The issue for us, of course, is that the Prime Minister would have confidence, but his powers are not unlimited. It's not a monarchy; the Prime Minister doesn't just rule. Parliament is still supreme. When we're talking about prorogation, we're talking about when Parliament sits. You could argue there's nothing more fundamental for Parliament to be seized with than when they're going to sit.
I want to move on to the argument you made that restricting the Prime Minister's ability to give advice to the GG constrains the GG. I just want to read to you from our law clerk's presentation to us:
The advisory role of the Prime Minister is based on an unwritten constitutional political convention. If prerogative legal powers can be overtaken by legislation, it must surely be true that unwritten political rules can be overtaken by legislation. Thus, legislation seeking to regulate prorogation without falling under paragraph 41(a), [which is the constitutional amendment] discussed above, might seek to regulate only the advisory role of the Prime Minister and not the power of prorogation held by the Governor General.
However, a failure to comply with the statutory restrictions imposed on the advisory role of the Prime Minister would not by itself invalidate an exercise of the prerogative power of prorogation by the Governor General.
He's basically contending that the Governor General's powers have not been touched. Even if the Prime Minister violates any rules we put in front of him, the GG still reserves her powers. Therefore, we're not doing an end run around the Constitution; we are constitutionally within our right to confine the Prime Minister, not having at all touched the powers of the GG.
That's my street interpretation of the law clerk's proposal.