Thank you, Mr. Chair, for inviting me to address the committee today.
Appearing with me is Stéphane Perrault, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Legal Services, Compliance and Investigations. We are here today to discuss a specific provision in the Canada Elections Act—subsection 463(2).
As you know, this subsection provides that an elected candidate who fails to file a financial return on time, or fails to make a correction to his or her return as requested or authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer, “shall not continue to sit or vote as a member” until the relevant documents are supplied. I agree with the Speaker of the House of Commons that this provision raises a prima facie question of privilege, since it deals with members' ability to continue to sit and vote in the House of Commons.
I am not here to offer you any advice on this question of privilege, which extends well beyond my field of responsibility. Instead, I will explain the Canada Elections Act scheme that leads to the application of subsection 463(2), and my role in it as Chief Electoral Officer.
Subsection 463(2) must be understood in its statutory context. As members will know, following an election, every candidate must file an election expenses return and related documents with Elections Canada. The statutory deadline for doing so is four months after polling day. These returns are then subjected to an audit by Elections Canada's auditors. The audit process serves the goal of transparency by ensuring that contributions and expenses are reported in accordance with the requirements of the law.
Auditors also seek to protect the public purse by ensuring that reimbursements are made only for eligible expenses. They also work to ensure the integrity of the political financing provisions by identifying improper transactions, such as ineligible contributions. In performing their duties, the auditors work closely with candidates and their official agents toward the common goal of compliance with the act.
The act provides for various means by which auditors, on behalf of the Chief Electoral Officer, can correct a return themselves, or authorize its correction on application by an official agent. The act also provides that the Chief Electoral Officer may request that a candidate or official agent make a correction within a specific period. Elections Canada only relies on this option in extremely rare situations, where it is evident that more informal discussions with the campaign are not yielding an accurate return.
Those in charge of a campaign may apply to a court to obtain, as the case may be, an extension of the deadline for filing the return, permission to make a correction that was refused by the Chief Electoral Officer, or relief from a request made by the Chief Electoral Officer for a correction to the return. The application must be made within two weeks of the Chief Electoral Officer's decision or of the filing deadline.
This is the context in which subsection 463(2) is situated. The purpose of this section is to provide finality in election filings. There comes a point where, if no return has been filed or if no corrections has been made—despite multiple attempts to bring a campaign into compliance with the reporting requirements of the act—there must be an effective mechanism to ensure transparency.
In the vast majority of cases, our experience has been that subsection 463(2) works as an effective tool for ensuring timely and accurate financial reporting by elected candidates.
My role in this process is a limited one. It is to ensure that the reporting obligations in the act are met. It's not for me to decide if and when a member of Parliament should be prevented from sitting. This is a matter of parliamentary privilege.
Accordingly, when it is clear that an elected candidate has not submitted a document as required under the act, or has failed to make a correction as requested or authorized, I write to the Speaker of the House of Commons to inform him of the situation. In my letter, I inform the Speaker that the member of Parliament has not submitted the required document within the relevant timeframe.
I refer the Speaker to the terms of subsection 463(2), and I also indicate that the member of Parliament is free to apply to a court for relief from the requirement imposed upon him or her. In the event that a court application is made, I advise the Speaker accordingly.
My sole purpose in writing letters of this nature to the Speaker is to make him aware of the dictates of subsection 463(2). Although it has been reported by some that the aim of my letter is to inform the Speaker that a member of Parliament should no longer sit in the House of Commons, this is not an accurate understanding of my intention.
As I indicated at the outset of my remarks today, I take no position on whether a member of Parliament should continue to sit in the House of Commons, despite the wording of subsection 463(2), as this is a matter of parliamentary privilege. My aim in writing to the Speaker is to acquaint him with the relevant provision of the act so that he may do whatever he sees fit to do.
There has also been a suggestion that I should delay writing to the Speaker for two weeks after a member has failed to submit a document. This is because, as I have noted before, an elected candidate is entitled under the act to take two weeks to file an application in court. It has been said that I should wait to see whether or not a court application ensues before bringing subsection 463(2) to the Speaker's attention.
I understand my obligation under the act differently. For me, waiting two weeks before writing to the Speaker would have the effect of substituting my own judgment for his, or for that of the House of Commons, as to the application of subsection 463(2).
You are gathered here today to study the very question of how the apparent prohibition in subsection 463(2) on sitting or voting in the House of Commons can be reconciled with the opportunity to seek relief from a court. We might have wished for the interaction of these two provisions to be more clearly set out in the statute, but they are not, and, as I have said, I believe their interaction raises a question of parliamentary privilege.
As I do not take any position on the issue of privilege, it is imperative for me to inform the Speaker as soon as possible of the situation to allow for a decision on this issue to be made. Waiting two weeks would mean that I could prejudge the matter, concluding myself that subsection 463(2) should not apply until after the two-week period. Indeed, if I were to wait two weeks in the face of a court application within that period, I might even have to wait until the completion of the entire court process, including any potential appeal.
This is the logical outcome of the argument that my writing immediately to the Speaker is premature, and yet this is precisely the issue of privilege that you are now debating. As I have already stated, it is not for me to determine whether subsection 463(2) applies only after a court process has run its course. My role is solely to inform the Speaker of the situation and the relevant statutory provisions. This is what I aim to do in my letters.
Mr. Chair, that will conclude my remarks. I will now be happy to take your questions.
Thank you.