Government Operations Committee on April 2nd, 2012

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Okay. Thank you. That clarifies it in my mind.

You're the only witness I remember who doesn't think it's necessary for the budget to coincide with the estimates in terms of timing. I think I tend to agree with the others, maybe because I'm a politician and I'm more concerned about timing. When we get information in the budget, it tends to render the estimates we're dealing with now obsolete, because the latest information, including the cuts and everything else, is not in the estimates.

You say it's impossible, but many other countries do it. In fact, the OECD person told us we were a rare and bad exception to the rule among most countries. So I guess I don't understand why you say we couldn't do it, and I also don't understand why you don't think it would be good if we could do it.

[Robert Marleau]

I'm not an international expert on budget-making, but I'll restate what I said. I believe the budget is a policy statement by the government on what it intends to do. It's not a binding legal piece of paper put on the table that the estimates have to match. There are things in the budget at the present time that change

I'll give you, as an example, MacEachen's first budget in 1981. It proposed capital gains on the transfer of farm sales within a family. That didn't happen. As the groundswell worked its way through Parliament, and whatever, a large part of that budget was never implemented.

So I see it as a policy statement. The Auditor General may see it as a bookkeeping operation. You have five days of debate on the budget, and it's about policy. You move amendments. You don't amend line 44 of the budget; you move an amendment that will impact on that policy and it may be confidence.

Those experts from the OECD may not understand the Westminster model and how supply is crafted. The crown will ask for your agreement before it takes your cows to feed its soldiers—it's that basic. How many cows it takes and how many soldiers it feeds may vary according to whether we're at war or not. That's a policy statement.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

I may be wrong—

[The Chair, NDP, Pat Martin]

You have one minute.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

—but I seem to remember that Australia and New Zealand do it coincidentally, and I think they are Westminster. I guess I don't disagree with you that the budget is a policy statement, but it's also a policy statement that contains measures.

When you want to review the expenditures of the government over the coming year, you want to have the most up-to-date information in conducting that review. I guess we'd be willing to take the risk that certain elements of the budget might not pass, as in the days of MacEachen some 30-plus years ago—so I guess I'd disagree.

[Robert Marleau]

We can agree to disagree, Mr. McCallum. I don't have a fundamental mental block. I just don't see what it adds to the parliamentary supply process to have a budget that mirrors the estimates, or vice-versa.

I know how the cycle works in the bureaucracy. I don't imagine that the Treasury Board ministers—and you've been there—have gone through every element of that $250 billion with a fine-tooth comb. The most powerful bureaucrat in the country is the Treasury Board analyst—the young man or young woman who's interacting with the government departments or parts thereof and saying, “I don't think we can put this before ministers.” They're the ones who have more influence than parliamentarians right now.

So in the context of a budget that should mirror spending, it has to do it by the supplementary (C)s at the end of the year. There's a dynamic that flows through Parliament with supplementary (A)s, (B)s, and (C)s, which flows from the budget—and some of it is not even in the budget. So what do you do as a government if you want to do something and you didn't put it in the budget?

[Mike Wallace, Conservative, Burlington, ON]

You don't do it.

[Robert Marleau]

It may be necessary to do it.

I don't see what it adds to your role as an MP. It may make the Auditor General more comfortable, because he can read a bottom line that matches another bottom line.

[The Chair, NDP, Pat Martin]

Thank you, John.

I've been letting the time go a little bit because the exchanges have been very interesting.

Now we have Jacques Gourde.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lotbinière—Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Marleau, thank you for joining us today. Your testimony is beneficial. You said earlier that the committee could perhaps improve or change its mandate, so that it may conduct studies that are a bit more thorough. You also mentioned the limited amount of time we have during this time of the year.

Are you suggesting that we spend more time in committee? In other words, are you suggesting that we to hold meeting during periods when we would normally be in our ridings? You know that our time is limited. Of course, regardless of the type of study we are carrying out, if we want it to be more thorough, we need more time. But more time would mean more frequent meetings.

Would the committee really have a more macroeconomic mandate? How much time do you think would be required?

[Robert Marleau]

As you say, the committee would have a macroeconomic mandate. It could give its work as much scope as it wants or, in some cases, conduct a more thorough study. I was talking about considerations like government purchases. There are only 308 MPs. If we leave out parliamentary secretaries, chair occupants, party leaders, whips, and so on, who's left to sit on the committees? If we divide the number of MPs by the number of existing committees, you are basically overworked, and not in a good way. The positions of associate member and supernumerary were created over the past few years for a reason. Those people are now on your lists. This committee is a large exception. However, in other committees, we never see the same faces from one meeting to the next, in part because of that. Members have many duties, and committees are often negatively affected.

I suggest that people sit on this committee for a whole session. The whip would not use you on other committees. This would be your committees.

Why is the deputy speaker of the House paid more? Because he has no choice; he has to sit every day. Would any of you be prepared to do that for free? You probably wouldn't, since you have other duties as members. That job requires experts, but those members would become experts in macroeconomics, the supply, finances, and so on.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lotbinière—Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, QC]

So, Mr. Marleau, to reach that objective, we would probably have to sit on a single committee. However, as you said, given the number of available members and the number of committees, we have the option of maintaining the status quo or reorganizing all the committees. When all is said and done, we may have to reduce the number of committees.

[Robert Marleau]

This is not the first time I appear and say that there are too many committees. Some of them—which I will not name—exist only owing to political perception. You know as well as I do that those committees have a title, but that their existence is an attempt to please a specific group of society.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lotbinière—Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, QC]

Senate committees often study the same issues we do. Therefore, the work is being duplicated. If some committees were both parliamentary and senatorial, would the same objectives be reached?

[Robert Marleau]

Since Canada is a two-chamber country with an unelected Senate, I would say that the Senate doesn't have the same spirit of accountability. Things are different in Australia, for instance, where the Senate is an elected body. Proportionality prevails. The majority is never overly marked in the Senate. As a result, compromises, discussions and outcomes are not the same as they are here.

We have a committee that works really well and is never mentioned. I'm talking about the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations. That committee, which brings the two houses together, studies regulations. It has the authority to recommend the revocation of regulations and can debate in the House on Wednesdays, between 1 p.m and 2 p.m.

Why doesn't that committee ever use that one-hour period? Because, when the brilliant staff of the Library of Parliament—who provide the committee with support—telephone department people to tell them that certain regulations are problematic and that the committee is planning to revoke them, most of the time, those regulations are amended or revoked by said department. That's the kind of influence the committee has. The fact that the committee can make a minister appear on the floor for an hour and explain why a given colorant is on the list when it shouldn't be, for instance, is sufficiently threatening.

In my opinion, that's the kind of mandate this committee should adopt. That mandate could eventually enable the committee—through recommendations—to influence the financial behaviour of the public service and the government.

[The Chair, NDP, Pat Martin]

Thank you, Jacques. I'm afraid your time has expired.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lotbinière—Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, NDP, Pat Martin]

We're getting close to....

We have Mr. Marleau with us only until 4:30, unfortunately. We've concluded one complete round. We have enough time for one more questioner.

Mr. Blanchette, you have five minutes.

[Denis Blanchette, NDP, Louis-Hébert, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr. Marleau.

Most people have a pessimistic view of the work we do in committee. We tried some things in 1998 and other things in 2003. However, you seem to be saying that we're not playing in our sandbox properly. A professor told us that Westminster-inspired parliamentary systems were falling behind within the OECD. You seem to disagree. I would like to know, generally speaking, what part of our British parliamentary systems makes it difficult for us to restructure our procedures and to modernize them, to some extent.

[Robert Marleau]

I really like what you said about not playing in your sandbox properly. I think that sort of sums up my presentation. Of course, this is not a recent problem. It is not the first time I appear before such a committee and say so.

Let's talk about British parliamentary systems. If we take the Westminster Palace in London as an example, one of the considerations that plays in favour of that Parliament's members is the fact that their mandate is longer than in Canada. When I retired, the average length of a Canadian MP's mandate was about four years. In London, their mandate is from 16 to 18 years. That's the standard.

In addition, their house has from 650 to 700 members. Not everyone can sit on a committee. Some members, if they are part of the government, decide to never be part of the cabinet. They don't want to be part of the cabinet. The dynamic is different. In Canada, unfortunately, there is so much partisanship that the system has become appalling, not only since this government has been in power, but also dating back to previous governments. I think that's the poison, if you will, of the parliamentary process.

In the 1970s, when committees used to have the same powers as you do in terms of the supply, the government and the opposition would compromise much more. In addition, there was much less partisanship and interference by whips.

[Denis Blanchette, NDP, Louis-Hébert, QC]

If you don't mind me saying so, your suggestions would be very nice in an ideal world. However, in the partisan parliament we have today, they could also lead to disaster.

[Robert Marleau]

If the committee's mandate, the appointments and the chairmanship were permanent, you would be sitting at the same table for three or four years. A sort of camaraderie would develop around the table that is currently impossible. You would have to work together for three years. You could not be as partisan, no more than, for instance, two or three House committees with less partisanship, such as the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs and the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, to name only two.

However, with a permanent mandate, a five-year plan, a vision and a goal in mind, I don't think you would be engaged the same kind of partisan politics.

[Denis Blanchette, NDP, Louis-Hébert, QC]

Most people are predicting that what we are currently doing will result in failure. If I asked you what our winning conditions would be so that the committee could do something to change our ways, what would you say?

[Robert Marleau]

First, a unanimous committee report would be strong. A government initiative would be needed to implement the recommendations. The government's response to the last report was, to use an English expression

“mealy-mouthed”.

Winning conditions are characterized by a government that wants parliamentary participation in accountability to be active and to produce something for parliamentarians as well. Furthermore, it is once again a matter of individuals. The membership of a committee becomes important if you get to that part.

I have been following this file for 40 years. The first major change came about in 1970 because the government wanted it. The second change was made in 1987 because the government wanted it. The response will be the same as it was regarding the last two reports if the government is not willing. Therefore, you need to use winning conditions to ask for the government's support in order to make your role in the business of supply more relevant.

[The Chair, NDP, Pat Martin]

Thank you, Denis. I'm afraid that concludes your time.

Mr. Marleau, I want to thank you very much for your very helpful, very interesting, and very frank briefing.

I have one point of clarification that the clerk has pointed out. You said a number of times that you think committee members should be appointed for the entire session. Did you mean for the entire Parliament or parliamentary session?