Okay. That's what it felt like at the time.
That actually makes an interesting point, from the scholarship regarding funding of referenda in the various American states. California, which is bigger than Canada in population and GDP, has most major decisions made by means of a referendum. They're constitutionally forbidden to put on spending limits. The scholarship seems to indicate that money, at least for the yes side, tends not to actually win referenda. I'm not sure if the numbers for the scholarship are different for what happens on the no side of various propositions. Anyway, that's an interesting observation.
The more fundamental question is this. It's not that difficult to establish that if one were seeking to overcome some kind of funding limit, you could have multiple no committees and work it that way. My suspicion is that as a practical matter it would be very difficult, unless one went to the system that Quebec uses, where you have umbrella yes and no committees. If you don't do that, I think as a practical matter you have to accept that you're not really going to have spending caps. You could presumably limit who can contribute, freeze out the businesses and unions, but you can't ultimately control the overall spending on the yes and no sides. That's my impression.
Is that roughly your impression?