Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 11th, 2024

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I would say that in this case our assessment was that it was investigative journalism as opposed to a leak in this specific story.

I will obviously not be speaking to the specifics of our investigative techniques or investigative interests, but I think what is very clear is that we have said publicly in our annual reports, in speeches, in appearances in front of this committee and other committees of the House and the Senate that CSIS has been concerned with foreign interference for very many years. It's part of our act. We have been investigating this, but what we have seen over the last number of years is an increased aggressiveness by a number of countries.

The speed and complexity at which the threat of foreign interference is coming at Canadians, yes, at the democratic processes, elections, but also at Canadians from different diaspora groups who are being interfered with in their democratic rights by foreign nations, this is something that is of grave concern to CSIS. This is why we have been speaking about this both publicly and privately to government. I think Canadians, through the work of this committee and other committees and the NSICOP and NSIRA and the commission of inquiry, are now getting a better sense of what is required.

Maybe the last thing I would say is that one of the best tools to address foreign interference is what we're doing right now. We're talking about it in public. Of course, I will not be able to share classified information, but by having more public discussion about these issues in different places with different people, we will increase resilience against these actors. It's not going to be CSIS or the RCMP or someone else catching people doing it all the time. We hope that we're good at what we do, but it's going to be Canadians in their day-to-day activities who will raise the flag and say, “There's something happening here. Maybe I should be talking about it.”

[The Chair, Liberal, Ben Carr]

Thank you very much, Ms. Mathyssen.

Colleagues, we now go to the second round.

Mr. Cooper, the floor is yours for five minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Turning to the NSICOP report, footnote 63 at page 17 of the report indicates that CSIS briefed the Prime Minister on February 9, 2021, about foreign interference activities by the Beijing regime, more specifically involving efforts to manipulate Canadian media, including “paying to publish media articles without attribution, sponsoring media travel to the PRC, pressuring journalists to withdraw articles and creating false accounts on social media to spread disinformation.”

Did you brief the Prime Minister on February 9, 2021? Was it you?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I do not have the report in front of me, but I will take the member's word that it's indeed accurate, the reference.

I do not remember that specific briefing. I will have to double-check if it was myself, someone from my staff or somebody else who briefed the Prime Minister.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you. Could you undertake to find out as well if the Prime Minister had been briefed prior to February 9, 2021, on the same subject matter?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, we'll take that under advisement. We'll try to see what we can do. In different committees—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

I would appreciate that. Thank you.

[David Vigneault]

—we have provided a number different chronologies. We'll try to see what we can do.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you.

Page 17 of the NSICOP report goes on to state that the SITE task force observed during the 2021 election a coordinated campaign “aimed at discouraging Canadians, particularly of Chinese heritage, from supporting the Conservative Party”. It states, “Specifically, different Chinese-language media outlets in Canada adopted the language of a PRC state media article, without specifically attributing it. Most of these media outlets were linked to the PRC via partnership agreements with the China News Service, the Chinese Communist Party’s primary media entity”.

Had a foreign influence registry been in place at the time, those media outlets would have had to publicly register in light of their partnership agreements with the PRC. Is that correct?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I'm looking to my colleague here on whether he wants to opine on this.

I would have to defer the question to my colleagues at Public Safety Canada, who are devising the current regime. I would not have a definitive answer to provide to this committee.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Well, I would submit that the answer would be yes, insofar as it is an arrangement. A partnership agreement would be an arrangement with a foreign entity, correct?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, it appears to be the case, but again, I would not want to speculate. I'm not the expert on the foreign registry. Our colleagues at Public Safety are.

[Bo Basler]

I don't think we could expand further on the nature and scope of when a partnership agreement would come into force under the current proposed legislation right now. I think it would be a stretch for me to go that far.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay. Well, I realize that you might not be the authority on the subject matter, but if one looks at the legislation, it's quite clear that it falls within the definition of an arrangement. I would just observe that, based upon the NSICOP report and other information, including through Global Affairs Canada and the reports of a rapid response mechanism, it is well documented that during the 2021 election, the Beijing regime ran a disinformation campaign aimed at discouraging Chinese diaspora communities from voting for the Conservatives. You would agree with that.

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, through the commission of inquiry presided over by Justice Hogue, CSIS, in partnership with colleagues, has made public some summaries of information, including specifically on this information. I think to be as precise as I can with respect to the member's question, I would refer the committee to that summary, which uses all of the classified information and the open information in coming up with the best possible story.

I think that would be the definitive story on this matter, Mr. Chair.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Do I have 15 seconds?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ben Carr]

No. You're over.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ben Carr]

Thanks very much, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. Gerretsen, the floor is yours for five minutes.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

There's a lot of talk going on lately about foreign interference, and I think you think that's a good thing. As you said earlier, Canadians need to be aware. Whether it's your work, the Hogue commission or NSICOP, this issue is out front in public. Is it safe to say that part of the reason for it is the work that's ongoing and the elevated importance of that work over the last number of years, Mr. Vigneault?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, that's a very interesting question. We've been reflecting on this issue.

In my view, I think we, CSIS and partners, are putting more resources and emphasis on this, because we have seen the threat increasing in the last number of years. We have seen a number of actors coming at it much more aggressively and doing things we had not seen before.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Knowledge is power, then. Knowledge is power. Having this information gives us and you and those responsible the power to be able to do something about it.

[David Vigneault]

Indeed it's the case. That's why, while respecting, in our case, the law of the Security of Information Act, and the partnership agreements with our partners to protect information, we have for a number of years now been talking publicly about foreign interference. That's why I do believe that a more organized discussion about these issues is what will make Canadians resilient.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Some of the information is public and can be discussed in public, but some can't. Some of the reports are classified for various different reasons, but some people can get access to those reports, obviously the Prime Minister, members of cabinet, the official leaders of each political party. If they have the information that comes from those classified sources, can they act on it or are they restricted in acting on it because the information is classified?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I testified to this issue a few days ago in front of another committee, and I'll say a couple of things in reaction to this.

First, this is uncharted territory. We have never done it before, so we're all learning together.

Second, I think that people with the right security clearance, with the need to know, are indeed able to get briefings on these matters.

Third, I think that while respecting the law, there are opportunities and abilities for people to make some decisions based on that information without having to reveal it publicly.