Foreign Affairs Committee on June 2nd, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 37 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, February 12, the committee commences its study of the security situation in the Balkans.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room, and others are joining us remotely using the Zoom application.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses.

We have, from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Jessica Blitt, ambassador of Canada to Croatia and Kosovo; Michelle Cameron, ambassador of Canada to Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia; Gallit Dobner, director general, Arctic, Eurasian and European affairs; and François Lafrenière, ambassador of Canada to Hungary, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who is joining us by video conference.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions from members of the committee.

I now invite Ms. Dobner to make an opening statement of no more than five minutes.

Welcome and thank you.

[Gallit Dobner, Director General, Arctic, Eurasian and European Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Chair and honourable members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here before you today on the security situation in the western Balkans.

My remarks will cover three elements: first, the security situation; second, the role of NATO and the European Union; and third, Canada's contribution to regional peace and security.

On security, while there has been important progress, the western Balkans remain structurally fragile. The region continues to be affected by unresolved ethnic disputes, weak institutions, corruption, organized crime and malign external influences, particularly Russia, which seeks to exploit divisions and slow Euro-Atlantic integration.

A possible flashpoint remains the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. The EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Priština has lost momentum, and tensions in northern Kosovo remain unresolved. Although the current situation is relatively calm, serious incidents in recent years, including, as you will have noted, the September 2023 attack in Banjska, demonstrate how quickly the security situation can shift.

In Serbia, there have been growing internal strains over the last 18 months. The Novi Sad rail station tragedy in November 2024 triggered a sustained protest movement over accountability, corruption and democratic governance. This is relevant not only as a domestic issue but also because instability can weaken regional resilience.

Kosovo's persistent inability to form a stable government, which has now lasted a year and a half, has led to a serious political crisis, marked by repeated elections—the next one will take place on June 7—and a continued reliance on interim governments. This institutional paralysis has increased the risk of instability at the national and regional levels.

Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the most fragile post-conflict state in the region. The Dayton Peace Agreement, signed 30 years ago, remains the foundation of peace, sovereignty and the multi-ethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the country is vulnerable to secessionist rhetoric, interethnic tensions, institutional paralysis and challenges to its constitutional order. International oversight remains essential, particularly through the High Representative and the Peace Implementation Council, in which Canada plays an active role.

In contrast, Albania remains a relative beacon of stability in the region.

North Macedonia remains generally stable, but its path to the European Union continues to be hampered by disputes with Bulgaria.

Montenegro remains the most advanced candidate for European Union membership in the western Balkans, but it continues to face challenges related to organized crime, corruption and public safety.

Turning to the role of NATO and the European Union, both remain indispensable to regional stability. NATO provides the region's most visible, hard security architecture. Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia are all fellow NATO allies. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are partners, and Kosovo continues to aspire to deeper Euro-Atlantic integration, albeit with uneven progress.

NATO's KFOR mission remains central to maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and freedom of movement for all communities. It currently numbers around 4,600 troops from allied and partner countries, and its continued presence reflects the reality that normalization is still incomplete.

The European Union is equally important here as both a security actor and the region's main long-term anchor for enlargement reforms. It promotes stability through diplomatic engagements, mediation and rule-of-law instruments. It leads the Belgrade-Priština dialogue. It runs EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina to maintain a safe and secure environment. It also deploys its rule-of-law mission EULEX in Kosovo. That said, slow or uneven progress towards accession reforms can create frustration and can leave space for destabilizing actors.

Finally, on Canada's contribution, our engagement in the western Balkans is long-standing and I'm sure well known and appreciated by everyone here. Canada played a major role in the region during and after the conflicts of the 1990s, with 40,000 Canadian Armed Forces personnel serving in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the broader region and with 23 Canadians losing their lives in the cause of peace.

Today, Canada continues to contribute in practical and targeted ways. In Kosovo, we've had a presence in KFOR and support defence capacity building through training and advisory co-operation. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada remains active through the Peace Implementation Council steering board, and we support programming there on rule of law, governance and resilience to foreign interference. In Albania, Canada supports defence and security co-operation through NATO engagement, demining and stockpile reduction efforts, and broader programming on democracy, cybersecurity and public sector professionalization.

The central point is this. The western Balkans are more stable than in the past, but the stability cannot be taken for granted. The region still faces unresolved political disputes, democratic fragility, organized crime and foreign interference. Continued engagement by NATO, the European Union and partners like Canada is essential to preventing backsliding, strengthening institutions and advancing a more secure and durable peace.

Thank you very much. We look forward to answering your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you for your statement.

We'll now open the floor for questions, and we'll begin with MP Michael Chong.

You have six minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing.

You mentioned foreign interference in your opening comments. Could you speak to that and the role that the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China may play in foreign interference activities?

Secondly, can you speak more broadly to the role that both of those states are playing in the region?

[Gallit Dobner]

On foreign interference, the Russians are doing in the western Balkans what the Russians do everywhere. They have a playbook. That playbook includes things like disinformation right down the spectrum to hybrid techniques. They're using the same tactics and techniques in the western Balkans that they use elsewhere. They obviously do not support transatlantic integration and don't want to see the countries of the western Balkans accede to the European Union. Their goals are quite clear, and evolving as they do, their tactics are also well known to us.

In terms of the roles they play in the region, China obviously has very clear security and economic interests in the western Balkans, as it does throughout the world, and it's pursuing those interests aggressively. It is quite clear how the belt and road initiative is playing out.

In terms of Russia, we have seen a dependence on Russian energy over time. That is something we are working with the western Balkans to try to shift. We'd like to see that shift, and I think there's a lot of commitment there to change the dependence in the relationship.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

On the issue of Russia, I understand that Serbia is quite reliant on Russian oil and gas. Can you speak a bit about what measures are being taken by the government and by other western governments to shift Serbia's reliance away from Russian oil and gas?

[Gallit Dobner]

Maybe I will turn to my colleague, the Canadian ambassador to Serbia, for a response.

[Her Excellency Michelle Cameron, Ambassador of Canada to Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Particularly since the U.S. enacted sanctions against Gazprom and Gazprom Neft, which own 56% of Serbia's oil and gas company, a year and a half ago in January, Serbia, Canada and its western partners have really put a concerted effort—even more so now, as there's a lot more willingness—into looking at divesting from the dependence on Russian oil and gas.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Is there any discussion from the Canadian side about taking advantage of new LNG facilities that are coming online? There's recent news about Germany in discussions with Canada.

[Michelle Cameron]

To be quite frank, we have had the discussions. The issue is getting the LNG from some of the ports up into Serbia. They're working really hard and diligently on building their infrastructure, but that could be a barrier to having an LNG port and then transporting it to Serbia.

We have been talking about all kinds of clean and green energies—solar panels, Slice and a bit on LNG. We've also connected Serbia with Canada's nuclear industry. We're looking at the breadth. The EU is also looking at some more temporary and medium-term measures. We're all banding together to help Serbia reduce and eliminate its dependency on Russian oil and gas, which quite frankly is a lever that can be used.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I understand that Montenegro has taken on a significant amount of debt from the People's Republic of China related to infrastructure development. Can you speak a bit about that and about what concerns Canada has about it?

[Michelle Cameron]

I think Canada's concerns are the same as those of the EU and Montenegro itself, quite frankly. Montenegro, as it's grown, has taken on a lot of Chinese debt. I think at the end of 2024, between 15% and 16% of its external debt was to China. That was mostly used to do infrastructure projects so that it could also join up with the EU quite quickly.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Are those infrastructure projects viewed as part of the BRI?

[Michelle Cameron]

Slightly, yes—most of them. There are a lot of nuances there, but yes, more or less. A lot of those infrastructure projects were won competitively. These were launched by international development banks, the Government of Montenegro or others. They were won competitively.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Do you suspect that the PRC sold below market prices in order to win the bid?

[Michelle Cameron]

I'm not privy to the internal bidding.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

What concerns do EU member states, the EU and Canada have more broadly about the BRI or this issue of Montenegro and its—

[Michelle Cameron]

Any time we see one country beholden to another in debt fashion, we have concerns. That's a lever that can be used. You can leverage that into activities that we're not aligned with, perhaps, or that we don't think are in the best interests of another country. This is just another example of that.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Going back to the Russian Federation, I'd say that in Canada, the threat coming from the Russian Federation is primarily or almost exclusively in the form of disinformation operations. That clearly is the case in the Balkans as well.

Ms. Dobner, you made a reference to the full spectrum. Maybe you could speak a bit about what Russia is doing in the Baltics in terms of other forms of foreign interference.

[Gallit Dobner]

Just to clarify what I was saying, I think Russia has a clear playbook, and it uses that playbook around the world. That's what we've seen.

It depends on the moment. We're seeing right now, as a result of Russia's illegal war in Ukraine, how the Russians are taking advantage of that and using hybrid techniques to respond. I don't think the Balkans sit outside of that activity.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you.

Next we have MP Vandenbeld.

You have six minutes.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you very much for being here and for your testimony. As you may know, this is a topic that's of significant interest to me.

I want to start with Ms. Dobner.

You talked about the fact that while things are relatively stable right now, we cannot take that stability for granted. I'm thinking particularly about Kosovo and Bosnia. I realize we're in an era where there is increasing geopolitical competition and strife in a region that is literally a fault line along that geopolitical influence, especially with Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine and increasing aggression.

You mentioned our peacekeepers—civilian peacekeepers—and democracy. Historically, there was a tremendous amount of Canadian involvement, and about 15 to 20 years ago, there was a decision. As Canada was looking at targeting where it could have the best influence geographically, it was decided that this area was really Europe's backyard and that Europe was able to handle it. We moved from OSCE primarily to the EU missions.

Things have changed. We are now looking at much greater Euro-Atlantic integration. The Prime Minister has made it clear that we want to have greater security and economic ties with Europe, yet in the region, our presence in the last decade or so has not been significant. One of the reasons—you mentioned NATO—is the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which has field missions all around the region. It has people present in place, and it targets economic and security issues, but there are no senior Canadians because, as far as I understand, when the OSCE hires people, the institution pays the per diem but the country from which a person originates pays the salary. If I'm not mistaken, for the last 18 years, Canada has refused to pay any salaries for any people who are seconded to the OSCE. That means the only presence we have in all of these missions is from young interns who just want experience or people who don't care about not getting paid. Other countries, like the U.S., are trying strategically to get positions within the OSCE in strategic places, and Canada is absent.

I wonder if there's been any discussion about reversing that policy of not seconding to the OSCE and perhaps agreeing to pay salaries for Canadians who are hired by the OSCE.

[Gallit Dobner]

I want to thank the member for this great question.

As was said, the OSCE staffs its missions through contracted personnel and through secondments. Folks who are seconded to OSCE missions in the field are then paid through a set of per diems that allow for housing and board. When Canadians apply for secondment to these missions, the Government of Canada makes clear if it's not in a position to provide a salary.

It's important to underline that the Government of Canada doesn't have a secondment platform where it can systematically second to international organizations like the OSCE. It happens, and it happens on an ad hoc basis. Absolutely, it's been an issue of discussion for the Department of Foreign Affairs—Global Affairs Canada—and it continues to be an issue for discussion.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Are we the only country that doesn't pay for secondments?