Procedure and House Affairs Committee on April 25th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I call the meeting to order

Hello, everyone.

Welcome to meeting number 66 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

The committee is meeting this evening to continue its study on foreign election interference.

The Clerk and I will maintain a consolidated list of members wishing to speak.

Just as a reminder, on Thursday we will begin at 10 a.m. with the steering committee meeting, followed by Minister Mendicino on foreign election interference. Then, for the third hour for some of us and the second for others, we will proceed with the first panel of our colleagues concerning the federal electoral boundaries commission report for Ontario.

On Thursday, April 27, Tuesday, May 2, and Thursday, May 4, we will be meeting in room 225 West Block, just upstairs, so that our colleagues on another committee can have access to this room.

This evening, we have with us Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau, doctoral researcher; Steve Waterhouse, retired captain, former information system security officer, Department of National Defence, and cybersecurity specialist; and Laurence Grondin-Robillard, Ph.D. candidate, Groupe de recherche sur l'information et la surveillance au quotidien.

You will now have up to four minutes for an opening statement, after which we will proceed to comments.

Welcome, Mr. Bordeleau.

The floor is yours.

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau, Doctoral Researcher, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I would like to begin by thanking the members of this committee for inviting me to testify today. I hope that I can be helpful and provide insightful responses to your questions.

As was said, my name is Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau. I am a Ph.D. student with the Konrad Adenauer research chair in empirical democracy studies at the University of Ottawa. I previously completed a master's degree in political science at the Université de Montréal and a bachelor's degree in political science and psychology at the Royal Military College of Canada.

I have conducted research with the centre for international and defence policy at Queen's University, the electoral integrity project at the Royal Military College of Canada, the Canada research chair in electoral democracy at the Université de Montréal, and more recently with the centre for the study of democratic citizenship at McGill University.

I would like to highlight that I am a political scientist who studies human behaviour. My expertise is centred around the behaviour and attitudes of citizens in the face of threats to democracy and democratic institutions. Specifically, my research considers the impact of information, whether it's misinformation, disinformation or factual information, on citizens' perceptions of electoral integrity, their attitudes towards democracy, as well as their likelihood to participate in the democratic process.

In my time conducting research at the centre for international and defence policy at Queen's University, I had the opportunity to conduct in-depth research on the Government of Canada's response to foreign interference—specifically with regard to federal elections. My research involved a comparative assessment of the election security policies of the Five Eyes countries, including Canada. Therefore, I can confidently say that I have a thorough understanding of the policies and efforts that already exist to mitigate interference, such as the Elections Modernization Act, the security and intelligence threats to elections task force, as well as the critical election incident public protocol.

Based on the scope of my expertise, I can respond to any questions you may have regarding the impact of information and specific election security policies on Canadians. I am able to discuss the effects of foreign electoral interference on voters, as well as the role of misinformation regarding election interference on Canadians' confidence in democratic institutions and elections.

More precisely, I am able to engage in important discussions on a range of topics, including the potential effects of election interference on voter behaviour, the threshold for making information regarding foreign interference efforts public and the lessons we can draw from the election security policies of our Five Eyes partners.

With that being said, I am not in a position to comment on the nature of specific incidents of foreign interference that have been reported in recent media reports. I can, however, draw inference from broader research on foreign electoral interference and apply these findings to the Canadian case.

I would also like to mention that I am going to answer questions from committee members in French or English, in the language in which they are asked. As well, I have provided a copy of my opening statement to the clerk.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Mr. Bordeleau.

Ms. Grondin-Robillard, the floor is now yours.

[Laurence Grondin-Robillard, PhD Candidate, Groupe de recherche sur la surveillance et l’information au quotidien (GRISQ)]

Thank you for having me here, Madam Chair, on behalf of the Groupe de recherche sur l'information et la surveillance au quotidien, the GRISQ, at the Université du Québec à Montréal.

I am a lecturer in digital media and a PhD candidate in communications at UQAM. My doctoral research focuses on the circulation of information via TikTok. My master's thesis dealt with Instagram and Russian interference in the 2016 American presidential election.

My presentation here will focus on the process of foreign interference using sociodigital media...

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Just a moment, please.

Mr. Calkins, the floor is yours.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

The interpretation staff have indicated to us that they're unable to keep up with the pace. For those of us who don't speak French, we would need that translation.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We are going to start over. If you need a bit more time, I'll give you some. You have to speak slower, since it is transmitted in both official languages.

[Laurence Grondin-Robillard]

It's a bad habit of mine, sorry.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We will start over with you, Ms. Grondin-Robillard.

[Laurence Grondin-Robillard]

Thank you for having me here, Madam Chair, on behalf of the Groupe de recherche sur l'information et la surveillance au quotidien, the GRISQ, at the Université du Québec à Montréal.

I am a lecturer in digital media and a PhD candidate in communications at UQAM. My doctoral research focuses on the circulation of information via TikTok. My master's thesis dealt with Instagram and Russian interference in the 2016 American presidential election.

My presentation today will focus on the process of foreign interference using sociodigital media to communicate with Canadians, which interferes with the informed decision-making that is central to people's civic duty in connection with elections. It is difficult to identify the results of this kind of operation, using these media, since there are numerous actors responsible for it.

There are three factors to consider.

The first is how sociodigital media and their economic model, which allow for the free production, distribution and circulation of content and information, actually work. The important thing for sociodigital media is not that the content be truthful, but that it circulates as widely as possible. This modus operandi is integrated into a commercial circuit of megadata in which the user, the subject, leaves a trail, such as a "like", a comment or a click, which is collected and processed. This allows the user to be profiled. They can then be sent a personalized content offer, which will itself produce a new trail, and so on. The result is a surveillance mechanism that is used, among other things, for commercial purposes such as targeted online advertising.

In addition, there is our second factor to be taken into account: the algorithmic recommendation of personalized content. Recommendation algorithms are a trap, according to the scientific literature. They are now completely shaping and dictating our sociodigital media interfaces. Users are presented with a personalized content offer that catches their attention. For example, if it was determined by the algorithmic calculation that you were going to like a certain type of content, you are going to be exposed to it, regardless of its quality or truthfulness.

Our third and final factor to be taken into consideration is the user themself. Not only are they faced with a veritable overabundance of information, which some call an "infodemic", but with all content being equal, it becomes difficult for them to distinguish what is true from what is false. This difficulty is actually exacerbated by public figures with a voice and a platform who question certain institutional pillars of democracy, such as journalism. As well, users may like consuming content that confirms their opinion, even if they are caught in what is called an echo chamber. In fact, without intending to cause harm and relay disinformation, they may inadvertently or unknowingly share fake news. In that case, it is called misinformation. In spite of themselves, they are then participating in interference.

In conclusion, the GRISQ believes there is no doubt that the integrity of the electoral process has been and will again be threatened by the existing sociodigital media mechanisms. However, it is essential that we point out that it is not just individual or state entities that are responsible for this. It involves a vast network of contacts between these actors and sociotechnical elements that create an obstacle to people's civic duty to be well informed. It is therefore crucial to examine the situation in global, social and communications terms.

Present and future elected representatives need to continue expanding their knowledge of sociodigital media, to be better able to provide oversight and legislate on these issues so they do not produce disinformation that undermines confidence in our political and media institutions.

As a final point, this discussion could and should open the door to improved understanding of information problems on the part of the public. This is an especially glaring need when the boss at Twitter alters the process of circulating information at the expense of the quality and credibility of users and of the content they produce.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Ms. Grondin-Robillard. I have given you the seconds that Mr. Bordeleau didn't use.

Welcome, Mr. Waterhouse. You have the floor.

[Steve Waterhouse, Captain (ret'd), Former Information Systems Security Officer, Department of National Defence and Cybersecurity Specialist, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

My name is Steve Waterhouse and I am a lecturer in the master's level microprogram in information security, prevention component, at the Université de Sherbrooke. I am a former information security officer at the Department of National Defence. I am also a former assistant deputy minister of information security and cyber security at Quebec's ministère de la Cybersécurité et du Numérique, and an expert witness in cyber security.

Thank you for the invitation to share insights on some of the problematics that are viewed, anticipated and perceived by fellow citizens on unwanted interference by foreign actors towards our democratic process.

The committee has had an opportunity in recent weeks to hear various witnesses to explain why the subject of this study is important in relation to our evolving society.

You will have understood that in these modern times, the use of digital tools and media is unavoidable, not to say indispensable, for conducting these influence operations.

In the 20th century, radio, newspapers, television, cinema, and even religious authorities, who once had a major presence in our societies, allowed for a form of validation of the message before it was disseminated, and this ensured that there was oversight.

As a result of the evolution of technologies and means of communication such has never before been seen in history, we have ways to get everywhere on the planet in a few milliseconds, with no filter and no oversight.

We are also facing fundamental, counterintuitive changes: that our society can be influenced using novel, subtle methods and strategies, and concepts like lawfare, media or public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and cognitive warfare, which itself is reflected in...

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Mr. Waterhouse, I just want to take a few seconds to ask you to speak a little slower.

[Steve Waterhouse]

Okay.

Do I need to start over?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

No, not this time.

You can continue.

Thank you.

[Steve Waterhouse]

Okay.

So I was defining cognitive warfare. It is the way to use knowledge in order to create conflict. In its broadest sense, cognitive warfare is not limited to the military or institutional worlds. With the use of this tactic of warfare, the various threat actors in cyberspace have evolved significantly since the advent of mass influence applications of all sorts, including Facebook, TikTok, WeChat and many others.

As a specialist with Defence Research and Development Canada, or DRDC, in the office of the Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence, said in November 2021, "Technologies and the profusion of data combined make human behaviour the main vulnerability. In its extreme form, cognitive warfare can exacerbate domestic divisions, making a society vulnerable to friction, polarization and radicalization."

What does that all mean?

Over the last 20 years, a technological evolution progressively inserted itself in our society, with the promise of making our lives easier with automation using smart devices. The notion of having a form of connectivity in every utility of our lives, like coffee makers, household appliances, TV, etc., seems to be very practical and convenient. Without embedding good cybersecurity in the designs of these devices, there is the potential for those to become vectors of influence by applying some sort of control, like software features that are enabled or disabled at will, complemented by applications on smart phones that are communicating towards the rest of the world.

As one other cognitive warfare expert, François du Cluzel, stated:

Any user of modern information technologies is a potential target. It targets the whole of a nation's human capital.

...This battlefield is global via the internet. With no beginning and no end, this conquest knows no respite, punctuated by notifications from our smartphones, anywhere, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

What can be done?

Strong leadership is required in order to address these problems. Education and awareness raising regarding subtle new approaches used by outside agents are essential if we are to prevent the erosion of our democracy. Governments at all levels must be aware of this so they can strengthen their governance and be in a position to reassure the public. Better cyber hygiene in the use of technology has to be stressed at all levels of our society so that it becomes second nature, in order to benefit from the technology.

I am now available to answer any questions you might have in both official languages. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Mr. Waterhouse.

We are now going to start questions with six-minute turns.

We will start with Mr. Cooper, who will be followed by Ms. Sahota, Ms. Normandin and Ms. Blaney.

The floor is yours, Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I'm going to direct my questions to Mr. Bordeleau.

In a July 2021 paper that you wrote for the centre for international and defence policy, entitled “Securing Elections: A Comparative Assessment of Canada's Response to Foreign Interference”, you rightly note that “the Canadian government has the full liberty to decide whether or not to disclose an interference”.

That is precisely what our other allies have done, including as you note, with the foreign influence transparency scheme public register, established by Australia, which I will ask you about shortly. We also saw this with the United Kingdom. For example, last summer the U.K. government, along with the MI5, when they became aware of a Beijing agent working within the U.K. Parliament, wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House of Commons. That individual agent, Christine Lee, was named, as well as the members of Parliament who were influenced by her.

CSIS has advised this government that, when it comes to foreign interference, the policy of government be grounded in sunlight and transparency, yet we have seen absolutely no sunlight and no transparency. Indeed, all of the troubling revelations about a vast campaign of interference by Beijing in the 2019 and 2021 elections have only come to light as a result of whistle-blowers and reputable journalists.

Do you find it troubling that the government kept Canadians in the dark over what clearly were some very concerning issues relating to interference by Beijing? Contrast that to how some of our allies have approached this.

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

Thank you for the question.

I would say that it shows a weakness in the current policies regarding the critical election incident public protocol. They need to perhaps improve and clarify the threshold under which information regarding active attempts of foreign interference in Canadian elections needs to be made public.

I think something that is important to highlight from our Five Eyes partners, notably Australia, is that they exercise something called controlled transparency, which is transparency when it comes to information that is unambiguous, that is verifiable and that has been verified by intelligence agencies—and in the case of Australia, by the electoral integrity assurance task force.

The information that is made public in those countries does not concern active investigations or any potential threats to elections. They concern active threats that have been verified and that are being made public because they're unambiguous.

I think that's something that perhaps needs to be incorporated within the Canadian election security policy and within this threshold of information that currently is somewhat unknown and up to a select few individuals to decide upon. I think there is certainly work that can be done in this policy area.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

In the case of Australia, that is made public through the public register of the foreign influence transparency scheme. Is that correct?

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

Yes, it is a website that you can actively consult. Even as a Canadian you can go on the website and see events of foreign interference listed on there.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Building upon what you said with respect to the critical election incident public protocol, in the same paper that I referenced from July 2021, you said that there is just “too much discretion to the government when it comes to” reporting interference.

When I and other members posed questions to members of the elections task force about what the threshold is, they had a real challenge explaining what that is.

Do you think the threshold is too vague? Is it too high? How could it be fixed?

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

I think there certainly needs to be a clarification as to what the threshold is, and it also needs to be made a bit stricter, in my opinion. It needs to be clear that once information reaches certain elements, which we can certainly discuss.... I think the unambiguity aspect is certainly an important factor that would be on that threshold. It needs to have been a foreign interference event.

Once this threshold is met, I think it should be automatic that any information be made available on a sort of registry like Australia has, on a website, or through a press release of some sort.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Pursuant to the cabinet directive, the threshold that is described is that there are incidents, or an incident, that threaten Canada's ability to have a free and fair election. That seems like a very high threshold.

Would you think it would be appropriate, for example, that the public be told when there's interference happening in one riding, perhaps? That might not threaten Canada's ability to have a free and fair election, but it certainly is a major concern, especially if you happen to live in that riding.

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

Certainly, but I think there also needs to be parameters. The vague mandate comes with its downsides. In the event that information is shared, there needs to be controls and it needs to be controlled with transparency. I think that's important.

Unverified information in the hands of the general public can be extremely damaging. I think this is why Australia adopted a very neat model in saying the information needs to be verified by a series of agencies, and once everyone signs off and it meets the threshold, they can publish it online.