Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
First, I join the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAMAW) in thanking you for the invitation to testify before you today. It's a tremendous honour and privilege to address you on behalf of my organization.
With 184,000 members covered by 1,000 collective agreements in the aerospace sector, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers is considered the largest aerospace union in the world.
For nearly 90 years, our organization has had a front row seat in the development of this industry in North America. We've been involved in the Canadian aerospace ecosystem since the 1940s, and have always made it our business to promote this industry.
The Canadian aerospace ecosystem really took off during the Second World War. That conflict revealed the strategic potential of the Canadian aerospace industry from a national security and technological innovation perspective.
From the 1950s onward, Canada stepped in to help build its domestic aerospace industry in an attempt to maintain its strategic potential. Faced with a weak domestic market, Canada chose to enter into several agreements with the United States to give its industry access to many of the military programs initiated by the Cold War.
From 1946 to 1970, the Canadian government's intervention essentially served to orchestrate the transition period of its aerospace industry. It therefore evolved from an industry focused on the war effort to one empowered to meet Canada's strategic interests in national security and technological development.
That said, Canada's initiatives did not prevent the failure of projects like the Jetliner and the Arrow. The virtual absence of technically and commercially viable industrial development plans was a major reason for the difficulties faced by the Canadian aerospace sector at the time.
Prior to the acquisition of the CF‑18, the Royal Canadian Air Force used several Canadian-made aircraft. These included the Sabre and the CF‑5 and CF‑104 supersonic fighters, manufactured under license at Canadair in Montreal.
During the 1950s, Mississauga-based Avro was responsible for the first jet fighter designed and built in Canada, the CF‑100 Canuck. Over 692 CF‑100s were built. This model was used by Canada and Belgium and was part of NORAD and NATO squadrons until the early 1960s. Thereafter, it was used for training and reconnaissance exercises until 1981.
Canada acquired the first aircraft in its CF‑18 Hornet fleet in 1982, and efforts to replace them began in the late 1990s. The Royal Canadian Air Force CF‑18s were originally scheduled to reach the end of their service life in 2003. In order to keep its fleet in service, Canada had to carry out major modernization programs beginning in the 2000s and acquire used CF‑18s from Australia.
Since Canadair was awarded the contract in 1986, CF‑18 maintenance and modernization operations have largely been performed by IAMAW members in the Montreal area. The CF‑18 Super Hornet fleet will be retired in 2032. Our members will have worked on the products for 46 years, 32 years longer than planned. Without the contribution of the workers who maintain the CF‑18s, it would have been impossible to keep these aircraft in service this long. Over the years, they have developed unparalleled expertise in the repair and maintenance of military aircraft and in life-cycle extension reviews. This expertise is an asset to the Canadian aerospace ecosystem. It also represents great strategic value to Canada from an economic, technological, industrial and military perspective.
Whether it was the Canadair maintenance contract in the late 1980s or the contract to acquire the next Royal Canadian Air Force fleet, the IAMAW has always been prepared to defend and promote the interests of our aerospace ecosystem and the people who work in it.
For us, there is no question that Canada must use its air defence procurement projects in a way that maintains and creates jobs, like those of our members at L3Harris.
Today, we are submitting three recommendations along these lines to the members of this committee.
First, we recommend that the tendering process for the maintenance or acquisition of equipment required for national air defence or any other type of aircraft and its components be part of a Canada-wide aerospace policy, a policy that sets out the roles, responsibilities and commitments of all stakeholders in the Canadian aerospace ecosystem.
Second, we recommend that the objectives for air defence procurement contracts include clear requirements for industrial activities, technology transfers and maintenance and manufacturing activities of defence equipment or its components.
Third, we propose that certain elements of the Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy be re-evaluated, such as section 8.2 on indirect transactions, and that the policy apply to all procurement and equipment contracts needed for national defence.
The Canadian aerospace ecosystem must be considered a highly strategic sector by the Canadian government. Ensuring its viability and development must be a priority for this government and part of an industrial policy specifically tailored to its needs.
I will conclude my remarks with a comment on the CF‑18 replacement process. When peace, freedom and fraternity are among our core values, it's out of necessity, not out of a sense of gaiety, that we choose to invest in the military rather than elsewhere. In this sense, we have a responsibility to ensure that such an approach is based on a rigorous process where the protection of the common good and the promotion of our interests are omnipresent. The purchase and maintenance of a fleet of fighter aircraft is a complex process that requires a long-term financial commitment and represents a significant portion of the government's budget. In return, this type of project has the potential to provide a government with the means to meet its air defence needs, maintain and create jobs and generate significant industrial and technological benefits in a key sector of its economy.
Thank you very much.