Thank you, Chair.
I was trying to be a gentleman.
I've had the opportunity, now, to listen to the testimony given this morning in the first panel. I didn't hand speaking notes to the interpreters, so I'll speak slowly and will pause when I switch to French.
I'm going to repeat what I said in the House of Commons. I believe the Government of Canada had a moral and ethical responsibility to tell those 18 parliamentarians that we were targeted by a PRC special unit for a form of digital surveillance, including me. I'm one of them. I'm a member of IPAC. The Government of Canada failed in its moral and ethical responsibility to tell us.
I have six points I want to make based on testimony I heard. I want to refer to these.
The first part was during the CSE's testimony here about when they became aware. They said:
...from January to April 2021, more than a year earlier, the cyber centre had already shared reports with the House of Commons IT security officials, specifically detailing a serious matter of technical indicators of compromise by a sophisticated actor affecting House of Commons IT systems.
Based on this testimony, I have to assume it was APT31. I had no idea this was going on at the time. I also did not know what APT31 was until I was told on April 24—by my two co-chairs and the executive director of IPAC—that I had been one of the targets of this PRC campaign.
Since then, I have not had any type of contact directly from CSE or CSIS. I have heard, though, from the FBI. I had the same May 9 FBI briefing that other members received, detailing exactly what APT31 is.
Later, in testimony provided before the committee, the CSE's Caroline Xavier said, “I can confirm that when we became aware in 2021 of some anomalies”—it's interesting that she called them “anomalies”—“that we were seeing with regard to potential cyber-activities towards the House of Commons, we did, indeed, inform the House of Commons IT security team.”
She went on to detail this, saying:
...we did, indeed, share that list of parliamentarians with the House of Commons IT security team. We also shared it with CSIS.
When I became aware that I had been targeted, they responded to me with a citation on April 25. Here it is, as copied and pasted by the Sergeant-at-Arms: “For your records, we have been involved in investigation of this activity while it was ongoing, well before it was publicly disclosed.”
My staff followed up and asked the question, “Are you saying that the Sergeant-at-Arms office was aware and investigated this activity before, or are you referring to the House IT administration?”
The office of the Sergeant-at-Arms, or SAA, was not aware of this investigation. However, the HoC cybersecurity team, information service, IT administration, stated that they were involved in this investigation while it was ongoing.
I want to draw your attention to another piece of testimony in questioning by Mr. Genuis. In that, Ms. Caroline Xavier said, as part of those actions, “We provided 12 reports to the House of Commons.” This would have been since January 2021. Again, I am not aware of the contents of those reports. I don't have the benefit of the in camera sessions that members of this committee received, so I am at a disadvantage.
In response to a question asked by Marie‑Hélène Gaudreau, Ms. Xavier said:
Since 2019, we've offered parliamentarians the opportunity to get support from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, especially if they've had problems after a cybersecurity incident. That is also part of the services we offer, but it is important for parliamentarians to contact us if they want our help.
You can't contact the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security at the Communications Security Establishment if you don't know it exists. This is the first time I've realized that there is such a service for parliamentarians. I was elected in 2015, and this is the first time I have heard about this service, which has been in place since 2019.
In addition, it is impossible to ask the government for help from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security if you do not know that you are being targeted by a foreign agency as a parliamentarian.
In cross-examination and following up on questions asked by Ms. Mathyssen, Mr. Genuis raised the point that the CSE made the following observation in different rounds of questions: that government institutions need to respect the parliamentarians of the House of Commons. However, it's hard to feel respected by CSIS, the CSE or the House of Commons IT cybersecurity administration when they don't bother to tell us we are the targets of foreign campaigns and they don't bother to tell us we're targeted by foreign agencies.
I do a significant amount of work with diaspora communities among Canadians. I have people often tell me that they cannot be seen in a picture of me that will be posted online, so they jump out of the picture.
In my office I also have a Ukrainian flag signed by many of our UCC interns in past years, so I am sure that Russian Federation officials don't like it.
Lastly, I have protest pictures from Hong Kong brought to me by Albertans who were there. Hong Kongers who come and visit me do not take pictures in front of that with me in it.
Thank you, Chair.