Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 2nd, 2022

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

In fact, we are here to think about the safety of parliamentarians.

Madam Chair, thank you for the opportunity to find out who was first to respond to the request. Was it the Parliamentary Protective Service, which has the legitimacy to respond on Wellington Street, or was it the Ottawa Police Service? I'm trying to figure that out.

[Chief Peter Sloly]

Thank you very much.

Through you, Chair, the police of jurisdiction in any Ontario location under the Police Services Act is the primary service with the responsibility for providing policing in all of its forms for that jurisdiction. In every case of protests, planned and unplanned events and natural disasters in Ottawa that require police response, the Ottawa Police Service is the primary police agency of jurisdiction to lead the response. They are inevitably supported by a wide range and in this case the full extent of policing and national security agencies for an event as large and as complex as this one, from CSIS to RCMP to, yes, the Parliamentary Protective Service.

I did say in my opening comments, and I will repeat in answer to your excellent question, that there are six primary police agencies. They are supported and coordinated by and collaborate through two primary entities for intelligence sharing, planning and operations.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

We talked earlier about January 13. You talked about the whole preventive aspect, which is important to you, and the possible request for 1,800 agents. I wonder how it is that nothing happened. Nothing was done beforehand. But you mentioned that this was a unique situation, in terms of security, both for parliamentarians and civilians.

I for one am somewhat concerned. There were many lessons to be learned from the events of 2014. Our witnesses have told us about it. How can I be reassured, when on January 13 we knew about it and a command post bringing together the six services was only established after the truckers were installed and the occupation had begun?

What happened? Were you pressured or ordered not to act beforehand?

[Chief Peter Sloly]

Through you, Chair, I thank the member for her question. I suspect that this may be one of those where I need to defer to Justice Rouleau's federal inquiry for that level of detail.

I can only say, in answer to your important question, what I said in my opening statements. This was a paradigm shift in terms of demonstrations and national security events. It had not been experienced by me before. I'm not aware of anybody else who's a serving police chief or national security commander who has experienced it. There was no opportunity for us to have a perfect response to the perfect storm that visited this city and other jurisdictions across this country.

What we did as a policing community and as a national security community was rally quickly around the reality that this was a different beast. We shared intelligence information. We collaborated and coordinated on a continuous basis until we had the right resources and the right combination of larger institutional supports to achieve a remarkable level of success, with no loss of life and no serious injuries.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Can I ask one last question, Madam Chair?

What can I tell my fellow citizens about the fact that a command post was only established after a week? What is going to be done to reassure us and to prevent the next breach, the next one-off event? Action was not taken when it should have been. We know that in other places barricades were erected to prevent the movement of these trucks, which were taking up a lot of space.

Madam Chair, I would like Mr. Sloly to reassure me.

[Chief Peter Sloly]

Chair, through you, I thank the member for her excellent question.

I actually think you answered the question excellently yourself. Lessons learned shared quickly amongst a broader community, in this case the policing community, allowed other jurisdictions to understand the full nature of the risk and the threat that had arrived in Ottawa prior to its arriving in those other jurisdictions.

I also want to include Coutts, Alberta, because that was happening almost simultaneously as the convoy and the events around it came to Ottawa. There were two jurisdictions, the RCMP in Coutts, Alberta, and the Ottawa police here in the nation's capital, that within hours were able to start to share information with other police agencies—Winnipeg, Windsor, Edmonton, Toronto, Quebec City. They had the time and the intelligence understanding of the threat coming to do things differently and ultimately more successfully.

The answer to your constituents is exactly that: We will never be prepared perfectly for these unique crises. What we must do is try to be as prepared as well as we can be, and then respond as quickly and as effectively after the storm breaks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Very well. We've used up some time from your second round of questions, Ms. Gaudreau.

Ms. Blaney, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair. Through you, I thank the witnesses for being here today.

Mr. Sloly, you have said repeatedly in your testimony today that you were unprepared and that this was something beyond anything you could have imagined or other sectors could have imagined. My curiosity, especially as we're talking about expanding the precinct, is around why there were not any indicators or plans or thoughts about blocking any part of it before they arrived. Perhaps you could clarify that thought process.

[Chief Peter Sloly]

Through you, Chair, I thank the member for her question.

Just to clarify, there was a range of discussions and a range of elements in every plan. There were multiple versions of the plan as we learned and went through the process with various agencies—around the blocking of routes, around jurisdictions, around city cores and around critical infrastructure, including border crossings. To be clear, all of that was part of the initial plan and every other plan that I was privy to, all the way through.

We did not have, I think in answer to your real question, an intelligence threat assessment that said what arrived was going to be arriving on the scale that it arrived, one that would require a full blockade of any portion of this city, including the downtown core, what we called the “red zone”.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Through the chair, there wasn't the appropriate intelligence. I hear what you're saying there, but is part of the challenge the multijurisdictional area? Listening to other testimony from other jurisdictions, this is a very unique overlap area. It felt like there was a lot of miscommunication. There are articles out there that are talking about the breakdown of communications that have been tracked through emails between different departments. Without that intelligence, was there...?

I guess what I'm asking is this: What would be different if the precinct were expanded? Would it clarify some of those things? Would it allow for responsiveness to be different or more unique, or is it just “now we know better and we're going to do better”?

[Chief Peter Sloly]

Through you, Chair, I think that is the ultimate purpose of the study this committee is undertaking. As I said in my principal presentation, this is an area that should be looked at, reconsidering the legislative and jurisdictional mandates of particularly those six police agencies. I suggest that it will be very difficult to change substantially. I'm certain that it will not alleviate all of the problems of communication, coordination and collaboration that happen, particularly in critical events like the one we are talking about.

I have also suggested that there needs to be more resources to the central bodies that allow those six agencies in their current state, with their current legislative mandates, to be improved. Financial resources and human resources to Intersect and the national capital region command centre will help to prevent and mitigate some of what took place in the events we've referred to over the course of today.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Through you, Madam Chair, I'm wondering if Senator White has anything to add.

[Vernon White]

If I may, Madam Chair, I think Chief Sloly has identified the issues.

Look, we're supposed to learn from these experiences. There are no two the same. Ottawa would have 250 protests and demonstrations a year, and not once did we see anything that came close to what we saw in Ottawa with the convoy. I don't think anybody could have accurately identified what was coming until it arrived.

I think we've heard witnesses in the Emergencies Act hearings, particularly from the RCMP, about the gathering of intelligence. I think they would probably identify that the amount of intelligence they had gathered was insufficient to actually tell other police agencies what was coming as well. I think there is a learning opportunity here. I think it's the reason other places handled it better. New Brunswick knew what was coming. They were able to deal with that situation, as were Quebec City and Toronto. I think the learning opportunity is something that shouldn't be lost here.

The reality, though, is that none of that changes the fact that, if we want to be better prepared, it means having a better structure of security for our parliamentary precinct. That may mean changing what parliamentary precinct security looks like in the future. They're still not a police agency. Regardless of the numbers or how much money we spend or how many tools we give them, they still don't have what I would argue are some of the assets they need to do their job sufficiently.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Through you, Madam Chair, I'll go back to Mr. Sloly again.

When we look at this context of where we're at and what we've learned, what powers did your officers require that didn't already exist in order to deal with the occupation?

[Chief Peter Sloly]

Thank you, Chair. Through you, again, I'll repeat from my principal presentation and other answers.

For me, the number one thing as chief of Police in Ottawa was resources. On the order of magnitude, the Ottawa police has roughly 1,200 officers. At any given time, 10% to 15%, potentially 20% of them, are not available for duty. They're required to provide 24-7, 365 policing to the largest geographical municipality in Canada, the second-largest in North America.

When something that big came to town, as we've been talking about, I threw every single officer that I could at it, while still trying to serve and protect the one million people who call Ottawa home. Ultimately, it took 2,000 additional officers from across the country, with specific skills—almost double the size of my regular staffing availability—to bring the events here in Ottawa to a conclusion. That is the order of magnitude.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Through you, Madam Chair, I've also read that there was an increased amount of absenteeism in the Ottawa police during that time. I'm just wondering if you could speak to that and to whether there was any related cause to that increase of absenteeism. Did that actually have an impact on the capacity of the force to do the work that it needed to?

[Chief Peter Sloly]

Thank you, Chair. Through you, I'm not aware of any particular increase in absenteeism. Like every sector of society, we were dealing with the ongoing fallout of the global pandemic. I think the Ottawa Police Service actually did a remarkable job in keeping their members healthy and well during that extended period.

We, like every police service, were extremely worn out from years of resource struggles against exponentially increasing threats, and most of my officers worked, in some cases 18 to 25 days in a row during that particular event, in the coldest snap this city has seen for the majority of it. Sometimes it was as cold as -35°C degrees during the daytime. I have every respect for, and offer thanks to, the members of my service and every other police service that came here and acted professionally, compassionately and ethically.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We will now move to Mr. Vis for up to five minutes, followed by Mrs. Romanado for up to five minutes, and then we'll probably get a minute from Madame Gaudreau, followed by a couple from Ms. Blaney.

[Brad Vis, Conservative, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'll move very quickly with my questions to the witnesses today, just out of time constraints.

Through you, Madam Chair, following up on my colleague's commentary, in questioning, Mr. Sloly, you mentioned “resources” numerous times and said that resources were a big issue. Through you Madam Chair, I believe you used to work in Toronto. Is that correct?

[Chief Peter Sloly]

That's correct.

[Brad Vis, Conservative, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Were you present during—I believe it was—the G7 or G20 protests?

[Chief Peter Sloly]

Toronto hosted the G20 in 2010, yes.

[Brad Vis, Conservative, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Were there more than 1,800 to 2,000 police officers present in Toronto during those protests?

[Chief Peter Sloly]

I don't have the exact numbers, but they were, on scale, over the course of that period, between Muskoka-Huntsville...probably 10,000 assets in and around that area.

[Brad Vis, Conservative, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

You say 10,000 assets, so it wasn't the existing laws in Canada that were preventing you from dealing with the situation. It was the use of resources that you were requesting from other levels of government that prevented you from doing the job you wanted to do at that time.