Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I've heard your words, and I'll try to keep it to seven minutes.
I am the professional responsibility officer for the RCMP, and with me is Ms. Jo-Anne Taylor, the manager of our PSDPA office.
The RCMP has undertaken a number of legislative, policy, and procedural initiatives as part of our approach to handling disclosures of alleged wrongdoing. We have just under 30,000 employees, comprising 18,000 regular members, who are police officers; 4,000 civilian members; and about 6,500 public service employees or PSEs. While members and PSEs are hired under different acts of Parliament, all are considered public servants for the purposes of the PSDPA.
It's important for the committee to recognize that the RCMP was not initially included in the proposed legislation and was only included at later stages, which necessitated certain provisions in the PSDPA to accommodate the fact that the framework for dealing with certain matters in the RCMP, such as discipline, was prescribed in the RCMP Act. That explains why certain things may not be dealt with by the Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner or may be put on hold pending the completion of RCMP processes. For example, the decisions of our conduct adjudicators are not subject to wrongdoing complaints.
Since the coming into force of the PSDPA in 2007, we have followed the advice that the spirit and intent of the legislation is to avoid duplication of processes. On the legislative front, the RCMP Act recently underwent significant and substantive amendments, with the coming into force of the Enhancing Royal Canadian Mounted Police Accountability Act.
The accountability act provided the flexibility to allow for a more seamless response to disclosures of wrongdoing under the PSDPA, such as aligning the new conduct management process and the investigation of disclosures of wrongdoing. A specific example here is that, as the senior officer in the RCMP, I am now the delegated conduct authority to deal with discipline, which we now call “conduct”, in cases involving PSDPA allegations. We also have new Commissioner' Standing Orders, which permit the RCMP senior officer to better balance responsibilities, requirements, and rights under the PSDPA and the RCMP Act.
In terms of policy-related initiatives, the RCMP has developed a new PSDPA policy for all RCMP employees, implemented a new code of conduct for RCMP members, introduced a new code of conduct for RCMP PSEs, and created a conflict of interest directive for all RCMP employees that consolidated over 30 previous policies or instruments.
It is important to note that both the code of conduct applicable to members and the code of conduct applicable to PSEs adopted a more positive, responsibilities-based approach to conduct, and both contain an obligation to report concerns relating to misconduct. The RCMP's PSDPA policy also affords the senior officer the opportunity to assemble an assessment committee to assist in confidentially reviewing disclosures of alleged wrongdoing against a template containing applicable assessment criteria. While the RCMP recognizes that OPSIC has exclusive authority for investigating complaints of reprisal under the PSDPA, the RCMP'S PSDPA policy includes an internal reprisal process, as do a number of other internal processes, such as harassment and grievances.
In terms of our procedures, in December 2013, the RCMP implemented the workplace reporting system, or WRS. It is a confidential and centralized way for employees to report workplace issues through the professional ethics office, which reports to me. The WRS works when employees are unsure how to voice their concerns or when established reporting methods are not appropriate or possible. This process respects the confidentiality requirements of the PSDPA and provides another avenue of reporting for all employees. Between 2014 and 2016, the WRS dealt with 95 requests for assistance, three of which specifically involved alleged wrongdoing under the PSDPA. Additionally, RCMP personnel responsible for the harassment process have been instructed to inform their clients of the reprisal complaint process offered by OPSIC, as well as internal procedures to address concerns of alleged reprisal, which is also reflected in our policies.
PSDPA training is delivered either upon request or through in-service training on leadership development, such as our supervisor development program, manager development program, and executive or officer development program.
In terms of our activity under the statute, the RCMP has posted instances of founded wrongdoing three times since the PSDPA came into force, most recently in fiscal year 2013-14. These cases have touched on concerns with financial signing authorities, contract administration, and travel expenses. Overall, we are presently dealing with the 16th case involving alleged wrongdoing under the PSDPA.
With regard to annual reporting to the Treasury Board Secretariat on the PSDPA, as committee members are likely aware, when we talk about disclosures, we are really talking about allegations, given the TBS direction that if a disclosure contains multiple allegations, they are to be counted as separate disclosures, one per allegation. In the RCMP's 2015-16 PSDPA annual report to TBS, we reported having received 12 inquiries and eight disclosures.
On any reading, the PSDPA is complicated and challenging in terms of how it is drafted.
In terms of areas of comment for the RCMP, one aspect is the premature release by OPSIC of information related to a reprisal matter when the RCMP may have ongoing, outstanding processes or investigations of its own.
In a recent case, as a result of El-Helou v. Courts Administration Service from the Federal Court, OPSIC followed the requirements arising from that decision and disclosed to the complainant the information it had gathered as part of its reprisal investigation before the RCMP had completed its investigation of the initial alleged wrongdoing.
The provision of information by OPSIC to complainants in such circumstances could influence the complainant and/or subsequent investigations. Clearly, it is not satisfactory to have one investigative body under an obligation to disclose information before another body has completed its investigative mandate. It may be that some clarification can be provided in the PSDPA with respect to the competing tensions faced by OPSIC as a result of this Federal Court decision.
More recently, the RCMP received a letter from OPSIC that indicated that because the RCMP's code of conduct applying to members is in a regulation, a breach of the code of conduct not only results in a potential wrongdoing under PSDPA's paragraph 8(e), “a serious breach of a code of conduct”, but also constitutes a potential wrongdoing under paragraph 8(a), a breach of a regulation.
In other words, a PSE will only have committed a wrongdoing involving a breach of the code of conduct where it is “serious”. However, for an RCMP member, a breach of the code of conduct, whether or not it is serious, will qualify as a wrongdoing because the code of conduct is in a regulation. As a result, members are potentially liable for a finding of wrongdoing that is lower than and different from that of a PSE, which would not appear to be in accord with the intent of the PSDPA in its treatment of public servants.
Relatedly, consideration may also be given to clarifying subsection 6(1) of the PSDPA to indicate that the RCMP's obligation to establish an organizational code of conduct is met, for members, through the existing conduct under the regulations.
Finally, clarification at sections 43 and 44 of the PSDPA, regarding the scope of the confidentiality requirements in section 22.3 of the Privacy Act, and section 16.5 of the Access to Information Act, would assist the RCMP and potentially other departments, as there is some debate about the scope of confidentiality requirements pertaining to information that was not created for an investigation into wrongdoing, but rather was obtained in the course of that investigation.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today.