Health Committee on Nov. 4th, 2010

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Oh, I'm sorry, Dr. Butler-Jones, I didn't mean to interrupt you. Did you have something to say as well? Please, go ahead.

Sorry, Monsieur Dufour.

[Dr. David Butler-Jones]

I'll be very quick.

One of the important things about surveillance is that when someone gets ill, they may or may not go to the doctor. If they don't go to the doctor, there's no diagnosis—and the majority never go, and never need to actually. Then those who go to the doctor may or may not get tested. Generally, you're not going to test everybody, and that's quite appropriate clinically. But if they're not getting better, then you'll test; or if they're severely ill or in hospital, you'll test. Then if it's tested, you may or may not pick it up in the laboratory, and then whether it gets typed....

So what we've done in the system—and Frank has described the laboratory system—is to make it better integrated, which increases the chances that if someone is tested, we will actually figure it out and be able to do something and recognize the links. It's far better today than five to ten years ago. If the listeria outbreak had happened ten years ago, we probably would never have actually found it until it was so big that it was just overwhelming.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Thank you, Dr. Butler-Jones.

Now, Monsieur Dufour, thank you for your patience.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair. This is take two. When we have Dr. Butler-Jones, it is always a pleasure. I would like to thank the witnesses for being here today.

Mr. Mayers, I am puzzled when I think about your answer to a question that Dr. Duncan asked. You are unable to identify the number of inspectors you had previously. I am referring to an Auditor General's report that states that your internal controls, such as your computer system, were ineffective.

Have I understood correctly? Are you unable to identify how many employees you have?

[Paul Mayers]

Thank you.

Just to clarify this, I didn't say I couldn't identify the number of inspectors. We can very clearly state that on, for example, March 31, 2010, the CFIA had just over 3,300 field inspectors. What I said was related specifically to the question of how many non-slaughter inspectors there were prior to the listeria outbreak. I simply don't have that number with me here today. Those are two very different things.

The agency, in its work around inspection and increasing inspection capacity, has made this a very clear area of focus. When we speak of non-slaughter meat processing, we have to understand that it includes broad meat processing, read-to-eat meat, cold storage, etc.

So the inspection coverage for our non-slaughter capacity is the area of focus that the honourable member's question went to. In speaking to that, what's important is that in addition to the capacity that existed prior to the review undertaken by the independent investigator, the CFIA has added to and augmented that capacity to the tune today of 150 inspectors, with an ultimate target of 170 additional inspectors.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

I understand that, but you are still not able to answer Dr. Duncan's question. You are unable to tell us exactly how many there were before the listeriosis outbreak.

[Paul Mayers]

We can speak to the total number of inspectors. The specific question related to just one component, and I simply don't have that information with me. That was my point.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Perhaps, Mr. Mayers, if you could look it up and send it to the clerk, we could distribute that information.

[Paul Mayers]

Very well.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Thank you.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Thank you very much.

Now, about the Weatherill report, what are the big challenges for the future? What still needs to be applied and what will the next steps be? The question is for all the witnesses.

[Dr. David Butler-Jones]

Thank you for the question. The next steps will be to consider to improve our process for recognizing challenges posed by nature. In fact, in nature, there are a great many elements that can cause infections in the population. So we must anticipate infections, like the H1N1 virus or a bacterium.

It is very important to improve our monitoring system and our relationship with the provinces, territories and municipalities. It's a whole system. Ensuring that communications are smooth is always a challenge when the system is large and very complex. This is always the greatest challenge. We need to focus on it constantly.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Ms. Yeates.

[Glenda Yeates]

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for your question.

For us as well, the challenge is to continue to be aware of new scientific methods and all the international developments in this and other areas.

For us, I think it is that challenge of making sure we keep up with the science. At this moment, we're very comfortable that we've combed the world, that we have gathered the scientific experts and have built the linkages with our international partners. We are very much focused on the current state-of-the-art science. But we also know that just as nature will change and throw us new challenges, science will continue to develop very rapidly.

I think for us it's never a matter of a point in time. It's never a matter of just one disease--listeria versus salmonella or E. coli or others. It is really to keep on top of the totality of the challenges in the scientific world. That is, I think, what our experts do.

Madam Chair, perhaps I will ask Dr. Farber if he could expand on that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Yes, go ahead just very briefly.

[Dr. Jeff Farber, Director, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products and Food Branch, Department of Health]

Very briefly, I think another challenge would be, as we get better tools and techniques to better detect these organisms and better detect these outbreaks, which are very difficult to detect, we'll start seeing causes of outbreaks coming out. We'll find out what actual foods cause some of these small listeriosis outbreaks. We have to really try to explain to both the public and politicians that it's actually a good thing we're detecting these.

We may be reporting more outbreaks in the future, but this is actually a good thing. That's what we have to really try to communicate very well.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go to Mr. Shipley.

[Bev Shipley, Conservative, Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, witnesses.

Through the agriculture committee, I had the distinct privilege of actually sitting on the subcommittee on food safety, which came out of the report I have in front of me. It talked about a number of issues that brought us to the 57 recommendations that Ms. Weatherill brought forward. I'm very happy to hear the comments about how that is moving and what has been accomplished, and at the end of the day within a very great timeline, with some of the complexities, they're actually all going to be met.

My understanding is that this is an agreement among all three agencies on how you're working together to make this happen. Would that be a fair statement? Thank you.

In the report, Dr. Brian Evans again said:

What was critical to this whole event was this determination at the end of the day that in spite of cleaning and disinfection and breaking down of equipment according to manufacturers' specifications, beyond the cutting and contact surfaces, a new threat, a new issue, was identified in this particular circumstance, which we had no knowledge about, that could colonize deep into the equipment.

Then Michael McCain, on numerous occasions, said,

“No amount of inspection, be it higher or lower, would have changed the outcome. If you want to go to the exact cause of this outbreak, it was not about a lack of inspection. It wasn't about the lack of product testing or a lack of inspectors.” Witnesses directly involved in the Maple Leaf plant repeated Mr. McCain's opinion that the inspectors at the plant did their jobs and were adequate.

Is this a true statement?

I'll talk to Dr. Butler-Jones first.

[Dr. David Butler-Jones]

I'll let CFIA speak to the standards of inspection.

[Bev Shipley, Conservative, Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, ON]

I do have another question, so I'm going to have to get a fast response.

[Dr. David Butler-Jones]

It was a surprise. The fact that we were able to detect it I think was an important piece of detective work. It was literally the needle in the haystack, or more accurately a different-sized straw in a haystack. It is something we now know about, and now I think inspection methods and things will be appropriate to that. But at the time, it was an unanticipated problem.

[Bev Shipley, Conservative, Lambton—Kent—Middlesex, ON]

I want to go, actually, to a comment my colleague Dr. Duncan made earlier. Her comment was about needing more numbers, and quite honestly all sides over there are talking that. They are questioning the numbers and saying how important is it to have more inspectors.

In 2005, in the previous government—and I know you weren't here, Ms. Duncan, at that time, but some people on that other side actually were here—mandatory testing and reporting by CFIA was cancelled. As a result, Maple Leaf Foods was not required to submit its environmental test to CFIA in the months leading up to the outbreak. For three months before the outbreak, Maple Leaf Foods collected periodic positive environmental test results for listeria but were not required to submit, were not required because it had been cancelled. As a result, CFIA was not informed of the listeria problem in the Maple Leaf Foods plant.

Since April 1, 2009, plant operators must now conduct environmental testing and immediately report any positive listeria results to CFIA. This new policy, which was brought in in 2009, also adds that additional environmental and end-product testing be done. I don't know, Dr. Butler-Jones, or to the CFIA, whether that actually would have stopped it. I'm certainly listening to what Maple Leaf has said, but I guess what I'm wondering about is whether this is a reality in terms of that change.

Secondly, quite honestly, we heard the same comments during our discussions at the subcommittee, about the union always saying more people needed to be hired. I understand that's what their objective is, but I'm wondering now what this conflict is in terms of not having enough people, when actually the former government cancelled a lot of the testing that had to be done. Can you talk to me just a little bit about the significance of the numbers we have? Actually, this new protocol that was brought in in 2009, does it have value?

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Who would like to address that question?

[Paul Mayers]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

The requirement that companies report to us any findings of significance in terms of public health has been tremendously valuable. What it allows us to do is not only identify individual issues but undertake trend analysis. That is perhaps the most important consideration here, and that is whether there are indicators found through the testing that's being undertaken in a facility that might suggest an organism is now becoming resident in the facility. We know that occasional contamination will happen in the production process, and that is why there are very strict protocols around sanitation in the facilities. However, if there is an indication that the organism is becoming resident and is therefore defeating the effectiveness of sanitation, our ability to identify that and respond to it becomes an incredibly valuable tool in terms of prevention, which is of course our largest interest. In fact, this approach is reflected in the policy Health Canada has now published.