Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The issues of cybersecurity, their nexus to national security, and attempts by adversaries to interfere in Canada, are becoming ever more complex. These issues require the full attention of the Government of Canada and all Canadians.
Increasingly, threats to the security of Canada take the form of cyber-threats. Malicious cyber-activity targeting Canada is growing in scale, complexity and sophistication, with cyber-threat actors seeking to advance their economic, political, security and ideological interests to the detriment of Canada and its allies. In short, the digital ecosystem has transformed the nature and conduct of warfare, espionage, diplomacy and trade.
Cyber-threat actors include those affiliated with foreign states, including military and intelligence services, as well as non-state actors.
CSIS actively investigates a variety of cyber-actors, including those from or associated with China, Russia, Iran and India. Regardless of who is directing their activities, cyber-threat actors employ a range of technologies and techniques to exploit weaknesses in information systems, target individuals to gain unauthorized access to systems and networks, or leverage infrastructure in Canada to achieve their broader strategic and geopolitical goals to the detriment of Canada.
CSIS is mandated to collect intelligence on threats to the security of Canada, to advise the government on those threats and, when appropriate, take measures to reduce them. This includes threats that emanate from the cyber-domain.
More specifically, when CSIS identifies national cybersecurity threats, it uses a variety of investigative techniques, including human sources, warranted collection and other methods to determine the scope, motivation, target and source of the threat.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, engages broadly with industry, academia, governments, and indigenous groups to help strengthen Canadians' alertness and resilience to a growing cyber-threat environment. For example, since 2021 alone, over 70 briefings have been provided to parliamentarians on foreign interference and espionage, in which security awareness, including cyber-hygiene, was a key discussion point.
Additionally, CSIS routinely provides intelligence assessments to our government partners, allowing them to make informed policy and operational decisions. CSIS also shares these assessments and investigative leads with our trusted foreign partners in order to assist them in ensuring the integrity of the global information infrastructure upon which Canadian security relies.
However, I would like you to know that CSIS is part of a community of agencies and departments seeking to protect Canada from cyber-threats. While CSIS plays a vital role in the team, it works closely with other key players such as the cybersecurity experts at the Communications Security Establishment, the cyber centre, Public Safety Canada and the RCMP, just to name a few. Together we work to safeguard Canada and its assets, information and national security from an array of cyber-threats.
Regarding the committee's specific study, our colleagues and cybersecurity experts at the CSE and CCCS, with CSIS, produced a chronology of events detailing the interactions between our organizations and the House of Commons.
I will note that CSIS learned of any issues with the House of Commons IT system from CSE in January 2021. Following this, our agency directly briefed the House of Commons IT staff with CSE. From there, we worked with CSE and the House of Commons from January through April 2021 to investigate this activity.
This work outlined that IPAC members were targeted, but importantly, it found no instance of compromise on the system, nor any follow-on activity.
CSIS broadly disseminated intelligence products to clients across the Government of Canada detailing APT31's email tracking attempts on IPAC members in Canada. CSIS's work with the House of Commons predates the FBI reporting that was shared with both CSIS and CSE on any information that was released to the public by the U.S. in 2024.
When this incident was uncovered in early 2021, CSIS followed the protocols that were in place at the time. CSIS worked directly with CSE and the House of Commons to better understand the incident and its impact. Our investigation, alongside CSE's work, helped to inform the House of Commons on the specific technical measures that could be taken to mitigate the incident.
In 2023, the Prime Minister issued a ministerial directive to CSIS, which outlined and clarified CSIS’s role and responsibilities in relation to the investigation, notification and reduction of threats to parliamentarians. The directive outlines that, wherever possible within the law, CSIS must ensure that parliamentarians are informed of threats to the security of Canada directed at them.
This is uncharted territory for CSIS, and is providing an opportunity for reflection, learning and improvement. What is different today under this directive is that it compels us to have the conversation with our partners on how best to ensure that parliamentarians are informed on the potential threats they face. It may not be CSIS, for example, when we are not the lead department responsible for the issue at hand, but because the ministerial directive was issued to CSIS, we will lead the discussion on the process.
Mr. Chair, I think I will skip the recap of the chronology because of time. I will speak quickly to some legislative authorities.
Members of the committee, I think you all understand that the CSIS mandate is guided by legislation that is nearly 40 years old. In the face of rapid technological change and an increasingly complex cyber-ecosystem, gaps in CSIS authorities that limit its ability to detect, investigate and respond to foreign interference, including by sharing information, have become more pronounced.
Bill C-70, which currently sits before the House, proposes a set of focused amendments that will improve CSIS's operational response to foreign interference.
Among these amendments is a proposal to enable information sharing outside the federal government to build resiliency to national security threats, including foreign interference. This will help to build resilience before the threats materialize and will directly enable parliamentarians to make decisions that are more informed.
More broadly, Bill C-70 will ensure CSIS investigations are nimble and responsive, resulting in better collection of intelligence and advice, including for parliamentarians.
The last thing I would say, Mr. Chair, is that in reflecting on this situation in preparation for this appearance, I think my analysis with my colleagues is that everybody did the work they were supposed to do. However, the outcome for parliamentarians is not, I think everybody will agree now, in hindsight, what was desired.
I welcome the work of this committee. I welcome the work that CSIS can do to make sure that in the future we learn from this, and that the outcome for parliamentarians and for Canadians is a different one.
Thank you.
