Thank you, Chair. I'm sorry that I ran out of time at the end of my last round. I want to come back to the issue I was raising at that point, which is that we've got a government that's saying, on the one hand, here's a target, and that's our job done. The problem is that, on the one hand, we see that there are people who are accessing that target who shouldn't be. We've heard testimony from the AFN about a majority of those companies accessing those set-asides being shell companies, and we've heard testimony today about systematic indigenous identity fraud. On the other hand, we have indigenous businesses that are not able to access these opportunities because of other barriers. We've talked about some of those barriers already.
I want to highlight in particular the issue of insider preference, structural insider preference in our procurement system, which has been highlighted many times by different witnesses. In particular, the procurement ombud has done great work on this. These are things like requirements for having a history of doing business with the federal government that don't make a lot of sense if you're a business that has the capacity to do the work and has done the work for other levels of government. Perhaps even you might be prevented from accessing certain procurement opportunities because you have to already be in the club to get these opportunities. There are various other structures that we've identified. Sometimes it looks like these structures are actually purpose-built to allow a facially independent bidding process to actually be directed towards certain companies. We saw with the arrive scam issue, cases where.... There was a case pointed out by the Auditor General where GC Strategies sat down with government officials to figure out what the terms of that contract would be.
What is the impact of insider preference and how can this issue in particular be tackled? Let's open it up to whoever wants to respond. I've got about three minutes left of my time and I'll let you take the rest of it.