Thank you, Chair. I appreciate that.
Thank you very much, Professor, for being here today.
At the risk of speaking out of turn—and I'll hear if I have—I think most of us accept that the power to prorogue exists in the Constitution. If we want to change prorogation in any way, we're talking about a constitutional amendment. And in speaking on this, I'm a layperson, not an academic, so I am going to say all of the following in pedestrian language. What we're looking at is making changes to the procedures that happen prior to the Prime Minister of the day taking the request formally to the GG. We accept that the GG has that residual or direct authority. What we're questioning is whether we can put certain restrictions on the Prime Minister that would not have constitutional backing, but would be enforceable through an array of other things, including some disincentives that would be in place. For instance, it's been mentioned that maybe a Prime Minister who prorogues without following a procedure in a resolution or in the Standing Orders would not be allowed to introduce certain government bills and wouldn't be able to do certain things that normally they would, so that there is a political price. The array of disincentives is a detail that we're not yet at. What we're still trying to come to grips with I think is the concept of where we can work and what our options are within that.
So I just want the following to be clear. When you talk about constitutional power, Professor, you are talking about the crown and not the Prime Minister per se. So my question would be....
Oh, I see you shaking your head, so I'd better stop there.