Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Nov. 1st, 2022

[Stéphane Perrault]

First of all, there's no indication that mail-in ballots had any swing effect on the election in terms of their spread. I'm not aware of that.

When we talk about this figure of 200,000, sometimes people talk about uncounted ballots. These were not uncounted ballots. These were ballots that were either not received or not cast. In some cases, electors came and voted in person. They had applied for a kit but didn't send in their ballot, or it was received late, or it was completed in a manner that the law directs us not to count and to set aside. These are accounted for. They are counted in the same way that at the polls, if a ballot is improperly marked, it is set aside. It doesn't mean it is not counted.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you for clarifying that. As you mentioned, a lot of people have a misunderstanding of these “uncounted” ballots, as they call them.

You brought up misinformation campaigns. We've seen more and more, with social media, the ease with which misinformation about elections can happen. What are some of the other safeguards? In your testimony you mentioned that immediately, once you see something out there, you counter it and say, no, this is in fact the situation, whether it be the dates of elections or how people can vote.

Can you elaborate a little on what else we can be doing in terms of making sure that misinformation is addressed? The problem is that it's so quick. It can go viral very quickly. We can be trying to counter it, saying, no, actually, this is the information, but it's almost not believed...by political parties, by candidates, by Elections Canada. Can you elaborate a bit on what we can be doing together to make sure people have the right information about elections, about where they can vote and when they can vote, to make sure we have maximum participation?

[Stéphane Perrault]

Certainly, Madam Chair.

The language is important. We prefer to use the language “inaccurate” information, because we have no way of knowing whether it's misinformation or disinformation. It's simply not accurate information. We promote the idea that Elections Canada is the trusted source of information about the electoral process. That is something that you as candidates and your parties can do. You can promote that in case of doubt, turn to Elections Canada. That is a very important aspect.

We monitor the environment, especially the social media environment. We have relationships with social media platforms. We monitor 67 platforms in 15 languages. It's quite extensive.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you for that.

Ms. Gaudreau, the floor is yours for six minutes.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

It is impressive to know that you monitor 67 platforms in various languages.

So I am going to frame my question a bit more precisely. Personally, I am concerned more specifically with disinformation and cyber threats. I would like to know what we are lacking for working effectively on prevention.

As an aside, I wonder whether laws at the international level are inadequate to properly regulate Internet service suppliers. There have been several committees that have examined the possible contribution of the Group of Five to legislating in order to target any attempted cyber attack or cyber threat, or even any attempt to spread disinformation.

In your opinion, is this not a tool we should first address before asking everybody to file complaints?

I would ask both witnesses to answer in turn.

[Caroline Simard]

Our office does have tools now it can use to do investigative work. It is important to understand the difference between the various roles. For our part, our role includes compliance and enforcement of the Canada Elections Act. With that in mind, as you know, tools have been created and new provisions added that came into force in 2019, for the most part. We were able to test it quietly.

I would like to add a clarification to the comment that was made. It is important to note that our office has received complaints relating to foreign interference, but no official action was taken.

On your question regarding recommendations, I will let deputy commissioner Chénier clarify that for you by giving you a more precise answer.

[Marc Chénier]

As Ms. Simard stated, new provisions were brought into effect with the enactment of Bill C-76. This strengthened the system and reduced the possibility of foreign money getting into the system.

On the question of foreign interference, our office's powers are limited to the provisions that Parliament has chosen to...

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

What are you lacking, then?

[Marc Chénier]

Mr. Côté, Ms. Simard's predecessor, had recommended that a third component be added to the definition of "undue influence" in the act. Under the act as it now reads, there is undue influence when expenses are incurred to promote or oppose a party or candidate, or when an activity that is carried out in order promote or oppose a party or candidate contravenes a federal or provincial law.

According to Mr. Côté, while it is important to protect freedom of expression in political discourse, the right to freedom of expression and the protection of political dialogue are clearly diminished when foreigners deliberately attempt to sow confusion in people's minds. He had therefore recommended that the act recognize that third way of exercising undue influence: cases where a foreign entity or person sows confusion or intentionally disseminates disinformation.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I am going to frame my question more precisely.

Would it help you if the G7 countries adopted rules that would determine what is acceptable on the platforms and what is not? Here, we are talking about foreign interference in elections, of course, but there could be rules that relate more generally to platforms that do not obtain people's consent or on which child pornography is found, for example.

The objective is to identify the factors that we should focus on in the action we take.

What are your thoughts, Mr. Perrault?

[Stéphane Perrault]

I made several recommendations in that regard in my report.

What we need, first and foremost, is greater transparency on the part of the digital platforms. We have to understand social media, know what their election advertising policies are, and understand how they deal with misinformation about the electoral process. As I said earlier, we monitor social media, and when we see what we consider to be misinformation or to meet the definition of disinformation, we can alert the major platforms. We have protocols in place for doing this. When cases are submitted to those major platforms, they deal with them in accordance with their policies. However, we do not always know their policies. There should at least be transparency. The platforms can make their own policies, but they should have to divulge them. I think that would help to establish trust.

I also have recommendations for strengthening the rules around disinformation, but I would start with transparency, before anything else.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

My next question is relatively simple: why does the commissioner limit herself to the election period for receiving complaints about foreign interference or for monitoring in this regard?

[Caroline Simard]

As the chief electoral officer explained in his remarks, there is no provision of the act that deals with foreign interference. I think you mean, rather, to refer to the provision on undue influence. On that subject, the chief electoral officer had in fact recommended extending the monitoring period, so that it was not limited to the election period. He could tell you about that. My predecessor approved that idea.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

I would like to point out to all witnesses that they can always answer a question in the official language of their choice, regardless of the language in which they are asked the question.

Ms. Blaney, the floor is yours for six minutes.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

I want to thank all of our witnesses here today. It's always important for us to talk about our election process and what we're doing to make sure we're protecting it from foreign threats.

One of the biggest hurdles is one that all of us as elected officials, and those in trusted positions such as yours, know, and that is getting people to trust the system. That's becoming increasingly hard with so much misinformation. We've seen recently, of course, what happened in the U.S., which was really a deliberate attempt to undermine the electoral system and make something that was concrete seem like it wasn't. That was very concerning. I know all of us are watching that and watching the outcomes of what happens when foreign entities abuse misinformation.

To both of you, through the chair, how can we ensure that accurate, reliable information is shared here in Canada so that misinformation isn't taken advantage of by foreign entities?

[Stéphane Perrault]

Madam Chair, it starts with seeding the environment with correct information. A big part of our work in preparing for an election is to build a repository of information about the voting process that the media and the candidates and the parties can turn to in order to understand what the rules and procedures will be.

The second thing is to monitor what is being said out there, to focus on information about the voting process, which is my mandate, and to respond to any misinformation or inaccurate information by pushing out the correct information. If there is the appearance of an attempt to interfere with the reporting process, I can refer that to the commissioner for investigation. My role is to make sure Canadians have correct information about the voting process.

In my recommendations report, I have made some recommendations about expanding the rules on disinformation. I'd be happy to speak more about that.

[Caroline Simard]

From a practical point of view, it is important that you know that in accordance with its role regarding compliance and enforcement of the Canada Elections Act, my office has initiated a dialogue with the platforms. To date, that dialogue has been extremely positive. Some content has been removed form the platforms, at our request, and the evidence has been preserved and communicated. Obviously, I am not talking strictly about foreign interference, but about our investigations in general.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Just to go back to that idea, I guess I'm curious about methods that are being looked at in terms of reporting on which communities are the most vulnerable. What I mean by that, for example, is that indigenous communities, where there is often a sense of distrust already, could be more vulnerable to misinformation around how to vote and what the process is. We also know that new Canadians may not be able to access information through English and French. The other part I would add is that I think rural communities can be under a particular level of concern. Because of their remoteness, often they don't have access to information as readily as other people.

In the work that is being done, how are those communities being considered around those particular vulnerabilities, especially in this area of foreign threats? There is a unique situation there that needs to be addressed. I would love to hear your thoughts on that.

[Stéphane Perrault]

Madam Chair, I think it's a very important point. We know there are communities in Canada that have a knowledge gap about our political institutions. They don't know as much as they perhaps should or could about the voting process and how our institutions work. That makes them more vulnerable. Our outreach activities are geared towards communities that have a knowledge barrier in terms of our voting process.

For example, right now we are working on a pilot project with indigenous communities in northern Ontario to build a civic education program specifically for indigenous Canadians. That's a pilot, and we'll learn from that and see how we can expand it.

We have a range of outreach activities aimed specifically at bridging that gap for certain communities. You're quite right to point out that it makes those Canadians—new Canadians and different groups—more susceptible to being vulnerable to disinformation.

[Caroline Simard]

Just so you know, this is not something included within our mandate of compliance and enforcement.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

We know that election interference is not just a Canadian problem, so I'm wondering from what other jurisdictions Elections Canada is learning lessons about protecting the integrity of elections, and what lessons are being learned.

[Stéphane Perrault]

Yes, again, Madam Chair, that is a good question.

We work with international partners. One of our good partners is Australia. They had in their most recent election a registry of misinformation. That registry would publish the false statements about the electoral process, and people could refer to that. They felt it was a valuable addition to their program. We're looking into something similar for our elections, so we are exchanging information. At the end of the month, I will be attending a meeting of the OAS—the Organization of American States. I expect to meet people there from Brazil, from the United States and from other jurisdictions in the Americas to deal with these issues.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

It's Mr. Calkins next, followed by Ms. Sahota.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Confirm for me if you can, Mr. Perrault, that approximately 17 million people voted in the last federal election. Is that correct?

[Stéphane Perrault]

That's correct.