Again, thank you for the question.
The strategy at its heart, when we started to work on it—that was one of the key issues we were trying to deal with. Within the federal government, within National Defence and with our colleagues at the coast guard, we had a number of projects under way, which you now hear us talk about in the context of a strategy, that were not moving completely independently but certainly were not sufficiently integrated to understand the very issue that you're talking about, with a certain expectation that competitive requests for proposals would go to multiple shipyards across Canada. At one point we were talking about how we could be in fact in five different shipyards building ships, which meant that the government would be investing in five shipyards to build up capacity and that there would be competition for skill sets.
So at its core, the shipbuilding strategy was, amongst other things, established to exactly do what you're saying. It caused us to bring all of the projects together to impose a certain amount of schedule, a certain amount of flow. In reality, each of the projects has now been phased to deal with, amongst other things, the things you're talking about.
The complexity of shipbuilding today is not based on the labour-intensive approach it had 20, 30, or 40 years ago. It is now much more technologically advanced, even in the construction piece. What we want to do is invest in two shipyards that have a reasonable amount of skill. If we create massive shipyards, we will in fact return to the boom and bust.
This is very much a drumbeat, by international standards, into medium-sized yards with a medium-sized workforce to build one ship after the other, to try to deal with the very issue you're highlighting.