With respect to the last part of your question, there's a good inventory of a fairly large number of projects, and I'll put in parentheses that I'm sure my colleagues will say that many of those projects are from the bad old days when things weren't done as well as they are today. If committee staff or you or your staff look at the Boardman and Vining paper, that has a fairly careful review of a fairly large number of projects.
On the question of risk, risk allocation and risk transfer is an issue that is really in contention amongst people who study this; I will acknowledge that. The accountants' study that I referred to in Britain looked at an extensive list of P3 projects, largely in roads and hospitals, and came to the conclusion that when you actually drilled into the details of those contracts and looked at how they actually operated, there was very little risk that was transferred, and there were new risks that were created that were related to the survival of the entity, the viability of the entity that had the responsibility for operating the project.
I would further say, in regard to the issue of what value gets placed on the risks that are transferred, at least in Ontario, if you look at the way Infrastructure Ontario explains value for money, the overwhelming majority of the benefits associated with P3 projects in the Infrastructure Ontario model have to do with very large values that are assigned to risk transfer. Interestingly enough, their analysis does not highlight what I would have thought, given the comments that we've heard today, would be more important things, which are improvements in life-cycle maintenance cost, expected better performance at the end of the contract, and so on.