I did just say June 3, 2020, was when it was published. My point is that, at that point, this information was relevant. All the stakeholders who are quoted in this publication would have been renowned economists who said things about the 2020 economic crisis that we're living through still today that substantiate the claim I've been making, or the argument I've been making, that the economic impact of COVID-19 is many times greater than the economic recession in 2008-09, which, I would add, Stephen Harper used as his excuse, or his reason, I should say, or rationale for proroguing Parliament twice, once in 2008 and once in 2009.
I really think this speaks to why we would hear from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, who I would think has heard from some of these stakeholders. Probably even her team of highly trained professionals would have been aware of this document, which I think helps highlight why this economic crisis is both unique but also far greater than the one that occurred in 2008-09. I would think that would be relevant information. It certainly echoes many of the other things I've been saying in this committee. Also, I think it supports in many ways the data that the chief statistician of Canada had gathered, which was slightly later but did include this time period as well. I think it helps us understand the first wave of COVID-19.
Going back to what I was saying, Kevin Milligan, a professor of economics from the Vancouver School of Economics, said that the main difference between the 2008-09 financial crisis and today's pandemic-induced recession is which side of the economy was hit, the demand side or supply side. He said that public health restrictions have shut down entire markets for goods and services, and it's not a lack of spending power from the demand side as it was in 2008; in fact, in this particular crisis, consumers have a lack of ability to purchase the same basket of goods and services, whether it be because of a fear for workers or consumers or because of public health restrictions in place.
The economic crisis we're in is very different in kind from the 2008-09 crisis, which was a demand-side shock. We're seeing a supply-side shock as a result of this pandemic, which is very different. It means that because so many workplaces have been closed down or work stoppages have been so far-reaching, in fact, there's a real shock to the supply side of the economy. This really informs how we should move forward. It informs how we can't simply apply....
Again, to Ms. Vecchio's point, this is a reason that a government would need to stop and reflect from time to time on what its priorities are and how it understands this crisis from a health perspective, an economic perspective, a social perspective, and so on. I think that's exactly why prorogation was used in this case.
To me, it's all very relevant and rational. I use that word a lot. I'm sorry to say that, but I keep saying it's rational. It makes sense. It lines up. There are reasons and evidence.
I studied formal and informal logic. I believe debate is supposed to be about argument and reasons and evidence, and not just saying things that are untrue or trying to persuade people to believe something because it serves your political interests. I believe we're actually being evidence based.
I totally get that no government is perfect. Especially in a pandemic, when you're in a public health crisis and there's a virus that's not completely understood, things are going to change. Evidence is going to evolve. Scientific research is catching up to a virus that's mutating in a way, and is almost surpassing human knowledge in terms of its ability to grapple with what that virus entails.
Again, the point I'm trying to make here is to take some time to understand that this economic crisis that is caused by the public health crisis is different. It's very different. You couldn't take the fiscal measures and even the framework or the understanding of the previous 2008-09 crisis and just apply it to this one. It would not work. It would not be successful, and there are many reasons for that.
For example, in 2008, the strategy to deal with the economic recession at the time was to restoke demand by promoting investment, injecting cash into households and to ensure financial sector balance sheets could support the resumption of lending. In the pandemic we know that family income and business cash supports are necessary to keep the economy just idling at a point so it prevents bankruptcies. This is why I think our government implemented things like the commercial rent subsidy and helped to work on making mortgage payment deferrals accessible, and provided small business supports and loans. This was to prevent bankruptcies right across our economy.
We also know that in the pandemic we wanted to prevent excessive debt that weighs down demand going forward. This is the rationale probably for direct payments to families, which we saw a lot of during this pandemic, in particular, the CERB. We all know why that was so important for families out there.
However, the demand-side measures will not get the economy back to full speed as long as the virus restricts economic activities. We can continue to try to bolster demand, but in a way we still have these very large supply-side adjustments. The ways of working are different, and they will continue to be different for some time. Workplaces may need to maintain a level of social distancing for some time. I don't claim to know all of the answers for that, but I will say that based on the evidence around the time that prorogation happened, or just before, there were quite a lot of economists saying that some of these supply-side adjustments are going to be in place for quite some time. This has a bearing on how the economy might recover and what measures would be helpful.
I'm justifying that it takes time to reflect on that, just as Mr. Blaikie said earlier in his comments that he needed time to reflect and have conversations with other parties to come up with a potential amendment that might be a counter-proposal that could move this committee forward. It takes a bit of time to reflect and work through those conversations. I think that's quite natural when you're undertaking a once-in-a-lifetime or once-in-a-hundred-years crisis of epic proportions.
I will get back to what I was saying, which is that the supply-side adjustments with the ways of working are different. The ways of households, caregiving and working from home have changed, and even consumption patterns, the ways of consuming for Canadians, have changed dramatically. You have these three levels—work, household and consumption patterns—that are all changing, and these are all supply-side adjustments. They're daunting, because it's hard to understand the costs and challenges that those create. Again, I made previous arguments as to how the economic impact actually affects different industries differently as well. There's inequity even in how industries are coping and in some of the structural challenges that some of the businesses had.
I think about businesses in my community. A few of them that have had to shut down seem to fall into a category where they have a very high overhead cost, often due to a facility they run. For example, one of the places is like an indoor playground for kids. They have a very high overhead cost to run their business. Restaurants would be another example where the overhead cost is quite high. Imagine not being able to generate revenue and still having some of those costs. This is exactly why our government put in place the commercial rent subsidy, which we've talked about before.
I want to quote Kevin Milligan, a professor of economics from the Vancouver School of Economics. He said, “The best way to minimize these costs is to strongly support public health measures needed now to suppress the virus sharply.” I find that just the fact that I could find that quote as early as June 3, 2020, sort of provides even more evidence to back up what my colleague Ms. Petitpas Taylor was saying, which was that the public health measures are some of the most important tools in our tool box for suppressing the community spread of the virus. Also, they're the best economic recovery measures because we know that, wave after wave, the small businesses and many of the industries are struggling because they can't get a foothold back into doing business again.
We sometimes see different leaders across the country lifting those public health measures prematurely. I think what we need to all do is encourage those to stay in place to get the case numbers down as low as possible. The primary reason is that it's the right thing to do to save human health and ensure that this virus doesn't mutate beyond the effectiveness of our vaccines, but it's also the best thing to do from an economic perspective as well. It's not just good for human health. I mean, we shouldn't need any other reasons, in my view, but if you do need other reasons, it's also better for the economy.
I read a paper a while back on the sunk cost fallacy, which I thought was really interesting because I'm a bit of a nerd when it comes to fallacies. For anyone who doesn't know, “fallacies” is this word we use in philosophy that refers to mistakes in reasoning. They're common mistakes. They're mistakes that people make a lot. There are all kinds of different fallacies out there. There have been books written that explain all of the different types of fallacies, all of the mistakes in reasoning that we can have as human beings, and there are a lot.
The sunk cost fallacy is an interesting one because it really applies to this pandemic. Seeing the economic hardship that is brought about by public health restrictions can really impact leaders' willingness and ability to make decisions about imposing those measures in a successive wave of COVID-19. This is called the sunk cost fallacy because you're projecting the cost of the previous wave into the future wave, but you're not looking beyond that. I think this provides a bit of a rationale. I have a lot of empathy for leaders who are in those positions of decision-making and power and who have to make those difficult decisions, although in many cases I think the decisions perhaps have fallen prey to the sunk cost fallacy.
I'll leave that, and I would be happy to provide anyone with a link to that article, too. If Ms. Vecchio would like to review the sunk cost fallacy, I would be happy to provide it. At any rate, I will move on.
I want to speak about another prominent expert. I don't know this individual personally, but his name is Mike Moffatt. He's a senior director at the Smart Prosperity Institute.
This goes back to my argument that the current economic crisis is much greater and more substantial than the 2008-09 economic recession. Mike Moffatt agrees, in the paper that he wrote, that we are definitely going through a supply-side shock, but he also talks about how there are demand-side implications, or even shocks that are triggered by the supply-side shock. I will tell you what I mean by that.
He uses the example of a tornado in the U.S. Midwest. This is hypothetical. It hasn't happened, but you could very easily see it happening at some point. It's a possible scenario that could be real, but it's hypothetical for now. If a tornado in the U.S. Midwest were to take out assemblers of automobiles, it would create a demand-side shock in Canada for auto part suppliers. We have big auto part suppliers. Obviously, the demand for their supplies or auto parts would be dramatically impacted if all of sudden two big auto assemblers in the U.S. were to be hit by the tornado and not be able to function. That's one scenario. Another is to imagine if the tornado hit, God forbid, southwestern Ontario and took out auto assemblers in southwestern Ontario. This would create a supply-side shock but also a demand component, because auto suppliers would still take a hit.
I think what's important to recognize is that the current crisis we're in is not as simple as just saying the economy has been hit by a supply-side shock. There are ripple effects across our supply chains that also create demand-side shocks as well. I think that's his main point.
Adding to the previous expert I was mentioning, Kevin Milligan, the professor of economics, this individual really speaks to how we have to develop a more sophisticated understanding of how our economy has been impacted and understand what measures to put in place to actually help it recover. I think it's very rational to think that you might want, as a government helping lead a country through a massive hundred-year crisis, to take some time and reflect on what really is the impact of this current crisis so that you can target measures of different kinds to the real situation we're in.
You know, I talk about situational leadership. I've had several people tell me that there are different assessments of what constitutes situational leadership. In my view, it's a heightened sensitivity and responsiveness to the very particular circumstances, the changing circumstances, in a given situation and showing leadership. Within that is the ability to assess, evaluate, gather information quickly and make sense of the many different aspects of a crisis or any situation. Obviously, the need for situational leadership is heightened within a global public health crisis, of course, or any form of crisis. I think crisis management in general requires situational leadership.
That's a bit of a tangent. I'm sorry about that. I certainly will get back to my remarks here.
In terms of my argument, each view of the world, like the supply-side shock or the demand-side shock, which was 2008-09, or some mixture of the two really has an impact on how large the economic decline is, what inflation will look like, how interest rates will reflect that or impact that and whether stagflation is an issue or not. In the 1970s there was a sort of stagflation that came out of the supply-side shock then. It led to moderate economic decline, substantial increases in nominal interest rates and inflation pressures that either forced the Bank of Canada to abandon the 2% inflation target or caused them to hike interest rates even further.
In our case, I think what we're seeing—and this is changing—is a much larger economic decline than in 1970 and a relatively modest impact on inflation and interest rates. Pressure is upward or downward, depending on the relative magnitude of the shocks, and there's been no stagflation to date.
Stagflation, by the way, in case people are wondering—I hate using academic-sounding words, but sometimes I do—is characterized by slow economic growth and relatively high unemployment.
I see my colleague Ms. Petitpas Taylor smiling, and it's making me smile, and I am sorry for using these academic buzz terms.
Again, stagflation is characterized by slow economic growth and relatively high unemployment, which obviously is economic stagnation, but at the same time accompanied by rising prices, inflation. You're seeing a stagnation in the economy but an inflation of prices. This is why stagflation is something of real concern or potential concern.
I have lots more to say, but I am also conscious of time. Before I finish up, I have a few other things that I really feel I need to say, and I think there are two other really important contributors to the compilation that I am quoting from and using as some of my evidence base for my argument today.
One person I would refer to is David Macdonald, senior economist at the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. He said, “The job losses during the great recession of 2008-09 were a garden party compared to what has happened since March 2020. You have to go back to the...thirties to see anything like it but, even then, the comparison stops after the first month.”
I did a bit of an analysis of this graph that was shown in this paper, and it's really interesting to see how the job losses compare. This gentleman, David Macdonald, took five of the top economic crises, recessions, depressions—however we refer to them—the recession of 1991-92, what he called the “dirty thirties”—I don't like that term and I'm not sure why it's called that, but maybe someone else can tell me if they know a bit more about that history—the great recession, which was 2008-09, and the recession of 1981-82. I know that the thirties refer to the Great Depression.
When you look at these four in comparison to the COVID-19 pandemic, the only one that even comes close to comparing is the recession in the Depression, and it only compares for the first month or two, and it's only about a decline in job loss of about 5%; whereas, at the point in time when this paper was written, on June 3, 2020—this was really early in the pandemic—the crisis we're in is almost a 16% decline over the first two months in terms of job losses. Again, it's from 5% to almost 16%.
I think the Minister of Finance has mentioned a V-shaped recovery. The V-shaped recovery refers to.... The drop in job losses has been so great and so many times greater that it looks like a cliff. The idea is that if our fiscal measures are working, we could see a rebound of that economy, a V-shaped recovery, which is a very steep incline of job gains. We started to see that recently before the third wave was really upon us. The job numbers were incredible. There were 300,000 jobs gained in one month. The previous month was a similar number. That was February, if I'm not mistaken.
The rebound of the economy is impressive. I think it actually provides another point of rationale that's now obviously in the future compared to where we would have been at the time of prorogation. When you look at what happened as a result of prorogation and then tie it back to the information that was accessible at that time, I think it actually helps to show that what the government has done was evidence informed. On top of that, it's working.
I don't mean to sound arrogant at all; I'm just literally saying that this seems to make sense to me. It adds up. It's rational. It's targeted. It took time to reflect. This gentleman, David Macdonald said, “This represents a seismic shift in how we fight recessions when private debt is high and interest rates are low: instead of encouraging debt, we put money into people’s pockets at an unprecedented scale."
In the contributions he makes in the article, he basically points to how the thing that's different about this crisis—and others have said it's both supply-side and demand-side shocks at the same time—was there was already a level of debt out there in our economy leading up to this crisis that was perhaps beyond what we've seen in other recessions, or other crises of this proportion. Again, this one doesn't even measure up.