Foreign Affairs Committee on Oct. 21st, 2025

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank you both for the work you're doing in circumstances that remain extremely challenging.

I'm going to ask Mr. Da Rin a couple of questions.

In February, you said that the transitional government in Haiti has “failed to galvanize the fight against gangs, while donors have provided only limited funding to the Kenya-led security mission.” There are two failures, really. There's a failure in the provisional government dealing with the gangs and a failure of the coalition of groups and countries that funded the Kenya-led mission.

I'm trying to dig a little bit into what a gang is. I sometimes worry that I'm using Canadian terminology about gangs in a situation that is completely different. There are paramilitary groups that have regional territory, which are gangs writ large, and even the word seems to be insufficient. I'm looking at terminology. What is a gang? I know we're worried about youth and engagement because of the membership, but what promotes the leadership of the gang? Who benefits from it? What groups in society take advantage of having the gangs have regional control?

Once we have a definition, is the new proposal under UN Resolution 2793 going to work, or are we missing the boat in Canada? Does Canada have to retool the way we think about gangs?

[Diego Da Rin]

Thank you for that question, which is extremely important.

We are in the process of preparing a report on that very issue. What are the gangs in Haiti, and what is the living together coalition, or Viv Ansanm? There's a big debate about whether an armed conflict is taking place in Haiti because there are two determining factors. The first is the intensity of violence, and the second is the organization and hierarchy of groups. We won't get into that debate, but we are explaining the origin of gangs in Haiti.

In Haiti, gangs began to emerge in the late 1990s. Those were groups that rose up in community organizations and poor neighbourhoods. They were instrumentalized, on the one hand, by certain political parties to win elections in the neighbourhoods the gangs dominated and, on the other hand, by economic elites to boycott rival companies, and so on.

After the 2017 departure of the UN mission, which was in Haiti for 14 years, Haitian security forces did not have the capacity to adequately handle the security situation. Those small groups, which had not been dismantled, began to gain power and be instrumentalized by the elites who armed them, gave them funds and guaranteed them impunity. Gradually, they began to diversify their resources and gain independence from their former sponsors.

Today, they are largely financially self-sufficient. Since the Haitian government requested the assistance of a security mission to fight them, they have decided to stop fighting amongst themselves and to create a coalition bringing together all armed groups or gangs in the capital and other regions to fight, united, against local and international security forces. Their goal is to put the brakes on plans to create a force that may be stronger than them and to force the authorities to engage in dialogue. What they want, even if they don't say it very often, is to have a full amnesty for their crimes. That is their goal.

Are those criminal groups? Are they groups with a political agenda? I will say that they are at the border. They are the de facto authorities in the regions they have controlled for years. They are providing food distribution. Recently, they have been trying to show that they are taking their responsibility as an authority a little more seriously. They post videos of them handing out cash, school kits and back-to-school food kits.

They are positioning themselves as political authorities, even though, in the background, they are trying to have a slightly more legitimate image in order to initiate dialogue with the authorities.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you.

That's very important, because I think we're missing the boat on that. It seems like they are doing what the cartels did in Colombia in the last century—establishing themselves as civil authorities and providing services—so that becomes quite different.

In our notes, it says that the vast population does not want discussions towards amnesty, but if they are providing civil services, is that a more complex issue than just saying that the population doesn't want amnesty?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Unfortunately, we're way over the time, so I won't be able to—

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Could I ask the witness to provide written material for us or point us to a source with respect to gangs about which we may be naive?

Anything the ICG has, or you have personally, that you could forward to us in writing would be very helpful and we would be very appreciative. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you, Mr. Da Rin.

Thank you, Mr. Oliphant.

Next, we have MP Garon.

Mr. Garon, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Jean-Denis Garon, Bloc, Mirabel, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

We were talking about the issue of gangs. I now want to continue the conversation with you, Ms. Martel.

The gang suppression force has replaced the multinational security support mission, or MSSM.

Do you have an opinion on that change? If so, what is it?

In that context, how do you see Canada's current and future roles?

[Andréanne Martel]

Thank you for the question.

I first want to make it clear that this subject is not really within my area of expertise, and it's not the reason why I was invited.

I would still like to mention that, as a humanitarian organization and an international aid organization, we want or rather expect those missions to facilitate humanitarian access and protect the public, especially women. That's obviously the role of security forces. Our job is really to work with the communities, but to do so in safe spaces as much as possible.

[Jean-Denis Garon, Bloc, Mirabel, QC]

Maybe I should clarify my question.

Do you think it will eventually be difficult to reconcile the security and repression considerations, given the whole issue of human rights?

From that perspective, it may also be more consistent with your mission.

[Andréanne Martel]

In the past, the presence of international military forces has unfortunately not helped protect women and girls in Haiti. On the contrary, cases of sexual violence committed by members of UN forces have been documented. UN troops also introduced cholera in 2010, which certainly left a very bitter memory in the minds of Haitians.

In the current context, this type of force is needed. It's a multidimensional response to a multidimensional crisis. What we want is for that force's objective to be to support the Haitian National Police so that they are properly equipped and able to respond to the situation and protect the public and communities.

To somewhat echo what the other witness mentioned, it is necessary to have a force that is adequately equipped and that helps strengthen the local police.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We'll go next to MP Ziad Aboultaif.

You have five minutes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses.

The GSF replaces the MSS. It seems like it's the case that we need force to deal with force. To deal with the gangs, we need to show force alongside the suggestions for some diplomacy and other stuff to resolve the issue of this gang group taking over the country.

I'm directing this question to Monsieur Da Rin.

Do you know if Canada has any role in the GSF or in the framework of the GSF?

[Diego Da Rin]

I don't have much information on that.

This has already been said, and it is public information. So I know that discussions have been held between very high-level authorities representing Canadian and U.S. governments to determine what level of engagement Canada could propose for this new force.

That said, no further details are currently available. I know that discussions are ongoing.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

If there's a role for Canada, what do you think that role should be?

[Diego Da Rin]

I would say that all countries that have the required capacity have the same role to contribute to the new mission through personnel, expertise and funding. It is essential to have a force that is stronger than the gangs to alter the trend and reverse the power relations with them.

In addition, as I mentioned in my speaking notes, resolving the situation in a way that isn't exclusively related to military measures should be considered eventually, since the gangs are based in extremely densely populated neighbourhoods. Houses are often made with very fragile materials that can't withstand intense fighting.

The threat of an imminent incursion should be used as a deterrent to make the gangs stop being combative and decide to co-operate with the authorities.

The problem is that, in order to do that, before the security force is even in place and ready to conduct operations, the entire disarmament, demobilization, justice and accountability structure has to be ready to manage the situation.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Do you believe that there's a—

[Diego Da Rin]

I'm sorry to interrupt.

Canada could also help plan and explore these non-military options, which could be associated with the mission's military operations.

Thank you.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

If the military option were the only option or the best option on the table, do you believe there would be enough public support for such a mission?

[Diego Da Rin]

Haitians want security of any kind. That could take the form, for example, of a multinational peacekeeping force. That's what I hear from people in the areas most affected by violence, especially in the capital. It's not really the people in Pétionville and the rich neighbourhoods who feel that way.

The people who are most impacted are not thinking so much about how security can be achieved. All they want is to go and buy food without being killed. They want their children to be able to go to school without being raped and to be able to go out a bit at night without being kidnapped. They're looking for some semblance of normalcy.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

The situation will not ever improve as long as the gangs are taking over the country. I see from your response that the public is at the desperation level, and there's a will to stand by the GSF to change the status quo. Am I hearing you correctly?

[Diego Da Rin]

Yes, that's exactly right.

However, at the moment, Haitians are a bit skeptical about the international community's efforts to help them and to restore security. The Haitian government asked for international support in October 2022. The mission was authorized in October 2023. To date, no operation has tried to dismantle a gang.

Haitians are seeing that a lot of discussions are taking place at the international level and that those discussions have not really translated into security support that would really help change the balance of power with the gangs.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

We'll go next to MP Bill Blair.

You have five minutes.

[Bill Blair, Liberal, Scarborough Southwest, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Again, thanks very much to our witnesses for their testimony before us today.

I'd like to step back a bit and make some inquiries with respect to the formation of this new GSF that the Security Council adopted on September 30, just this year. The objectives they've identified in the UN are to include conducting intelligence-led operations to neutralize the gangs, securing critical infrastructure, facilitating humanitarian access and supporting the Haitian National Police and the armed forces.

I note that in some of your previous testimony, for example, the ICG has advocated very strongly for inclusive political engagement, security sector reform and measuring international engagements to avoid repeating past intervention mistakes. I also note that in Ms. Martel's previous testimony before committee, she stressed that the training and arming of police has to go hand in hand with fighting impunity and strengthening the judiciary.

The security sector reform is really the area that I wanted to inquire about with our witnesses.

First of all, I think that just having a stronger police presence, and even the armed military, is necessary, because as long as there's a very dangerous situation on the ground, people will find it difficult to implement reforms and to deliver the humanitarian assistance that is so vitally needed.

How do we balance the humanitarian requirements with our security imperatives? Is simply investing in a stronger law enforcement response, for example, sufficient without a functioning judiciary or prison system? I see that both your organizations have advocated for this in the past. I would very much like your impressions on that issue.

[Diego Da Rin]

I'll try to be brief.

The Haitian crisis is multidimensional. We have to move on many fronts simultaneously in order to succeed in improving the situation to the point of sustainability.

In very concrete terms, a project was launched to create two specialized judicial divisions. It's not just a tribunal. An entire judicial chain will be created to operate in parallel to the Haitian legal system so that it won't be affected by that system's dysfunction. Those two specialized judicial divisions will specifically address two issues: major corruption cases and mass crimes.

This project, which is in the process of being implemented, relies on the support of the Government of Canada. In fact, it is the Government of Canada that supports this project the most. For the time being, the project has not yet been implemented.

It is extremely important to move this project forward before undertaking slightly more ambitious legal reforms. The specialized justice system would, for the first time, make it possible to convict people who are involved in mass or high corruption crimes.