Health Committee on March 26th, 2009

[Prof. Greg Matlashewski]

I agree 100% with what Peter Singer has been saying.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Bonavista—Gander—Grand Falls—Windsor, NL]

I still have time, right?

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

You have 30 seconds.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Bonavista—Gander—Grand Falls—Windsor, NL]

Pardon my newness. I understand the impact of the risk group 3 and 4 situation--I get that--but why should the government bother with these agents that pose no public health risk, such as, for instance, a lab worker in contact with a micro-organism and he or she gets sick and it doesn't go beyond that? I don't really understand what it is you're looking for in this.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Who would like to answer?

Mr. Simms.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Bonavista—Gander—Grand Falls—Windsor, NL]

You're explaining it to someone who knows very little.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Ms. Tam.

[Theresa Tam]

The risk group of pathogens, like salmonella, or the E. coli that caused the Walkerton incident, when grown in certain concentrations are dangerous. It is important for laboratory workers to be protected against those pathogens and apply the laboratory biosafety guidelines.

A number of these pathogens can be spread, if it's an enteric pathogen, to the immediate family or to their community. If someone chooses to access them for nefarious means, for bioterrorism events, then they're obviously more prevalent. We're not concerned about the biosecurity piece as much for risk group 2, but we are concerned that they are still pathogens that cause disease in humans and must be handled according to good biosafety practices.

If we left it to, of course, provinces or research councils or private labs to do things differently, what you would end up with--and actually it's the gap today--is an extreme patchwork of some people following these, like these good researchers, and then there are laboratories that do not follow laboratory biosafety procedures. Level 2 pathogens can cause significant disease in humans.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Thank you.

Mr. Uppal.

[Tim Uppal, Conservative, Edmonton—Sherwood Park, AB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you all for coming back again.

There's something from the previous testimony that I was thinking about. There are approximately, we were told, 4,000 labs with human pathogens and toxins that are not subject to any form of regulation in Canada in operation right now. How confident is your department, and you as a security expert, that these labs are following proper biosafety practices right now?

[Theresa Tam]

After the bill is passed, upon royal assent, we actually will be able to get in touch with these labs.

At this point in time, it's not easy to say what labs are using proper biosafety practices, but we've just had some very recent experiences of laboratories that fall under the radar of any research or academic institutions that are working with level 2 pathogens and have very worrisome practices, including abandonment of pathogens with no indication as to what's in their inventory. This has occurred on more than one occasion.

So we do know that there are labs in this country that are handling and storing significant pathogens, but we don't know where they're located or who are the people in them.

[Tim Uppal, Conservative, Edmonton—Sherwood Park, AB]

Thank you.

Dr. Singer.

[Dr. Peter Singer]

It's a really good question. I'd be interested in the comments from David and company.

I would say that you could have a pretty good assurance that most of those labs are well regulated, because most of the 4,000 are probably in universities and in private companies that are a little bit more complicated. For instance, at the University of Toronto alone, there are a few hundred level 2 labs, and when you start adding up universities, you're getting towards that 4,000 number.

I think one can have reasonably good confidence that universities have biosafety procedures, good accountability frameworks, by and large, and granting agencies coming in and out, etc. I also suspect that what Theresa is saying is also true. At the margin, there are probably some laboratories that may not.

The question really is one of burden and benefit. To get those laboratories, which is the benefit I was asking about in my initial comments, against the negatives of the criminal law and the fact that, as I said in my earlier remarks, there might even be a false sense of security, because by regulating pathogens you don't regulate everything, I'd just be more comfortable on the level 2 stuff.

I appreciate everything they said. It's somewhat convincing. I'd just be more comfortable on the level 2 stuff and would really think a little bit more carefully about what the best way to create biosecurity would be. I proposed a mechanism to do that.

[Tim Uppal, Conservative, Edmonton—Sherwood Park, AB]

We've heard from the department on a couple of different notes: on the criminal penalty side of it and on the way they would regulate level 2. Does that not make you feel better about the level 2 stuff, or are you still convinced that it needs to be completely out?

[Prof. Greg Matlashewski]

I'm still concerned if the bill says that for a first offence there's a fine of $50,000. I recognize that it used to be $250,000, so now I will be fined $50,000 instead of $250,000. I can see that they have moved on that.

But I would like it to be zero, because on level 2, with the 4,000 labs and thousands of graduate students and thousands of professors working on level 2 pathogens in this country, I don't think they should be faced with a new bill that criminalizes you if you make a mistake in working with level 2. So if you mislabel something, if you put something in the wrong location, or even if you send something without proper--

[Tim Uppal, Conservative, Edmonton—Sherwood Park, AB]

But do you honestly feel that would take you to a $50,000 fine? What our legal expert is saying is that it would have to go through some kind of court system or there would have to be charges laid.

[Prof. Greg Matlashewski]

But it's very simple to do it if it's in the law. The law would be written.

[Jane Allain]

The law doesn't allow the government to basically issue a fine. What that does in there is set out the penalty. It does not allow them to issue the fine for $50,000. They still have to go through a court process. There still has to be a charge.

[Prof. Greg Matlashewski]

Sure, but it's a criminal charge.

[Jane Allain]

It's a summary conviction charge. It's not an indictable offence. That, from a criminal law perspective, is a much lesser procedure.

[Prof. Greg Matlashewski]

And every student in our undergraduate...? We have 350 undergraduate students in microbiology and immunology. We need to train those students. Otherwise, this country will not be able to deal with bioterrorism and pathogens--

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Dr. Butler-Jones, would you like to...?

I would ask everybody to please pay some attention to the chair. I'm trying to be as lax as I can. Let's try to do this, okay? I taught junior high. I can handle this.

Dr. Butler-Jones.

[Dr. David Butler-Jones]

As Jane is saying, it's not a fines system. It would require a charge, etc. I can't imagine anybody in their right mind charging somebody in that position.

Certainly, all the universities are currently in that situation in terms of the importation and export of pathogens. We haven't charged them. We work with them. The committee has heard from university biosafety officers and others who say this will help to level the playing field with those who are outside. We're most concerned about the exceptions. We will, through consultation and discussion, make sure that in fact the burden is a minimum, if anything. We've been reassured by biosafety officers and others that there really is no additional burden if you're already doing basic, good biosafety.

The other thing is the issue of fines. Having worked with fines and issues for a long time, I know that in public health legislation there are often very large fines and jail terms. That is the very, very last resort with the most egregious situation, and you still have to take them to court. You don't take people to court unless there is an egregious and impossible situation where nothing else has worked.

As for the notion of the scenario that you're suggesting, it's virtually impossible in my mind and in my experience to go down that route. It serves nobody well.

You're right, in that if we did take that approach, yes, it would do that, but who would ever do that?

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Ms. McLeod.

[Cathy McLeod, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Thank you.

Just as a quick reminder for me, how many level 3 and 4 labs are there in the country?