Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Nov. 1st, 2022

[Michelle Tessier]

Certainly. As we've mentioned—and I believe there will be members of the SITE task force appearing later this week—we, as well as other government partners such as CSE, Global Affairs Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, participate in SITE. It is really a combination of all our intelligence that is used to inform the critical panel if there is any type of foreign interference we feel could potentially affect the integrity of the overall election. In this case, there was not, but that is the work we do on a constant basis. The SITE group briefs the panel on a regular basis in terms of the incidents we see during an electoral period.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you for that clarification.

We can probably infer that there are potential threats in our electoral process. It's just that they're not going to impact or make a material difference on the election integrity. Is that correct?

[Michelle Tessier]

That's correct. As we've mentioned, we see activity of foreign interference or attempts at foreign interference in terms of trying to influence, but not enough to have met the threshold of impacting the overall electoral integrity.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you. I'll go to Ms. Tayyeb now.

Many social companies have signed what's called the declaration on electoral integrity, which, among other things, commits them to address MDM, as you call it.

We know that algorithmic transparency is an issue; it's been talked about quite often. The algorithms they use predominantly originate, as far as I understand it, from U.S., i.e. foreign-based, companies. What impact do you think this has, Ms. Tayyeb, in terms of being considered foreign influence on an election?

[Alia Tayyeb]

We work very closely with social media companies all around the world. We did so in a collaborative fashion as part of the SITE task force as well.

In terms of addressing your question about the U.S. origin of those algorithms, we definitely work with U.S. companies. As well, we will advise them of any information or any interference we suspect to have taken place. We have a very collaborative relationship with them. They've been very open to addressing those concerns. As you pointed out, they have very robust policies in and around proper use of those platforms, and we've found them very responsive to that.

Maybe I'll just clarify. When we here at CSE are looking at foreign interference and foreign influence activities, we're mostly looking at state actor activities. It's not to say that a foreign organization couldn't also be engaged in such activities. In the case of the U.S., we've found very strong partnerships with those companies, and we've been able to work with them in a collaborative fashion.

Thank you.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

One recent concern that stands out in my mind is Canada Proud tweeting @ElonMusk, hours after he became the owner of Twitter, to ask about Bill C-11, which we know was the subject of significant disinformation in the last election.

What role do social media companies have in being responsible actors during and leading up to elections?

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

I'm sorry. Yes, I was directing that to you, Ms. Tayyeb.

[Alia Tayyeb]

I'll leave some room for Michelle to answer, in case she has anything else to add.

We think they play a very strong role in this domain. As practitioners in the security and intelligence community, it's important for us not to be seen to be interfering at all in what is healthy discourse, even when we don't like it. We definitely see activities that are not foreign state directed as being well within the purview of responsible industry to take care of. Certainly, our role in that is to advise them and provide them the information they need in order to protect themselves and to protect their audiences, but we absolutely believe that they are well placed to address those threats.

Thank you.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thanks.

Ms. Tessier, would you like to add anything?

[Michelle Tessier]

No, I find Alia answered quite well.

I would just reiterate that we work in a democracy. Managing social media, knowing that it is very much a tool used by foreign actors, is, of course, of concern, and we encourage awareness and liaison with these platforms so that they recognize foreign interference and are able to act on it.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Would you say, Ms. Tayyeb, that the majority of the MDM that's out there is propagated through social media?

[Alia Tayyeb]

I would say that it certainly is a very large vector we have in society these days. It's not exclusive to social media, but certainly, since the very robust propagation of social media throughout our society, we've seen an increase in those types of activities.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Ms. Gaudreau, the floor is yours for six minutes.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being here. I am learning a lot from this testimony.

You know that just before you, we heard from the commissioner of Canada elections, the deputy commissioner, and the chief electoral officer. I asked them a question that I would like to ask you now, and I will have more after that. This is about the present legislative situation.

The monitoring you do is crucial. It is not only preventive, but also remedial; we don't want to have to get to that point, but, things being what they are, it is a possibility.

Are the laws in our country inadequate to regulate Internet service providers and online platforms? That is a subject we have been discussing for several years. There have been talks and consultations on this subject among the Group of Five, but we have not yet heard anything about any common legislative action being taken by the members of the Group of Five or the G7, for example.

What should we do to establish the priorities among our efforts in this regard, so that you could do your job better?

I would like to hear comments from both witnesses in turn.

[Michelle Tessier]

We are constantly reviewing the powers and tools we have. As I said earlier, the technology is evolving, as are the laws and the complexity of the environment. We are in constant discussions with other departments or agencies of the Government of Canada and with our allies to understand what might be useful for this country.

Obviously, we respect the fact that decisions relating to legislation and changes to policies belong to the political sphere. We simply send our recommendations or opinions. That said, we are always on the lookout for anything that could be useful for us here in Canada, based on experiences that other countries may have had.

[Alia Tayyeb]

For my part, I am going to answer your question in English, in order to be more precise.

I agree with what Michelle said. Our authorities are in a constant state of evolution. We have very robust engagement with partners across government in order to make sure they have the information we collect with respect to foreign threats to Canadian electoral processes but also in terms of manipulation of societal dialogue.

That said, regulation in that vein is not the purview of CSE. We'd be happy to provide advice to our government colleagues, but we ourselves don't have a part in the regulation of telecommunications or social media.

Thank you.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

You have given me some reassurance, nonetheless, when it comes to election interference. Certainly it is concerning to hear about malicious acts, clandestine activities, or even flattery.

Does what we see today in terms of cyber security and cyber threats give you cause for concern for the coming decades, if we look at it from a global perspective?

[Alia Tayyeb]

If I may, I will answer that question first.

From a CSE perspective, certainly we see that our adversaries are very well resourced. They're dedicated to their strategic interests. We have a lot of work to do to ensure that we can catch up and that we can continue to both identify and counter the threats they pose.

That said, we have a very robust set of authorities, at least at CSE, as they relate to a foreign intelligence mandate, our cybersecurity mandate, and furthermore, more recently, in 2019, we were given the authority to conduct both defensive and active cyber operations, which I think added significantly to the toolset Canada has in order to defend against these threats.

We also have very robust partnerships with our Canadian colleagues in the security and intelligence community and across government, in addition to robust partnerships with our Five Eyes and additional colleagues across the world.

I think we're well positioned to defend against these threats, but we need to make sure we are constantly evolving to match the threat. As you know, the cyber domain is increasing exponentially, and it is incumbent on us to ensure that we are constantly reviewing our authorities and our tactics in order to make sure we can continue to defend Canadians.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

In short, the answer is neither yes nor no; the important thing is to adapt to what is coming.

Ms. Tessier, can you tell us quickly what your thoughts are?

[Michelle Tessier]

I would add that a lot of information continues to circulate on the Internet. People have to protect themselves and be suspicious of the emails they receive. People have to stay up to date on threats and pay attention to the information they publish on the Internet themselves, to avoid making themselves vulnerable. It is always a question of education, because the actors use very sophisticated techniques that are constantly evolving.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Ms. Blaney, the floor is yours for six minutes.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Of course, I thank the folks who are here testifying. I really appreciate the work you do. I'm learning a lot today.

As we're having this discussion, I can't help but reflect on how important it is that voters and institutions be protected from any threat to democracy, and how important it is to continue that work. I thank you for being part of it.

I will come to Ms. Tayyeb first and go to Ms. Tessier if she has anything to add.

In a July 2021 update on threats to democracy, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security wrote that between 2015 and 2020, cyber-threat activity was directed at voters more often than at political parties in elections. Based on that information, how do you think an everyday Canadian should understand this? We're hearing that these threats are becoming more and more sophisticated. What sorts of actions should voters take to ensure that they are viewing correct information about democracy in Canada?

[Alia Tayyeb]

It's an excellent question, and it's really core to how we see this threat, which is to really do our utmost to ensure that Canadians are aware of the threat, that they're aware of the tactics that are used, and that they know what to expect when they are viewing material online. That is, in large measure, why we've published cyber-threats to democratic institutions in previous years. The 2021 one was, I believe, our third.

Our first line of defence is to ensure that Canadians have as much information as possible about the tactics that are used and the adversaries that we name, specific adversaries we see as most prolific in this space. We outline the tactics they use, including spreading disinformation about the political process, sowing divisive seeds in our social media and casting aspersions on the democratic process as a whole.

We feel it's important that Canadians receive as much information about that as possible. We regularly reach out to Canadians, through either media releases or Twitter, in order to emphasize those messages as much as possible.

Thank you very much.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

I appreciate that, but I also represent in my riding a lot of rural and remote communities that often have limited access to services. I'm just curious if there are any particular strategies or recommendations that you're providing for different community groups—rural communities, remote communities that have limited access to connectivity—or looking at different groups across our country that are more marginalized. I'm just wondering if there are specific strategies or recommendations around that, especially in terms of promoting democracy. We know that sometimes these groups are the groups that don't participate in democracy as often or as fulsomely. I'm just curious about that process.

[Alia Tayyeb]

It's an excellent question. It's one that we talk a lot about at CSE and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: how to reach more Canadians, how to increase the reach of our media campaigns and how to ensure we're reaching communities across Canada, including remote and northern communities. We are developing ways to do that in a better way, but we realize there is a lot of work to do in that regard.

Thank you.