Thank you, Chair.
Thank you, Professor Heard, for being here.
I'd like to hear a little more of your analysis and your opinion, at least on how prorogation could be limited within our current constitutional conventions. You mentioned, for an example, that particularly in a minority Parliament, if we had fixed election dates, a government wishing to force an election or break a fixed election date could perhaps request prorogation. If it was refused by the House, that would potentially trigger an election.
You also mentioned that you anticipate—and correct me if I'm wrong, I don't want to be putting words in your mouth—or at least foresee a situation whereby, through a combination of changes to the Standing Orders, statutory or legislative changes, and those types of approaches, Parliament wouldn't necessarily have to amend the Constitution.
Here's my first question. Are there other Westminster models of government you're aware of that have such a combination of factors and that allows what you're suggesting should be done here in regard to the limits to the government's ability to prorogue?