Thank you. I have read through the testimony of other witnesses on this bill and I see three themes in particular emerging. First, there's the sense that the bill has not received sufficient consultation with affected communities. Second, there's a concern as to the inclusion of risk group 2. Third, there's the fact that much is being held over to be included in the regulations as opposed to in the legislation and that affected parties should trust that the regulations will be appropriate.
You've been hearing about these concerns primarily from research scientists and lab executives. My comments overlap with theirs, but I'm applying a legal lens to the bill. I'm concerned that aspects of Bill C-11 may be vulnerable to court challenge on the basis of the Constitution, both the division of powers and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I will also discuss the policy question of leaving to regulation significant aspects of the legislation. In each of these areas, I will propose tentative solutions.
On division of powers, the federal government has indicated it is relying primarily on the criminal law power under the Constitution Act to justify entering into a new area of federal jurisdiction. My basic concern is that aspects of this bill may be viewed by the courts as matters of property and civil rights, which fall under provincial jurisdiction. The problems, and I'll deal with each of these in turn, are with overreach, with leaving important matters over to regulation, and with establishing a complex structure that may be viewed as not criminal but regulatory.
First, then, is potential overreach. The full title of Bill C-11 is “An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins”. Note that it's aimed both at biosafety and biosecurity. Thus, there are risk groups ranging from 2 to 4, the highest being clearly biosecurity, preventing the substances from being used for purposes of terrorist activity. This is clearly a national security matter and falls comfortably under the federal criminal law power.
As the risk groups go down in level, one might conceive that they are more broadly focusing on biosafety—preventing accidental releases that could cause harm—and less on biosecurity. The greater the focus on biosafety as opposed to security, the more likely that the scheme is intended to regulate labs utilizing these materials and the less it appears to be a criminal measure. The inclusion of risk group 2 human pathogens and toxins, a number of which can be found in our natural environment, tends to look like a matter of provincial jurisdiction.
Second is leaving important matters over to regulation. The Governor in Council under this bill is given very broad regulation-making authority. That's paragraph 66.1(c). Further, very much of how this act is going to operate, how facilities will be licensed and run, what will be the inventory requirements, requirements for security screening, etc., have all been left over to be included in regulations to be drafted at a later date. In fact, Mr. James Gilbert indicated to this committee that the act itself is a shell and the details are to be in the regulations.
In law, the more the heart of the matter is contained in regulations as opposed to in the legislation itself, the more the scheme appears to be regulatory in nature, and thus under provincial property and civil rights powers, and the less it appears to be criminal.
Third is sophistication of the regulatory scheme, and this overlaps with the topic I was just discussing. There's one blanket prohibition in the act and that's on use of schedule 5 human pathogens and toxins. However, primarily, Bill C-11 exempts a whole series of activities from constituting a prohibited activity, assuming certain conditions are met, such as licensing. It gives authority to administer these matters to inspectors, analysts, biological safety officers, etc. This is the third way in which much of the bill appears to be more regulatory, in setting out this complex regulatory scheme, than criminal in its orientation, leading again to the question of whether aspects of the bill fall under provincial jurisdiction.
The three topics I've just identified as giving rise to issues of division of powers...in order to avoid problems with them, I suggest that risk group 2 either be completely removed from the scope of the legislation or restricted to the subject of importation in a separate section, and also that more substance be included in the legislation and not held over to be addressed in regulations.
I urge that the time be taken to sort through the substance of this legislation. I see no reason for haste in this matter and plenty of reason to undertake comprehensive consultations. This is a brand-new field for the federal government in certain respects and the time should be taken to get it right.
Those are my submissions on division of powers. I'll now address policy concerns.
The essence of my concern is that it is not appropriate to leave substantial aspects of the legislation to be decided by regulation. This is separate and apart from the argument I made a minute ago regarding why this leads to questions as to whether the bill is criminal in nature.
The nub of my argument here is that the legislative branch of government should not be delegating authority to the executive branch to define many aspects of the functioning of the scheme. One example of this is that there are risk groups ranging from 2 to 4. We know it's prohibited to handle materials in schedule 5, but for risk groups 2 to 4, there is not a single part of the bill in which the difference as to which risk group applies is identified.
In other words, major aspects of how this bill will work are opaque. This has led many of the witnesses, as well as at least one of the provinces, to express the concern that they're not being told enough about its workings and impact.
Bills receive serious scrutiny prior to becoming law. Indeed, this committee is one of the important protections against there being bad laws enacted. Further, there is the scrutiny of the public as reflected in debates of the House of Commons and Senate. On the other hand, regulations are enacted by the Governor in Council, meaning essentially that cabinet gets to decide what is in regulations.
The ease with which regulations can be enacted, varied, and annulled at the whim of the government of the day should sound a major note of caution to the committee. These matters should be in the legislation itself.
In terms of solution, the same solution as in paragraph (a), the division of powers, is suggested; that is, hold consultations with the communities of interest and then develop a bill that includes its full substance, leaving merely the administrative matters to be dealt with in the regulations.
Next, and finally, there is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The charter limits the discretion of the government in that it grants persons rights against certain actions of government. If legislation intrudes on these rights in a manner not justified in a free and democratic society, it may be struck down as being of no force or effect. Thus, it is important that the bill in its entirety not violate the charter. In particular, I'm concerned about the right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the charter.
Privacy is a protected right under the charter in a variety of contexts, notably the right against unreasonable search and seizure in section 8 of the charter. Clause 38 of this bill grants the minister very broad powers to compel the supplying of personal information that, in his or her opinion, is required. Note that there's no requirement for reasonableness. The minister, in turn, is entitled under clause 39 to disclose this information without consent to a wide range of parties, including to foreign governments, for a wide range of purposes.
Clause 41 allocates similarly broad powers to inspectors to search places or conveyances and to seize materials found there. None of this is on the grounds of reasonableness in terms of requiring the information or materials. Further, there is no confidentiality clause in Bill C-11.
I propose that these powers be more closely circumscribed. The bill should identify in much greater detail the specific types of information the minister may compel and the purposes for which the information can be utilized, including the disclosure abilities. It should also indicate that the least amount of information in the most de-identified form necessary for the purpose be collected, used, or disclosed.
Further, the requirement of reasonableness in the compelling of information should be incorporated. The more criminal in nature the activity under review, the higher the requirement that there be a reasonableness component. It's important that the powers of search and seizure, or at minimum the more intrusive powers of search and seizure outlined, be exercised on grounds of reasonable suspicion.