Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Further to the events of early last week, I'm sure that as our new member of the NDP becomes briefed and familiar with the happenings of this committee over the last several months, they will be further informed as to the situation we were dealing with early last week around the former CIO of the CBSA.
Mr. Chair, I will now present the motion that I will be moving here today:
Given recent concerns regarding information management of public servant emails, pursuant to Standing Order 108(1), the committee call the following witnesses and undertake a four-meeting study to better understand how the Government of Canada’s information management policy, the Privacy Act, the Access to Information Act, and the Treasury Board's directive on information management govern the handling and storage of government records:
The President of the Treasury Board, Anita Anand;
Treasury Board officials;
The president of the CBSA, Erin O'Gorman;
The Information Commissioner of Canada, Caroline Maynard;
The former chief technology officer of Canada, Minh Doan;
The chief technology officer of Canada, Luc Gagnon;
Former assistant deputy minister, Health Canada, Cameron MacDonald; and
IT security specialists involved in the investigation
As I indicated, Mr. Chair, I and I'm sure many other Canadians and those who follow the government operations committee have been in confusion and disbelief over the order of events of Minh Doan's emails. I will briefly review the timeline.
On February 23, 2023, Minh Doan is alerted that there is an access to information request on his email.
On February 27, 2023, he states that his PST file has been “corrupted” and that this has impacted his emails available for the ATIP.
In December of 2023, an IT employee submits a complaint to the internal investigator, Michel Lafleur, and describes the event as follows:
When I had my conversation with Mr. Doan, the things he was telling me or saying he was advised to do made no sense. I have never heard of a [vice-president] or an individual who receives VIP treatment in regards to IT related tasks taking it upon themselves to move files or organize information in the way he suggested he did.
In January of 2024, his email deletion is announced in The Globe and Mail, and Minh Doan responds:
I am deeply concerned that this all seems to be part of a pattern by certain individuals to deflect attention, to blame me for their actions and decisions, discredit, and harm my reputation, despite growing evidence that demonstrates I had no relationship with any of the vendors in question.
On June 5, 2024, Minh Doan appears at this committee and states that the CBSA and SSC have no backups of his corrupted emails. That is then followed by an email communication to this committee in October of 2024 in which Erin O'Gorman writes to the committee that this backup does not exist and that all local files were deleted when Minh Doan left the CBSA, as his email address was deleted upon departure.
The bottom line, Mr. Chair, is that something happened here whereby the CIO of CBSA inconveniently had his files corrupted days after they were sought under the Access to Information Act. I will add that this CIO went on to become the chief technology officer of Canada.
Whether it was malicious actions in the face of a sound process or a failure of the process, we must get to the bottom of finding out what happened so that this does not happen again in our public service and in the face of Canadians.
Mr. Chair, our study of ArriveCAN may be coming to a conclusion, but the level of process failure and the incompetence or the poor actions of individuals must be determined for the good of all Canadians and the confidence of all Canadians moving forward.
I will conclude my opening comments there after having moved this motion.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.