we're hearing things and the public is hearing things that sound very alarming. You have said that while it's not new, there's been an escalation and there have been more incidents. If you look at this in context, going back to, say, the Cold War, are there other periods when you've seen this kind of escalation and then you've seen maybe a pulling back, or is this unprecedented? Is this something that is completely new, that we've never seen before?

[Eric Laporte]

I would say the fact that you have Russia in an active and open war on European territory in the context of NATO being in existence is unprecedented.

Russia probing allied defences and responses, I would say, is not unprecedented. We saw that throughout the Cold War, not only in Europe but also vis-à-vis North America, where the issue of having to scramble jets to escort Russians out of NATO or North American airspace was a reality. I don't think it's unprecedented in that context, but I notice that Mr. Curran has something to add.

[Ty Curran]

Yes, I'd just like to add that penetration by Russian military aircraft into North American air defence identification zones has certainly increased over the last couple of years, but it's also relatively regular. We expect that this is a bit of a return to pre-COVID levels, so while we've observed this increase in activity, I would just note that these flights occur regularly and are not deemed threatening as Russian military aircraft remain in international airspace and do not enter Canadian or American sovereign airspace. I would also say the vast majority of these engagements have been professional, which is different, I guess, from what we're seeing on the eastern flank.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you.

Can you elaborate on what you mean by “professional”?

[Ty Curran]

I mean it in the sense that the behaviour is standard. I'm certainly not a pilot, so I won't pretend in that space. I would say that when we talk about “safe” and “professional”, it's the aircraft behaving in a way that is predictable, that is standard and that recognizes international best practices—

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Okay.

[Ty Curran]

—as opposed to, for example, someone who is behaving in an erratic manner, which could be dangerous to both parties.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Are there certain incursions that you are more worried about than others? Obviously, a fighter jet is very different from a drone. Where they are doing this might differ, as well as frequencies. Is there some element in this that is raising more red flags than it normally would?

[Eric Laporte]

Mr. Chair, I will start, and then I will invite Mr. Curran to join in.

What becomes more worrisome or concerning is duration, depth and location, such as whether they are penetrating deeper into airspace, loitering or spending a lot of time, or going over critical infrastructure or civilian airspace, etc.

[Ty Curran]

Perhaps I'll just add that the question of whether they are armed is certainly significant. While we are concerned about intelligence gathering, we are also concerned about activities regardless of that. When we know that the aircraft or drones are armed, it increases the risk significantly of an unplanned escalation, to add to your colleague's earlier comments.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Have they been armed? Do they know?

[Ty Curran]

Certainly, the MiG-31s that flew down that space were armed.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

You mentioned that we have called the ambassador.

What is Russia's response to this? Is Russia taking responsibility? Are they trying to hide the fact that this is happening? What is their response?

[Eric Laporte]

I would say the standard Russian practice is denial. In the case of the conversation we had with the Russian ambassador here, there was a whole bunch of other theories: They were jammed, it was electronic warfare, and they were not Russia's. As Russia tends to do, it put out a smokescreen of other possibilities. They haven't denied that the MiG-31s flew in the direction that they did. They certainly say that it wasn't into anybody's airspace. Again, it's the usual pattern of Russian denial.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We will now go to MP Rood.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for being here with us and providing this information.

From Canada's briefings at the North Atlantic Council and Allied Air Command, what are the top three capability gaps that are exposed by these incursions?