Procedure and House Affairs Committee on April 25th, 2023

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Would you say that artificial intelligence is exponentially increasing the threat of countries intervening in our elections?

[Steve Waterhouse]

The use of artificial intelligence is certainly going to have a multiplier effect, but at this stage, the technology is in the embryonic stage. The use of that technology will raise the danger of fake messages being generated, but with such verbal and visual authenticity that it will be very difficult to distinguish the real from the fake.

We should perhaps consider a way of authenticating the source of the message, to confirm its official provenance. The Government of Canada is already doing this with the use of public key infrastructure, in which the stamp on an electronic certificate proves the authenticity of the message. So there are technical methods that could help.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

You have answered my question.

I sound a bit rude, and I apologize, but I have a lot of questions to ask you.

We talk a lot about foreign influence. We presume it is carried out from other countries, but we see that there are numerous diplomats from a certain communist regime posted to Canada. If foreign agents are operating out of Canada using their computer systems, is it possible to identify them as foreign agents?

[Steve Waterhouse]

There is no way, because it can also be an agent operating from their country of birth, but who pretends that they are in Canada or the United States. This could make it very difficult to geoblock the source of the information if it is in an allied country but the message is fake. So technology complicates management of the message source.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

In its departmental plans, Elections Canada announces that the organization will be making increasing use of cloud computing, in particular for lists of electors and polling stations. Do you think Canada is ready? Is this an additional threat to the impermeability and protection of our democratic system?

[Steve Waterhouse]

To verify that the use of cloud computing complies with Government of Canada standards, regardless of the company hired, Elections Canada had to do a threat and risk assessment, with the assistance of the Communications Security Establishment, which is Canada's technical authority in the area of information security. Having witnessed the security measures adopted in each case, I can say that the necessary level of security has been met, particularly when it comes to management of lists of electors.

Once the information is in the cloud, I believe it is secure. However, the way the people who have to handle it work is another matter.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Assume that 200 polling stations are going to have access to this cloud: the risk arises once the information leaves the cloud and is transmitted to all those people, is that right?

[Steve Waterhouse]

The risk is higher, yes. Remember the good old days when people received voters' lists in their mailbox. Not much could be done to control what they did with that information, at the time. Today, a lot of crime, even fraud, can be committed with that information, which is easier to access.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Why do we have to be more suspicious of applications owned by hostile regimes?

[Steve Waterhouse]

The foreign states that certain applications come from and that own them can use them in several ways as vectors of influence, particularly by using messages for their own benefit that they send to all kinds of people, going as far as to target very specific diasporas. For example, TikTok and Douyin in China generate educational information intended for North America and the west in general, and for the rest of the world.

TikTok is used for entertainment, which means that people get this information via the vector used: 15- to 20‑second messages. People will stay connected to this medium and stay permanently connected to the application. No matter what is served up to them, people will consume the information, which means they don't change. A psychologist could perhaps confirm the point I am making. So there is a danger that a message might be used to influence a person negatively.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Mr. Waterhouse.

Mr. Fergus, the floor is yours.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being here today. Their testimony was fascinating and I think they have given us a lot of invaluable information.

Ms. Grondin-Robillard and Mr. Bordeleau, I am mainly going to address you, but don't hesitate to add your two cents, Mr. Waterhouse.

In your studies on Russian influence in the 2016 American elections, what lessons should we learn from that interference in the era of social media?

[Laurence Grondin-Robillard]

Thank you for the question.

I think there are a lot of lessons to be learned in general. In my master's thesis, I mainly observed the extent to which no housecleaning had been done. There are huge numbers of publications from the Internet Research Agency, from Russia, still circulating. So there are still traces of that interference, and visual content from those publications was still being reposted on Instagram. In spite of the fact that the election was over, it lived on in the discourse. That is still the case today, since we can find these arguments or discussions when we talk about American politics or issues.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Is this information still having an influence on subsequent elections?

[Laurence Grondin-Robillard]

It influences American politics, in general, since it contains disinformation and misinformation that directly affects how we perceive, for example, Trump, the American army, or certain rights like abortion. So the housecleaning has not been done. It should have been done by Meta, but that has not been the case.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Mr. Bordeleau, can you briefly give us your views on that?

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

I think it's a lesson about oversight and politicization of information in connection with foreign interference.

This was the first time that information about foreign interference in the American electoral process was really brought to light in the public sphere. However, that information was used for political purposes inside the country itself. So the damage was twofold: first because of the Russian interference, and second because of the American political actors themselves, who used that information about foreign interference as a political weapon, attacking the public's confidence in the democratic process.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

What you're saying is very interesting. Is that happening at present in Canada?

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

Since November, I would say that is the case.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Ms. Grondin-Robillard, what is your opinion about this?

[Laurence Grondin-Robillard]

I'm going to side with my colleague. I have no exact answer to give you about this.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Mr. Waterhouse, you have a lot of experience inside the government apparatus. What are your comments about the observations by your colleagues who are testifying at the committee?

[Steve Waterhouse]

The agencies that handle how elections are managed are independent. They have access to a lot of information, which they are able to obtain from the technical authority in place, or from intelligence agencies. However, they disseminate very little information, overall. So it is very difficult to counter-check the information and assess whether it is truthful or not, or determine whether there has been improvement or not.

However, from what we can observe among our allies in the world and when it comes to all the elections we can see on the planet, there is undue influence coming from domestic actors everywhere. They are not going to shy away from continuing to do what they do, to promote their interests.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

I have only 40 seconds left, so I would ask you to answer my next question briefly.

Are the institutions that Canada has created and the tools available to us adequate? If not, what other weapons should we acquire?

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

For the moment, I would say the tools are not adequate. However, we have taken a step in the right direction, with the Elections Modernization Act.

However, as I often say, there are gaps when it comes to inter-agency cooperation. At present, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force involves four organizations working in partnership. Its equivalent in Australia involves more than ten government departments and organizations. In Canada, at present, there are no financial experts in the task force or in the election integrity cooperation circle and this is certainly a weakness.