Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I would like to apologize to my colleague Mr. Duncan. He has to wait for his turn to speak, but I am very much looking forward to hearing the points he has to make.
I would also, in turn, like to congratulate my colleagues Mr. Gerretsen, Ms. Romanado, Mr. Long and certainly Ms. Vandenbeld on their interventions. I hope I have not forgotten anyone. What they raised was very enlightening.
We are currently debating the amendment proposed by my colleague Mr. Turnbull to amend Mr. Cooper's motion. Like my colleague from Kingston and the Islands, I am vehemently opposed to the spirit of the motion for exactly the same reasons he mentioned.
In our country, which has a parliamentary system based on the Westminster system, ministerial responsibility has a long tradition. Mr. Gerretsen quoted remarks made by Mr. Poilievre in an interview with CBC when he was in government. Mr. Poilievre had mentioned that this tradition has been around for 300 years. Until the current government came to power in 2015, this tradition had only been broken once. Unfortunately, since 2015, in the seven and a half years that we have been in government, there have been two occasions when ministerial assistants have appeared before a parliamentary committee. Even though this has only happened three times in over 300 years, I am concerned that we are opening the door to political assistants appearing. Yet, I hope that this will always remain something quite exceptional.
There is a reason why ministerial responsibility has become a tradition. This is based on experience in various parliamentary systems around the world. It has been concluded that those who are accountable are the elected officials, the public servants and perhaps even some Canadians, not the people who work for politicians. These people did not put their names on a ballot. They are simply acting on behalf of their boss, who is an elected official, a parliamentarian. This is one of the many fundamental principles that make our parliamentary system work.
As M. Poilievre said in that 2012 or 2013 interview, it is not political assistants who answer questions during oral question period in the House of Commons, but their bosses. Similarly, we don't expect to have these people appear in committee to answer questions. We can invite their bosses, and that's fair and important. However, inviting the assistants, that is not done.
That is why we are having this extended debate today, if I can use that euphemism for filibuster. I hope that common sense will prevail among my colleagues in the opposition and that they will see to it that this part of the motion is withdrawn. Then we can move on, or at least talk about other aspects of foreign interference, which is taking place not only in the political world, but also in the academic, economic and social world. These issues are very important. So, I hope that we will have the chance to deepen our knowledge in this regard, to better understand, better act and thus prevent these kinds of undesirable interventions in Canadian society.
I spent much of the weekend reading the “Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar”. I see similarities between what we are experiencing now and what happened in the case of Mr. Arar. I want to emphasize that the damage caused by the so-called leaks is damaging the reputation not only of individuals, but of an entire community.
You may think I am exaggerating, but in reading about this commission of inquiry that ran from 2004 to 2006, something deeply saddened me. Unfortunately, I did not write down the page where I read this, but I will report it from memory. In speaking with those close to Mr. Arar, Mr. O'Connor learned that one of his great disappointments was the unwarranted smearing of his reputation. Mr. Arar said that after his release from Syria, after the year of hell in which he was tortured for fabricated reasons, he was repeatedly told by Canadians who passed him on the streets of Ottawa that they were in solidarity with him and that what he had suffered was unacceptable. What touched him deeply and saddened him was that some members of the Muslim community had been afraid to express their solidarity with him because these unwarranted leaks to the media demonized the entire Muslim community and these people did not want to be seen as being too close to him.
We can very well understand all that has happened to this community. Much more than regrettable, it is unacceptable.
We need to not only save ourselves a little embarrassment, but use a lot of judgment before deciding to publish unverified or verifiable information from so-called leaks without having other sources that could corroborate it.
I am a man of a certain age. In my youth, there was Watergate. Information had leaked out, and I think the journalists who received it had the best instincts and applied the best standards of the journalistic profession: they used that information as a basis for seeking independent confirmation, before deciding to publish that information.
It comes back to what all of my colleagues have raised and what we heard during the national security experts' appearance. They said that intelligence is often a matter of rumour. Indeed, we may hear someone say something or receive information from our allies. People are bound to be looking for that information. Sometimes you can see partial information in a report, like a snapshot. However, intelligence is gained through analysis, through the overall picture that can be painted after adding other information and placing it in context in a systematic way. Sometimes this is done by taking information from our allies who make up the Five Eyes alliance, that is, the countries with which we exchange information freely. These are great democracies of the world with whom we exchange an enormous amount of information, because we share the same values.
So sometimes people have had brief access to partial information and they pass it on to the media. I understand the reasons why journalists publish this information. However, I think it is much better when they follow the same journalistic standards that were applied during Watergate, when reporters sought a second source to confirm the information.
Otherwise, when people have only a small detail or glimpse of a piece of information, their imagination leads them to paint a whole picture of the situation that may not be well-founded or accurate. They may even imagine all sorts of falsehoods that will nevertheless have very real repercussions on individuals and on an entire community.
I know that there are Chinese Canadians who feel targeted, who are on the lookout and who are on the defensive because of all the things you read in the newspapers. I remind you that this is based on partial information that is certainly not impartial. It is partial and biased information, I should say. It is terribly unfortunate, because the consequences will be enormous. It all saddens me so much.
As Ms. Blaney said, we shouldn't put all the blame on journalists. If some publish just anything because they want to be the first to talk about an issue, that's their business. But my expectations of all of us as parliamentarians are much higher. Indeed, I expect us not to go off in every direction after receiving information that is not true or confirmed.
I take my hat off to the committee, which at least invited experts and responsible people from the various agencies involved to present information to us. What did they tell us? They told us at least four things. First of all, they described to us how they collect all this information. They also told us about the importance of not relying on partial information. You have to look at the big picture if you want to do a more accurate analysis. That's how you get to the analysis.
In all of this, there is one thing that is not mentioned. I personally don't have the security clearance to receive top secret level information, but everyone I've talked to who has been in sensitive positions in this area has said that context is very important to paint a picture. Often, they can tell that the information they receive is probably true. In other cases, they know that the information is not very reliable. Sometimes they have no idea if the information is true or not, but they take it into account because it comes from one of their sources. That said, the stories we read in the newspapers, after so-called leaks, did not include any such assessments. So we have no way of assessing the relevance of the material selectively reported by some journalists after these information leaks.
At the end of the day, I'm really saddened that we're in the situation now where this kind of investigation is being called for.
He was the one who chaired the commission of inquiry set up because of a huge injustice suffered by Mr. Arar.
It all started on September 26, 2002. I am sure that day is etched in Mr. Arar's memory, as well as in the memories of his family members and many Canadians. On that day, while transiting through John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, Mr. Arar was intercepted and then detained by U.S. authorities for 12 days. He was then sent against his will to Syria, where he was tortured for over 12 months.
Commissioner O'Connor then launched an investigation, much of which focused on leaked information. After months and months of investigation, he wrote this in his report:
The evidence shows that over an extended period of time classified information about Mr. Arar was selectively leaked to the media by Canadian officials. The leaks date from July 2003, before Mr. Arar's return to Canada, to July 2005, during the course of this Inquiry.
So, even during the commission of inquiry, there were these kinds of leaks of classified information.
The commissioner continued:
I am satisfied that the issue of leaks falls within my mandate, as it relates directly to Mr. Arar and to the conduct of Canadian officials. While it is not my role to draw legal conclusions about possible breaches of Canada's Privacy Act, Security of Information Act or Criminal Code, I am satisfied that I should report on the nature and purpose of the leaks and the impact they had on Mr. Arar. Perhaps not surprisingly, the identity of the Canadian officials responsible for the leaks remains unknown despite the fact that several administrative investigations have been conducted by the relevant government departments or agencies into the sources of the leaks. There is also an ongoing criminal investigation into a leak of information to Juliet O'Neill, a reporter for the Ottawa Citizen. Although there appears to be little cause for optimism that investigations will ultimately determine the source of any of the leaks, I do not consider that my mandate directs me to pursue such investigations. To do so as part of a public inquiry would be a huge endeavour and determining the source of the leaks is not sufficiently linked to my mandate to be warranted. That said, I do not consider myself constrained in reporting on the leaks by the fact that the specific sources are unknown. The evidence at the Inquiry is more than sufficient to enable me to comment on the origins of the leaks in general terms, their purpose and the impact they had on Mr. Arar and his family.
Madam Chair, I will give you the English version of what I am reporting. If it is possible, I would like to ask the clerks to pass it on to the interpreters. Our interpreters work very hard and do an exceptional job. I think that if they had the English version of what I am about to quote in front of them, it would make their job easier. I think that's important, if we all want to do our jobs well.
I will continue:
Criminal investigations are generally kept confidential in order to ensure fairness to individuals subject to investigation, who may never be charged, and to protect the ongoing effectiveness of the investigations. There is an additional rationale for confidentiality in the case of national security investigations: the need to protect classified information. Nonetheless, the fact that an investigation is being conducted may sometimes become known, generating interest on the part of the media and the public. In those instances, government authorities with access to classified or confidential information are in a position to sway public opinion by selectively divulging information to the media. Because the public cannot know the full picture, leaks of selected information can be misleading [...]
I will repeat that:
Because the public cannot know the full picture, leaks of selected information can be misleading and unfair to individuals who may be subjects of the investigation or persons of interest to the investigation. This is especially so when the leakor adds a spin to the leaked information to get his or her message out. Leaking classified information is clearly wrong and a serious abuse of trust. It can also be a dangerous practice if the information is subject to a legitimate national security confidentiality claim. Leaking classified information may harm national security, international relations or national defence. This case is an example of how some government officials, over an extended period of time, used the media to put a spin on an affair and unfairly damage a person's reputation. Given the content of the released information, only individuals with access to classified information could have been responsible for the leaks. The obvious inference is that this was done to paint a picture they considered favourable either to the Canadian government or to themselves. It is worth bearing in mind that leaks of government information can have different aims. In some cases, the leakor is seeking to disclose what he or she perceives to be government wrongdoing that would not otherwise come to light. Other leaks, however, seek to advance the interests of the Canadian government or of government officials, in some cases by disparaging the reputation of another. This was the case with some of the leaks concerning Mr. Arar, which were aimed at tarnishing Mr. Arar's reputation and undermining his credibility. Some were likely intended to persuade the Government of Canada not to call a public inquiry. While most leaks likely involve a breach of some form of confidentiality, using confidential information to manipulate public opinion in favour of the Canadian government's interests or the interests of the leakor of the information is obviously more egregious. This is particularly so when third parties are targeted in a way that is unfairly prejudicial to them. Because it can be so difficult to counter this type of leak, one can only hope that some of the public and the media are sophisticated enough to perceive the reality of what is occurring and to reserve judgment until there is a fair and transparent disclosure of all of the relevant facts.
Moreover, I would never have the necessary context here, around this table, to judge and assess whether or not that information is relevant. Why? Because we don't have the necessary security clearance.
On the other hand, what is an appropriate place for that discussion? Clearly, one such place is the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Why is that an appropriate place? Because the MPs who are members of that committee have the necessary security clearance to access all the information that has not been redacted. So they are able to accurately review the situation, make an appropriate assessment of what they are reviewing, and determine the accuracy of the information.
Our committee is not the place for those discussions.
To the Canadians watching us on television, I would like to point out something that all MPs know: any inquiry to get to the bottom of an issue, regardless of the subject, must have two components. One is a public inquiry, during which publicly available information can be discussed without impacting our intelligence agencies, our institutions or our allies. At the same time, we have to think of the hard-working men and women who in some cases put their lives at risk to gather certain information. Any discussion of such matters is always behind closed doors. Everyone knows that.
In spite of this, complete transparency is being demanded and Canadians who are not following these events closely are led to believe that everything will be disclosed. That is utter nonsense though. That has to be said. If we did that, we would not be living up to our fiduciary duty as MPs. I hope everyone takes seriously their duty to always ensure that Canadians are well protected. That is our basic duty as elected officials.
That is the challenge. Will we tell the truth or mislead Canadians by claiming that we will get to the bottom of things, while knowing very well that we cannot disclose classified information? We simply do not have the right to do that. That would be irresponsible.
Furthermore, perhaps too much information is classified or considered secret. That is indeed something we could discuss. That said, as long as we are not changing the rules, we will be in the same situation as we are today. Disclosing classified information would be a violation of the Criminal Code and we could be fined. In so doing, we would certainly be jeopardizing our seats in Parliament.
When journalists ask me if I am opposed to a public inquiry, I say I would be very glad to have one, but there would have to be two parts, like the O'Connor commission into the events relating to Maher Arar.
Ten days ago, the Prime Minister told Canadians that he would be appointing an independent special rapporteur who would suggest a better way of proceeding. I think that is the best approach. That person will examine, on a prima facie basis, everything we need to do to get to the bottom of what happened. He will determine the best course of action and suggest that to the Prime Minister, who has agreed to immediately disclose the results of that review and follow all the recommendations of the independent special rapporteur.
We have a good solution before us and I hope my colleagues will ultimately admit that this course of action is entirely reasonable and principled. In so doing, I hope that we, as members of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, can finally move on to matters within our mandate which we can investigate in accordance with our skills and abilities.
We have to remember that our committee has other very important matters to consider. I am thinking in particular of the federal electoral boundaries commission reports. This is an important and non-partisan aspect of Canada's democratic system. We have the fiduciary duty to work on that. I hope we will be able to continue our work.
In reading Mr. O'Connor's report, I was struck by certain elements. I would like to quote a few passages, because I think we need to bear them in mind as we attempt to find a solution to this impasse.
By way of context, this report was written by Commissioner Dennis O'Connor, who was a member of Canada's judiciary.
I know that front-page headlines are appealing. My colleague from Kingston and the Islands noted that, for some people, they are a way to appeal for funds from the public. We have to ask at what cost, though. The reputation of certain individuals has really been tarnished. Regardless of their guilt or innocence, this is not right.
This report is a good warning to us all. We should recognize that there are certain lines we should not cross, but we are in the process of doing just that. As I said a few seconds ago, we have to consider what the cost is.
I will continue reading from section 5.2 of the report:
The Inquiry heard evidence of at least eight media stories containing leaked information about Mr. Arar and/or the investigation that involved him. Some of the leaks sought to portray Mr. Arar as an individual who had been involved in terrorist activities such as training in Afghanistan, had named other “terrorists” while imprisoned in Syria, and was “a very bad guy” and “not a virgin.” The sources of the leaked information were both human (unnamed government officials) and documentary (classified or confidential documents).
Justice O'Connor then lists all the instances in which these leaks truly affected Mr. Arar's reputation.
The first leak occurred in the summer of 2003, before Mr. Arar's return to Canada.
I would add here that he was returning from Syria, where he had been tortured. Torture is never justifiable, and his detention is Syria was unjust. Let me continue:
[This was] a time when the public campaign to obtain his release from Syrian custody had intensified. An unidentified official was quoted as saying that Mr. Arar was a “very bad guy” who had received military training at an al‑Qaeda base [this was patently false]. The article also noted that the unnamed government official had refused to provide further details, attributing the need for secrecy to ongoing intelligence operations [once again, this was patently false]. The apparent purpose behind this leak is not attractive: to attempt to influence public opinion against Mr. Arar at a time when his release from imprisonment in Syria was being sought by the Government of Canada, including the Prime Minister. Around the time of Mr. Arar's return to Canada in October 2003, four more leaks were reported. On October 9, 2003, the Toronto Star quoted “an official involved in the case” as saying that American officials had contacted their Canadian counterparts when Mr. Arar's name had been noted on a passenger flight list (referring to Mr. Arar's arrival in New York on September 26, 2002). According to the unnamed source, conversations had taken place between American and Canadian officials about Mr. Arar, in particular about whether he had travelled to Afghanistan and whether he could be charged if returned to Canada. The next day, October 10, 2003, an article in theGlobe and Mail cited unnamed Canadian government sources as saying that Mr. Arar had been “roughed up,” but not tortured, while in detention in Syria.
Once again, the content of these leaks was patently false. The information was published without confirmation from a second source, which is the minimum required before deciding to publish such information. In this case, there was a serious impact on the physical and mental health of a Canadian. This infuriates me. The report goes on to say:
The latter comment that Mr. Arar had not been tortured is consistent with the reaction of several Canadian officials on Mr. Arar's return to Canada: they attempted to downplay the seriousness of the ordeal he had endured in Syria. The implication in this regard is that, if Canadian officials were in any way involved in what happened to Mr. Arar, it would be better from their standpoint if he had not been seriously mistreated.
Once again, this is infuriating. To continue:
On October 23, 2003, the CTV 11 o'clock news broadcast a segment quoting “senior government officials in various departments” as saying that Mr. Arar had provided information to the Syrians about al‑Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and cells operating in Canada. Mr. Arar was alleged to have implicated other Canadians in extremist activities. Again, the indirect suggestion was that Mr. Arar himself had been involved in extremist terrorist activities.
This is completely false.
As noted in an Ottawa Citizen article published on October 25, 2003, the leaks about what Mr. Arar might or might not have said to his Syrian interrogators were “particularly worrisome” and potentially very dangerous, not only for the Arar family, but also for the individuals allegedly named by Mr. Arar and still in detention in countries known to practice torture. The allegation that he had denounced others would also have been harmful for Mr. Arar psychologically. As noted by Dr. Donald Payne, a member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture, “it would be difficult for anyone to be pointed out as a betrayer of people, to be falsely pointed out as a betrayer of people.” Even Mr. Arar's first meeting with DFAIT officials in Ottawa on October 29, 2003 did not remain confidential despite an understanding before the meeting that what Mr. Arar said would not be disclosed until he chose to divulge it. On October 30,CBC Newsworld reported that Mr. Arar had met with Minister Graham and had told DFAIT officials that he had been tortured while detained in Syria. Although this disclosure appears to have breached a confidence, it obviously did not discredit Mr. Arar, as several others did. In the press conference held in Ottawa, on November 4, 2003, Mr. Arar told his story at length and described the torture he had suffered in Syria. He strenuously denied all allegations that he was implicated in terrorism or associated with people involved in terrorist activities. He also called for a public inquiry into his case. Four days after the press conference, on November 8, 2003, the most notorious of the Arar leaks occurred. Information from classified documents was published in the Ottawa Citizen, in a lengthy article by Juliet O'Neill entitled “Canada’s dossier on Maher Arar: The existence of a group of Ottawa men with alleged ties to al‑Qaeda is at the root of why the government opposes an inquiry into the case.” This front-page article contained an unprecedented amount of previously confidential information, including a detailed description of the RCMP Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) office in Ottawa, a place not accessible to the public, and specific reference to the “main target” of investigation, Abdullah Almalki. It indicated that “one of the leaked documents” contained information about what Mr. Arar had allegedly told the Syrian Military Intelligence during the first few weeks of his incarceration and then went on to describe this information in detail. The article moreover referred to some aspects of the RCMP's investigation of Mr. Arar and cited a “security source” for the proposition that a suspected Ottawa-based al‑Qaeda cell was at the root of opposition by the Canadian government to a full public inquiry into Mr. Arar's case [...]
These leaks, which were not validated, caused a great deal of harm. We are in exactly the same kind of situation as in the Arar affair. We must learn from our past mistakes.
When it is suggested that we become part of the problem, that we react on all fronts to information that is unverified, if not denied by the officials who appeared before this committee at the start of the month, that is a mistake and leads nowhere.
Throughout this report, Justice O'Connor indicates that the purpose of these leaks was probably to serve the interests of those who thought they had the truth about Mr. Arar. Yet, they were proved wrong. Why did those people act that way? As our witnesses told us two weeks ago, those people only saw part of the whole picture that was revealed in the information to which the officials had access.
We must do everything possible to avoid past errors. Those errors had a terrible impact on Mr. Arar. We mustn't do the same thing to other people when we have no proof that they did anything wrong or were disloyal to Canada. Let us save our energy instead to go after those who want to harm our country, and go after those who are responsible or guilty.
There is a very important section in this report. It will not take too long. I will read out the part about the effect of the leaks on Mr. Arar. I referred to this when I began speaking, and for the interpreters, it is in Section 5.4 of the report. Justice O'Connor wrote:
The leaks had deleterious effects on Mr. Arar's reputation, psychological state, and ability to find employment. The impact on an individual's reputation of being called a terrorist in the national media is obviously severe. As I have said elsewhere in this report, labels, even inaccurate ones, have an unfortunate tendency to stick. While the Inquiry did not hear from Mr. Arar directly about the personal impact of the leaks, Dr. Donald Payne testified that, generally, such leaks would have a traumatic psychological effect on someone in Mr. Arar's position and would carry a likelihood of re‑traumatization.
Before I continue reading, I should note that Professor Stephen Toope, who is mentioned, is a well-known Canadian academic. He was the president of the University of British Columbia. He was also vice-chancellor of Cambridge University, in the United Kingdom. It is very rare for a person who is not British to hold that position, which says a lot about Stephen Toope's excellent reputation. Let me continue.
In addition, Professor Toope, the fact-finder I appointed to report on Mr. Arar's treatment in Syria, made specific findings on the impact of the leaks. Professor Toope reported that the leaks had caused further psychological damage to Mr. Arar:
[Mr. Arar] was particularly disturbed by certain “leaks” from sources allegedly inside the Canadian Government that cast him in a negative light. These events compounded his sense of injustice dating from his detention and torture in Syria. All his advisers that I interviewed emphasised that Mr. Arar was “devastated” by these leaks. Some described him as “hysterical.” He simply could not control his emotions, and it took many hours of constant conversation to calm him down each time new information surfaced in the press that he thought to be misleading or unfair. Professor Toope also linked the leaks to Mr. Arar's feeling of social isolation from the Muslim community: [Mr. Arar] told me that he is disappointed with the reaction of many Muslims to him and his story. Whereas other Canadians sometimes come up to him on the street to share a sense of solidarity, most Muslims stay far away from him. Mr. Arar thought that this distancing was exacerbated after the press “leaks” mentioned previously. Finally, Professor Toope described the economic effect of Mr. Arar's ordeal on the Arar family as “close to catastrophic.” Inasmuch as the leaks have painted Mr. Arar as a terrorist, it is reasonable to infer that they have contributed to his ongoing difficulty in finding gainful employment in his field. Lastly, I note that Mr. Arar's time in Syria deprived him of something most Canadians take for granted: “control over the truth about oneself.” The fact that this deprivation continued after Mr. Arar's return to Canada—this time because of leaks of confidential information by government officials—is both unfortunate and deeply unfair.
I am not accusing anyone here of treating others unfairly. I know that we MPs around the table are all trying to do the right thing and protect our country's interests, and those of our fellow Canadians, of course.
We had a warning in 2002‑03. We have to resist the temptation of getting sidetracked by all the courses of action suggested. There are certainly rumours that are unconfirmed or that are from a single source. Let us hope the information provided by the sources is true. I hope the sources are not reporting false information.
Quoting small bits of information does not constitute intelligence. Intelligence is based on the analysis of the entire situation. Intelligence agency officials have all said that what was leaked to the media does not come from them. That should concern us. Moreover, even if the information is true, it does not provide an overview of the situation.
Finally, as Mr. Gerretsen, my colleague from Kingston and the Islands, mentioned, the fact that the RCMP is not investigating the information reported in the media shows us that the review of the entire picture does not reveal anything.
If that is the case, why is it that we committee members and MPs, who are committed to protecting our fellow Canadians, can be tricked and drawn into a situation, the only result of which is to tarnish the reputation of our fellow Canadians and of an entire community?
I do not know why we would go down that path. It makes no sense. If we continue along that path, I suggest that we proceed very carefully. At least, we should start with the assessment of the intelligence experts who shared their conclusions and stated that this is not something we should do.
I will now return to another aspect of the “Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar”.
People might be tired of listening to me talk about this, but it is essential that we recognize that we are playing with fire.