Thank you, Mr. Chair
Welcome, Professor Mendes; glad to see you.
Based on what we've just heard--Madam Jennings' suggestion and your response--I could be wrong, but I have the impression that two different paths are being suggested, or two different considerations are at work here.
One is conventional constitutional obligations, which, as Dicey said, are those that are enforced by public opinion writ large, by public pressure, by an expectation that norms have been developed and political actors ought not to violate those norms. I think that was the avenue you were taking in your presentation.
Although I could be wrong, it sounds to me that what Madam Jennings is suggesting is actually a rule that says the Governor General will actually take the advice of the Speaker over that of the Prime Minister under certain circumstances, that it's not being enforced by public opinion but it's being enforced by a convention binding upon the Governor General. The Governor General would be acting unconstitutionally, in the British sense, in the conventional sense, to take the Prime Minister's advice.
In other words, it's not a matter of the public getting around to punishing the Prime Minister. It's a matter of the Governor General responding to a different set of expectations.