On this, Mr. Chair, if anybody wants to consult it, the best source on constitutional conventions is actually Professor Andrew Heard's book, Canadian Constitutional Conventions.
One of the things he is just repeating is that the British writings on the subject say there are two ways a convention can be achieved. One is through the unanimous consent of all the relevant actors, and the other, if one of the actors is not agreeable to it, is ultimately that it gets tested in the political arena, because it's conventional. These things are politically enforceable, which means by an election. So if there are two different sides with different opinions on the appropriate course of action, you have an election to resolve the matter, as in 1926 over the powers of the Governor General, where, effectively, that was the subject of the election. This means that if there isn't an agreement—and I think, as a practical matter, there might not be agreement between the government and opposition parties on this—the only way to actually test whether a prorogation is legitimate is to have something occur like this.
Back at the end of 2008, the Prime Minister asked for prorogation. He was granted it. The House came back eventually. If the government were then defeated on that issue, an election would follow and we would figure out whether, in the end, people agreed with the former government or the former opposition.
So I think we could reflect something like this in what we write, that ultimately there's not really anything we can do here that would result in it being a convention or not.