One minute on this question, Mr. Chair? I'll try.
Mr. Chair, Madam Jennings is absolutely right when she says that legally nothing in Bill C-16 changes the current legal situation or the conventions of the Constitution. The reason it cannot is because the only way that can be affected is a constitutional amendment under section 41, which would require unanimous agreement, because it would affect the office of the crown.
However, we don't have to deal with theory. We can deal with practice. Again, I would cite all of the jurisdictions in the Westminster model that have adopted the fixed-date election. None of them has restricted the old discretionary powers of the crown, but in all cases they're working. And I gave a concrete example, Mr. Chair. If Mr. McGuinty, the premier of this province, decided to go to the Lieutenant Governor, he'd have to have an awfully good reason to dissolve now.
What fixed date elections do is create the expectation in the political classes and in the citizenry that this is the new norm, the new standard. So a prime minister or a first minister who decides to use his discretionary political power and rely on the crown's legal discretionary power would be treading on very difficult political ground. The reality is that jurisdictions have adopted it, and almost, I would dare to say, a convention of the Constitution has evolved, in which those first ministers simply do not...unless it's a national crisis or the government loses clear confidence, and that's very rare in a majority situation.
Theoretically, you're right, Madam Jennings, but in practical reality this will set the new standard. Certainly we've witnessed that in B.C. and Ontario.