The idea has bounced around a bit that there might be merit under federal law to have a version of the umbrella committee idea that's used in Quebec legislation. My impression is that there are good arguments on either side of this question.
One of the features of Quebec's legislation is that the leader of the yes side in any referendum is the premier, and the leader of the no side is the leader of the opposition. It seems that there could be cases in which this is problematic. Had there been a referendum under this model in Canada at the federal level when the Bloc Québécois was the opposition, you would have had, effectively, an opposition representing only one province, despite the fact that it was conceiveably a minority government in which other parties from other provinces could have participated. Even today, if we had such a system, we could have a situation in which the leader of the Liberal Party would be the head of the no committee, and the Bloc and the NDP, who are legitimate opposition parties, would be in some way not represented.
In 1992, I think Mr. Bourassa said that if they didn't get a constitutional deal that they could present to the people, they'd have a referendum on whether Quebec should secede. He would have been the head of the yes committee, and Mr. Parizeau would have been the head of the no committee, and you could not have spent money on behalf of the no committee without Mr. Parizeau's say-so. That strikes me as being inherently problematic.
Am I missing something?