Foreign Affairs Committee on June 2nd, 2026

[Krenare Recaj]

I'm by no means saying that Canada comes in and becomes the person to push the talks, but I'm saying that Canada can, behind closed doors in international forums, raise concerns about the way that Vučić's government is being accommodated, even while he's intransigent to the international community. On the flip side of that, Canada can use its goodwill among the people of Kosovo and the people of Canada to support the talks. Behind closed doors in forums, we could raise their concerns and then openly support the talks and their allies.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go to Mr. Majumdar, and following that it's Mr. Oliphant, at which point we will adjourn.

Mr. Majumdar, you have five minutes.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you, sir.

This first question is for Ms. Percival and Ms. Berishaj-Sylejmani. The question I have for you is related to Russian political and security influence. Given Russia's enduring political, military, energy and security ties to Serbia and its support for hardline actors such as Milorad Dodik and others, how is Moscow exploiting ethnic tensions and blocking progress on EU integration for Kosovo and Serbian normalization?

What specific evidence exists of Russian hybrid activities, including disinformation, paramilitary training or political financing, which we know is very problematic, that undermine both stability and human rights in the region? How should Canada coordinate with allies on targeted sanctions, on support for independent media and civil society, or on diplomatic pressure to counter this without rewarding obstruction?

I know it's a very small question, but please proceed.

[Maria Berishaj-Sylejmani]

It was all for me. Is that right?

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Yes, that's correct. Please go ahead.

[Maria Berishaj-Sylejmani]

Okay. Thank you.

First, you are completely right. As you know, there is a Kosovo majority, which is the Albanian population, and then there is a minority in Kosovo, which is the Serbian population. Serbians living in Kosovo are about 4% or 5% of the population, and 92% are Albanians. There are also other minorities in Kosovo.

Tensions are created because most of the Serb population in Kosovo live in enclaves and are directly responding to Vučić and Belgrade parties. Basically, most of the Serbs in Kosovo, unfortunately, don't consider Priština to be their capital; they consider Belgrade to be their capital. Most of the Serbs in Kosovo would rather listen to what Moscow and Belgrade have to say than what Priština—which should be their capital—has to say when it comes to what their integration should be and where their path should be.

Basically, without having a meaningful integration of the Serb minority community into Kosovo's institutions, and without them seeing Priština as their capital, not Belgrade, there will be a lot of influence. Russia influences through different media. Russia influences through the media in Serbia, but most of the Serb population watches that media from Serbia in the Serbian language. It's basically news from Russia to Serbia, translated into the Serbian language. People in Kosovo are basically being informed directly by Russian sources and Russian bots through Serbian media.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you very much. It's impressive that you were able to get through so much in such a brief time.

Let me ask a quick follow-up, if I might, in the interest of time.

Russia and China are increasingly coordinating authoritarian tactics internationally, including in the information domain. To what extent are they using disinformation, cyber-operations or influence campaigns in the western Balkans to inflame ethnic divisions; to erode support for democratic reforms and EU or NATO aspirations; or to target Kosovo's sovereignty and minority rights? I appreciate this is pretty much a legacy of the late Richard Holbrooke, who I got to know a little before he passed, but it certainly was a confusing mess that was left behind.

[Maria Berishaj-Sylejmani]

To a large extent, and not very directly, this is not something you might see as obvious, but if you track the signs, you will basically be able to read it.

You mentioned meddling directly with the elections in Kosovo. We didn't see that. We saw it more through the influence of the Serbian List. It is the only Serbian political party in Kosovo that operates, and 99% of the Serbian population that works and lives in Kosovo votes for this party. It's Vučić's party, basically, which is a Russian proxy in Serbia, so this is a direct link if you want to see it.

Also, we had very good examples from before, unfortunately, in Montenegro. When Montenegro had elections and was trying to join NATO, we saw that Russia was directly influencing the referendum and these processes.

On the other hand—and I also have to stress this—as I said before, Chinese influence is not that obvious in Kosovo. In other Balkan states, yes, it is, but Kosovo is still pretty good at handling Chinese influence when it comes to energy, infrastructure, soft power and other things. For this, I have to give the Kosovar government credit.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Thank you very much for that answer.

We'll have our last round with Mr. Oliphant.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to all the witnesses.

I want to delve a bit into the so-called normalization issue. I guess I'm a little less pessimistic about it than maybe our witnesses are.

I want to talk about two areas. One is the Belgrade-Priština dialogue, what has stalled it and what could incentivize it to continue. Some think that EU membership for either Serbia or Kosovo could lead to that. I understand that it may not, but I want to push a bit harder on that dialogue and what we could do as Canadians to foster it.

Not related to that but not dissimilar is the issue of the Peace Implementation Council, or PIC, and its steering board, which Canada is a member of, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the influences that have led to the high representative stepping down. We have foreign influence this is not just Russian and Chinese but also American. We have foreign influence from Serbia manifesting in minority populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

I just want to get a bit of thought on what could incentivize the dialogue to be bumped up, and what role Canada could play in the north in Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to the Peace Implementation Council. I know we have a bit more Kosovar experience here, but maybe some Kosovar and some Bosnian and Herzegovinian...and also witnesses online.

[Krenare Recaj]

I'm happy to start. Thank you for the question.

There are two things that I think can further normalization.

First, as I said, decoupling Kosovo's Euro-Atlantic integration from normalization will make progress on normalization. If Kosovo starts making progress on its own merits on Euro-Atlantic integration, the Serbian government will see that. The Serbian populace will say, “Kosovo is making progress on Euro-Atlantic integration. We want to make progress too.” I think both countries are being stalled by it.

The second thing, which is related to that, is to put pressure on the Government of Serbia when they are intransigent towards the international community and Kosovar Albanians. Continue to put pressure on the Government of Kosovo when they are intransigent towards the national community as well.

At no point today have I said that the Government of Kosovo is never an obstacle to normalization of relations. I have only said that there cannot be an equivalency between the two. Both governments have been obstacles.

I think decoupling normalization from Euro-Atlantic integration will serve as an impetus for both countries to move forward.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

What about the PIC?

[Krenare Recaj]

The PIC is not my area of expertise, so I will defer.

[Valerie Percival]

I have only worked tangentially on Bosnia, so I won't engage.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

I see that Madame Berishaj-Sylejmani has her hand up.

Go ahead.

[Maria Berishaj-Sylejmani]

Thank you.

It's a bit challenging being online. I hope I'm not interrupting. I just want to add something to what my colleague said previously.

A clear European path for Kosovo and Serbia...whoever is constructive in the dialogue. Speeding up the process of EU accession would, I think, speed up and incentivize people to be a bit more constructive in the dialogue.

Somebody mentioned sanctions towards Serbia. I think the international community needs to be a bit firmer when Serbia is, let's say, not honouring its commitments to the EU.

Also, as you said very rightly, it's not only Russian or Chinese influence. We have had a major shift in Bosnia. I'm sorry; we are talking about things regionally, but this has been all over the news lately. We saw the change in high representatives. It's all about praising Dodik and trying to have different political shifts and movements in the region in order to accommodate certain business interests.

That's why I think Canada stepping into a more active, constructive role and having a different approach than the U.S. at this stage would mean that we have a friend across the Atlantic Ocean that wants good things for this region.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Thank you very much, Mr. Oliphant.

Thank you very much to all three of our witnesses on this panel. Your testimony is valuable and will be, I'm certain, incorporated into a potential report.

Without further ado, this meeting is adjourned.